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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the development of interactive 
communication skills in young school children, that is, skills which 
depend upon the linguistic interplay between dialogue participants. 
Semantic negotiation is investigated in the restricted context of a 
task-oriented game to examine how communicators co-ordinate their use 
and interpretation of language.
The conversations considered were generated from pairs of same-aged 
8-, 10-, and 12-year-old children playing a specially designee
computer maze-game which elicits spontaneous dialogue, yet within a 
very restricted domain. The dialogues typically contain a number of 
location descriptions within a pre-defined spatial network, and such 
description sequences enable an exploration of the emergence of co­
ordinated description schemes. As well as this, various aspects of 
problem solving abilty were investigated since the task involved a 
joint co-ordination problem.
Results indicated that all age groups were able to engage in semantic 
negotiation and develop co-ordinated description schemes to describe 
locations on the maze, however there were certain developmental 
differences in their choice of schemes and their ability to increase 
co-ordination over the games. Furthermore, it appeared that the 
younger children were co-ordinating on the expressions to use, without 
fully understanding each other.
Yet these results indicate that interactional processes are essential 
to the establishment of meaning, and that young children are able to 
infer meaning from the interaction in specific contexts of use. These 
findings tend to suggest that social-pragmatic factors play a critical 
role in the development of meaning, and indicate that the general 
process of co-ordination (in respect to language), may be a basic 
component of all human interactional dialogue.
THESIS,OVERYIEW
"Each of us is a prisoner in a solitary tower, 
and he communicates with the other prisoners who 
form mankind, by conventional signs that have 
not quite the same meaning."
Somerset Maugham (1951)
The experimental studies reported in this thesis explore the processes 
of semantic co-ordination in natural dialogue and how these processes 
develop in school age children. The aim is to investigate the 
meaning of expressions in natural dialogue empirically, which involves 
concentrating on one particular area. The area chosen examines the 
meaning of location descriptions which are generated within the 
context of a specially designed computer maze-game task. The approach 
is to look at different pairs of children engaged in a task-oriented 
dialogue and examine how their interpretation and use of language 
converges to fit the particular functional and interactional context 
of the exchange.
The thesis is based on the standing assumption that successful 
communication relies on the co-ordinated use of a shared meaning 
system, which rests on the dynamic relationship between the users 
of the language and language itself. Several aspects of 
communication are explored, in particular, how speakers and listeners 
negotiate and co-ordinate on the meaning of natural language 
expressions.
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The focus of attention, in this thesis is therefore on hew young school 
children converge and enter into a shared local system of meaning, 
within particular dialogues. This semantic and conceptual
development is examined with a view to chronicling the development of 
a major pragmatic and interactional skill.
A computer controlled maze-game was used for this investigation, where 
pairs of subjects spontaneously described positions on a maze. This 
restricted reference domain allows empirical control over the topic 
being discussed yet subjects were free to discuss maze locations when 
and hew they pleased. Subjects played the game in pairs, seated in 
separate booths and communicated through headphones. Each player's 
task was to manoeuvre an X through the maze to an *, with the game 
only terminating when both players were in their respective goals. 
However, a number of barriers were placed in the paths of subjects, 
which could only be removed by requesting the co-operation of their 
partner, and finding out each others maze location.
Thus the dialogue elicited contained several location descriptions 
since success depends, to a certain extent, on establishing a co­
ordinated spatial description scheme between two players.
The advantages of such a technique are that detailed comparisons of a 
large sample can be made, and comparisons across a wide range of age 
groups. The dialogues typically contain a number of location 
descriptions within a pre-defined spatial network, and it is the 
analysis of such sequences which enables one to explore the emergence 
of co-ordinated description schemes. Furthermore, task involvement
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generally produces natural and spontaneous speech since subjects 
typically become involved in solving the task and less aware of the 
language they produce.
Part I of the thesis (Chapters 1 to 3) covers the general background 
area while reviewing some of the relevant literature in this field. 
Part II (Chapters 4 to 8) reports the empirical work from the computer 
maze-game and the results.
Chapter 1 focuses on how communicators co-ordinate on the meaning of 
natural language expressions, and the role shared and mutual 
knowledge play in this process. It is argued that speakers and 
listeners use the interaction to infer the meaning of expressions in a 
dynamic way. This interactionist approach emphasises the speaker and 
listener, their common knowledge, and the social context of the 
exchange, in order to deduce meaning and communicate successfully.
The relevant literature was reviewed and semantic negotiation 
discussed both at a general and local level. For example, in relation 
to populations of speakers and then in terms of definite reference 
between particular communicators.
Chapter 2 focuses on the development of communication skills as they 
relate to language, and outlines various theoretical issues in this 
field. In particular, how the child develops and acquires the skills 
to enable them to communicate successfully, and how they learn to use 
terms in a shared and mutually effective way. This covers a very 
broad and complex area, so only the key issues that are relevant to 
the work in this thesis are focused upon.
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An outline of the computer maze-game used in the thesis is provided in 
Chapter 3, followed by a review of some experiments which have used 
similar methods.
For example, co-operative games, explicit description from spatial 
arrays, and other types of experiment that constrain the topic of 
discourse in a similar way. The chapter concludes with a review of 
work carried out by Garrod and Anderson (1983, 1987) who used the same 
computer maze-game on adults. This proved useful as a comparison for 
the children's data.
Part II of the thesis covers the empirical studies and the results 
found. Chapter 4 describes the computer maze-game in depth with the 
procedure and experimental design. The following sections discuss 
children's general performance at solving the task in terms of 
efficiency and problem solving ability, and their language 
performance.
Chapter 5 deals with a more specific statistical analysis of the 
speech in relation to the semantic contents of location descriptions. 
It investigates the way that subjects refer to positions on the maze 
and the meaning behind their descriptions.
The co-ordination of descriptive patterns is investigated in Chapter 
6, both between and within different subject pairs. This investigates 
dialogue co-ordination, any improvements in co-ordination across 
games, and subjects dynamics of choice of descriptive scheme across 
game.
xiii
Chapter 7 describes an independent study which was carried out to 
investigate dialogue descriptions which were produced in a less 
interactive environment than the computer maze-game. This may then be 
compared with results from the computer maze-game study.
The conclusions from the thesis are considered in Chapter 8 in 
relation to the theoretical issues and research discussed in Part I of 
the thesis. The results from the studies are incorporated into a 
wider context along with the issues and ideas produced from them.
In summary, the thesis explores how meanings may be established within 
particular dialogues, and considers social-pragmatic aspects as 
essential to this process - in particular, the interaction between the 
communicators. For example, where communicators use the interaction 
to infer the meaning of expressions rather than depending on any other 
isolated aspects of the individual. The development of these 
abilities are explored in young children, since such understanding 
seems critical for greater appreciation of the development of 
meaning.
xv
PART.I
BACKGRgyKD_AND_REVl£V/
1
COPTER 1
IBE_ ROLE QF SOCIAL-PRAGMATIC FACTORS IN COMMUNICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the development of communication skills as they 
relate to language and investigates how speakers and listeners co­
ordinate on the shared meaning of natural language expressions. It 
takes the view that communication is inherently a social process using 
language as the instrument to relate to others, and emphasises social- 
pragmatic aspects of dialogue. This interactionist approach takes 
into account language use, the users of that language, the knowledge 
they share with each other, and the context of the exchange. The 
thesis develops a certain approach to communication in language which 
will be explored in this chapter. For example the approach emphasizes 
dynamic aspects of natural language and how communicators use the 
interaction to infer the meaning of expressions. It relates meaning 
to the users of the language and discusses the role of shared 
knowledge for communication. However, this is not the only view one 
may take, and these social-pragmatic factors have often been under­
rated in the study of language.
The origins of pragmatics being a factor in language comes from Peirce 
(1957). He discussed three main levels of semiotic in language which 
are distinct but not necessarily independent. These are: syntactics, 
which involves the signs of that language and the relations between 
the signs; semantics, which investigates the relations between the 
signs and what they designate, that is their meaning; and pragmatics,
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which involves the relations between the signs, and what they specify 
in relation to the users of those signs. In its most general sense 
the meaning of natural language expressions depends on all three 
levels, however, social-pragmatic factors will be focused on 
throughout this thesis.
Language in relation to communication, basically involves two parties, 
and occurs over time. This extended interaction raises questions on 
the dynamics of natural language. Studying communication involves 
adopting one of two contrasting assumptions. One assumes that words 
have enduring and conventional meanings that can be represented in 
static structures, while the other highlights the flexibility of 
natural language where the speaker can manipulate words to convey 
different meanings in various situations (see Anderson (1983) for a 
full review on theories of meaning). Nelson (1985) stated that: 
"These two approaches to meaning exemplify semantic models as a 
structural system on the one hand and as the functional realization of 
communicative intentions on the other."
While this thesis focuses on the latter, previous literature often 
adopted the former view and analysed the speaker, listener, and 
sentence, as isolated entities without reference to the wider social 
situation. Traditional work often concentrated on the rules, sound, 
and symbols of a language, and their interpretation.
Noam Chomsky (1957), responsible for the syntactic revolution, made 
researchers aware of the complexities of natural language. However,
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his syntactical structures approach emphasised the isolated sentence 
as the main unit of focus, devoid of the speaker, listener, and social 
context of the exchange.
Although relevant to contemporary research, this approach is now 
criticised for concentrating solely on the literal meaning and 
propositional content of the exchange. The interpretation of a 
sentence is not only dependent on these phonological, syntactical, and 
semantic rules, but also depends upon pragmatic factors. In the 19th 
century, Frege had considered such an approach, and defined the term 
proposition. He discussed hew the meaning of expressions may be 
deduced independently of the communicators. This opposes the notion 
that meaning may evolve from the interaction between the 
communicators.
Alternatively, Rommetveit (1968, 83) has argued that what we convey in 
an utterance does not depend on the propositional content of the 
expression, but rather, who the listener is. Similarly our
interpretation may depend on who the speaker is, and the target of the 
communication. For example, a statement such as:
"I felt the painting crying out to me"
would be interpreted differently, depending on whether it was uttered 
by a schizophrenic or an artist. Thus it appears that the meaning of 
expressions depends on the perceived relationship between speaker and 
listener. Successful communication relies on the co-ordinated use of 
a shared meaning system, something which only arises out of the 
dynamic relationship between the users of the language and the 
language itself.
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Rommetveit (1983) stressed the dynamic nature of the meaning of 
expressions, and proposed that conversants may not be totally 
dependent on the set of predetermined assumptions, as defined by the 
conventional, dictionary definition of a word. Indeed Rommetveit 
(1983) argued:
"What is meant by what is said is neither fixed nor perfectly 
determinable in the way it is in Chomsky's idealized and perfectly 
homogeneous speech community."
He proposed that expressions have 'semantic potentialities' which are 
alternative meanings of the phrase in different contexts. These were 
far more important than their literal meaning. He compared
conversations to contracts, where the interlocutors control the 
boundaries and limits of expressions and their extensional semantics - 
which is the set of meanings the terms may refer to in certain 
contexts.
Thus conversants are viewed as adopting a type of 'tacit contract* 
during an interaction which defines the meaning of expressions at a 
local level. Thus while global meanings are obviously central for 
communication, Rommetveit, and others such as Garrod and Anderson 
(1987), point out that local conventions of meaning may be central to 
our everyday use of language. As Garrod and Anderson conclude:
"...general conventions of meaning may serve only as starting points 
for interpretation, perhaps giving a default which may be overwritten 
by more local and transient conventions set up during the course of a 
dialogue."
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According to such a view the meaning of expressions is often 
constructed dynamically in the course of a conversation. 
Communicators appear to negotiate and control meaning at a more local 
and informal level. In this way existing words can be used more 
effectively by adapting their meaning to suit the particular function 
of the exchange.
From a somewhat different standpoint arising from a computational 
model for representing meaning, Woods (1931) argued that ambiguity in 
natural language is actually a solution rather than a problem. He 
di st i ngui sh ed between an internal and external language, where our 
internal language refers to our thoughts and intelligence, and our 
external language the means to communicate with others. Our internal 
language is clearly far more discriminating than our communicative 
ability, since we can make many more distinctions than are actually 
lexicalised. He points out that were there a one-to-one relationship 
between conceptual distinctions and vocabulary it would inevitably 
result in a huge unmanageable lexicon.
To summarise the position we can say that most sentences in our 
language are highly ambiguous, and so the listener must infer the 
intended meaning from the set of possible alternatives. There are two 
ways of doing so which are by no means independent of each other. One 
involves making various inferences in an attempt to deduce the most 
likely meaning in that situation. The second concerns the view of 
Rommetveit and others, who argue that communicators take advantage of 
the interaction in order to constrain the meaning, as well as taking 
into account the relationship between the speaker and listener.
2^ _THE_ROLE_QFT.SDCIAL“PRA6MATIC^ gAC5,QR^JN_ SQMMyNlgAJJOM 
It appears that communicators use the interaction to their advantage 
to infer the meaning of expressions, where comprehension is dependent 
on the interaction itself. The notion that meaning is negotiable has 
been around for some time. The first possible indication of this 
began as far back as 3^0 BC with the debate between Aristotle and 
Plato, who were concerned with the issue of what things mean. For 
example, was meaning determined by the world we live in as a property 
of that world, or a property of the discourse we use. Aristotle 
argued that the way we perceive things is an inseparable part of our 
conceptual framework. Whereas his instructor Plato believed that 
philosophy concerned * going beyond' or 'getting out' of everyday 
experiences, Aristotle argued that we cannot coherently go beyond our 
experience, and thus:
"we cannot provide, for any principle, a foundation that stands 
altogether outside of our discourse and our conceptual scheme."
According to this doctrine, that which is completely external cannot 
enter into our discourse and thought, and we may only use certain 
terms in speech when they have entered into the experience of someone 
in the linguistic community. However, where Aristotle argued that 
meaning is in the mind of the individual rather than in the actual 
world, the view taken in this thesis is that meaning evolves from the 
interaction between speakers and listeners.
More recently Cherry (1971) argued that language develops socially
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through a process of verbal interactions in a variety of different 
situations, where views, beliefs, and knowledge, gradually transmit to 
the learner. This view assumes that we cannot have any concepts of 
our own apart from those expressible within the language, symbols and 
signs, taught by our society. Cherry suggests that communication 
depends upon a mutual acceptance of the signs of the language and a 
common usage of these, and that language only succeeds because of this 
common bond in the population. He considered language in general and 
stressed the social nature of communication.
This implies that languages encompass culture. For example, since 
Eskimos require the differentiation of more types of snow than the 
British do, then they accordingly have more words for snow than 
English. In this vein Miller (1981) emphasised the close link between 
language and communication, comparing the difficulties of composing a 
Zulu/English dictionary with a French/English one, as a result of 
similarities and differences between the cultures involved.
The linguistic relativity thesis also maintains that these properties 
will influence the way people from different cultures think. For 
instance Whorf (1956) argued that the language we use determines the 
way we perceive and organize things.
Cross-cultural and inter-cultural studies illustrate how languages are 
directly associated with their users, where meaning may be in part a 
function of the society. Yet it is unclear whether the functions of 
the society fully determine a language. Many aspects of language and 
communication are not yet sufficiently well understood to determine if 
language evolved directly from the need to communicate (Bierwisch, 
1981). 8
ix_C0NIMlI0NS_2f_MEANI^fi
This section relates meaning to the users of the language and
discusses some of the mechanisms involved. It relates populations of 
speakers to meaning and investigates how a society can support shared 
meaning.
Within, as well as between different societies, it is evident that 
various groups tacitly evolve meanings and language codes, which are 
mutually and exclusively shared by the members. These specific
terms evolve as a by product of the interaction itself, and may in 
turn develop into more stable conventions such as jargon terms,
colloquialisms or neologisms, relative to the group’s function. For 
example, various groups within the language community often require a 
greater differentiation of their field to develop their own expertise, 
such as surgeons, mechanics, and most large organizations requiring 
various departmental codes. When experts communicate with fellow 
experts they attempt to affect them as they specifically intended, 
using terms which outsiders may find obscure or unintelligible, but 
which are necessary to achieve their goal.
Local conventions are also popular in the political sphere, where 
terms may be interpreted one way by the public, yet indicate something
quite different to those who use them.
In particular, Chomsky (1985) discovered some specific examples of 
this while researching USA foreign policy in Central America. For 
example, the U.S.A. regularly "justifies" their intervention in the 
area as "defending" the USA against Central American agression:
9
"where 'aggression* (by any third world country) has its usual 
Orwellian meaning: defense against US attacks"
Chomsky mentions countless examples of double standards and 'newspeak* 
(*) of the USA government, enough to impress Orwell. (*) Orwell's 
(19^8) version of a language imposed by a government in his book 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.
This process may occur as a neccessity, as when specialists become 
very esoteric to differentiate a certain field, or on the other hand 
to exclude others, where certain elitist groups often develop shared 
meaning systems. Another specific example is "nukespeak" jargon where 
terms are deliberately misleading to confuse the public over the 
realities of nuclear war. Paul Chilton (1982) describes 'nukespeak' 
as:
"a specialised vocabulary for talking about nuclear weapons ... which 
is not neutral and purely descriptive but ideologically loaded in 
favour of the nuclear culture; ...and affects how people think about 
the subject".
He points out that it did not transpire overnight as some type of 
"Orwellian grammarian rewriting the English language in the Ministry 
of Truth" but evolved over time to accommodate those concerned with the 
development of these weapons. For example, we have a new variety of 
word-groups such as 'Limited Nuclear War' translated by Aubrey (1982) 
as 'Much of Europe annihilated', or 'Partial test ban Treaty' 
translating as 'tests conducted under rather than above ground* and so 
on.
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Essentially a language is composed of many groupings of private codes, 
where interlocutors use words relative to the function of that group, 
peculiar to the members. A system of mutual knowledege develops 
between communicants where the terms used conceptually represent what 
best conveys their intended meaning. On a small scale we can see this 
operating between twins. Zazzo (1960, 1984) describes twins
developing "Criptophasia" and "Secret Language" as their way of 
communicating, which is mutually shared by them alone. Thus within 
and between different language groups, specific interest areas produce 
terms to express their function. They are all attempting to
communicate some idea as precisely as possible.
Each population appears to form their own conventions relative to 
their specific environment and needs. Thus in certain populations 
only time, coupled with interaction between the members, will allow 
comprehension and a mutual understanding of the expressions used. 
For these reasons, Cherry (1971) sceptically questioned the efficiency 
of space communication, which involves one way communication links 
with others who have no knowledge of our language system. Without 
mutual interaction and feedback occurring he argued mutual 
understanding may never be achieved, and pointed out:
"What can be assumed to exist in common between Earth and the planet 
that can serve as signs and rules, for a start, to build up a common 
language?"
These observations raise issues of how the child can enter into a
11
system of shared conventional meanings within society since they must 
develop the ability to use terms in a shared and mutually satisfactory 
way. The terms learnt by the child will presumably indicate the most 
relevant functions of the society, and may be acquired by conventional 
learning. These issues will be discussed fully in Chapter 2.
The next section will discuss what is involved in a mutually shared 
system of meaning and the role of shared and mutual knowledge for 
communication.
We have considered language as a socially derived phenomenon with 
humans establishing a variety of languages, dialects, codes, and 
meanings, to accomodate their environment and needs. This implies 
that using a language requires more than just learning certain 
responses. For a language to succeed we require knowledge of that
language, knowledge of the world involved, and knowledge of how to 
use the language in a shared and mutually satisfactory way. The 
meaning of expressions depend upon social-pragmatic factors, such as 
the relationship between the listener and speaker, their joint 
knowledge, and the wider social context of the exchange. This joint 
knowledge appears central to all aspects of communication, for 
meaning, conventions, reference, and so forth.
It is argued that there are two types of joint knowledge used in 
communication - shared and mutual, which are independent of each 
other. Shared knowledge refers to the portion of information that we 
have in common with others, and which is actually shared within
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members of the community. For example, certain world wide and
contemporary facts, historical and geographical information, and 
knowledge that is taught through a basic school education, is shared 
in the community. To meet another British person may lead us to 
assume that they similarly know our political system and Prime 
Minister, the currency we use, our television system, and so on. 
However, this is different from actually knowing certain facts are 
mutually known within the community. For example, you may assume 
person X knows who the British prime minister is, and that you may 
share this knowledge, however you do not know for sure. This 
knowledge becomes mutual after interacting with person X reveals that 
they are aware of the British Prime Minister and aware that you know 
that they know this information. So now you both know that you both 
know who the British PM is.
Shared knowledge then, refers to an abstract concept of what is 
actually shared with others, which is independent from knowledge that 
is clearly known to be shared. While mutual knowledge is information 
that we are aware of sharing, and includes mutual belief, and common 
knowledge, between conversants. In this way, it would be possible for 
two people to have total shared knowledge where they know exactly the 
same information, although they have no mutual base. On the other
hand, to mutually know some information X, then:
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A would know X
B would know X
A would know that B knows X
B would know that A knows X
A would know that B knows that A knows X
B would know that A knows that B knows X
and so on ad infinitum (Defined by Schiffer, 1960).
Mutual knowledge in this form is basically a formal specification, 
which has generally been left to philosophers to define, since it is 
debatable whether we require such knowledge prior to an interaction, 
and how this knowledge develops and is assessed. This problem will 
be addressed later.
Lewis (1969) referred to the concept as common knowledge, while 
Schiffer (1972) preferred the term mutual knowledge, and both 
independently identified conditions which determined what situations 
may elicit this knowledge.
Yet the extent to which mutual understanding ocours is all a matter of 
degree, and must depend on the communicants shared knowledge and 
ability to take the role of the other.
Kreckal (1981) suggests that no two people will have exactly the same 
concepts, although communication aids the development of independent 
shared knowledge into a mutual perspective. And once one part of 
mutual knowledge is discovered between communicants, much more may be 
derivable through inference. In this way, conversants play an active
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role in converting individual knowledge into shared knowledge for 
communication to succeed. Thus knowledge acquired separately may be 
at best a type of shared knowledge, however, knowledge acquired 
through mutual interaction may lead to communicators developing 
similar concepts.
5. CONCLUSION
This section emphasised the importance of social-pragmatic factors in 
communication, and proposed that the meaning of natural language 
expressions is inherently dynamic. It was argued that conversants 
co-ordinate on the meaning of expressions depending on social- 
pragmatic factors, such as the social context of the exchange, the 
interactors, and the knowledge that they mutually share.
However, one general problem involves how people co-ordinate their 
knowledge to ensure they have a mutual base to discuss some issue. 
The suggestions offered to infer such mutual knowledge are 
theoretical, abstract specifications, and hypothesize how mutual 
knowledge may develop prior to, or during an interaction. Of 
particular interest in this thesis, is how co-ordination of language 
occurs during an interaction, where communicators arrive at the same 
interpretation of expressions within a particular context. The next 
section will investigate this issue further.
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B. GENERAL CO- QRDINATJQN^  Jfl.N ATIJR AL„DJAj.QQUE
Successful communication re q u ire s  the  co -o rd in a t io n  of various 
knowledge and decision-making procedures between speakers and 
l i s t e n e r s .  This sec t io n  considers  how t h i s  process occurs in  a more 
general sense between popula tions , while s ec t io n  C. in v e s t ig a te s  
p a r t i c u l a r  cases  o f  semantic co -o rd in a tio n  between two speakers, such 
as  in  d e f in i t e  re fe ren ce .
Co-ordination of meaning involves the relationship between what the 
speaker means by a certain expression and how the listener interpretes 
it. Indeed co-ordination is fundamental to all aspects of 
communication, and as Clark (1985) stressed:
"is needed whenever two or more people do things that impinge on the 
actions of one another and is inherent to almost all social 
activities."
Grice (1957) argued that four principles guide conversational 
interaction which depend on tacit conventions. These can be thought 
regulative rules of conversation. They concern: the quantity of 
information given, which should be adequately informative; the 
truthfulness or quality of the information; the relevance and validity 
in the current context; and its presentation in an orderly and audible 
manner. Although communication does depend on these to a certain 
extent, they are somewhat idealized since it is unclear to what extent 
they are actually used in communication. For example, politeness 
usually competes with truthfulness where people often prefer to act 
politely and cover up their true opinions, rather than expressing 
exactly how they feel. Thus Grice* s principles may not be as
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universal as once thought, since the specific context of the exchange, 
the individuals culture, and the co-ordinated use of a shared 
language are equally as important.
However, these underlying tacit conventions appear early in life since
children as young as 2 years old expect co-operation from their
listeners, and by 6 years old demonstrate definite expectations of 
communicative patterns (Shatz, 1978c).
This thesis investigates how speakers and listeners co-ordinate on the 
meaning of natural language expressions, and how they utilise shared 
and mutual knowledge in the process. The following theories are 
directed at the more general problem of co-ordination where 
populations come to share certain meaning through conventions of use. 
This may be useful in determining how people locally converge on the 
interpretation of an expression discussed in section C.
Language has often been viewed as a type of joint problem where
conversants have to converge on the meaning of natural language 
expressions. Schelling (1960) refers to these situations as "co­
ordination problems", or "games of strategy", where the best course of 
action for each person depends on the actions of the others involved. 
For example, with deterrence a potential enemy is prevented from 
following some course of action by way of a threat, where the 
interdependence and expectations of each party are essential. 
Similarly, bargaining involves each party calculating what they expect 
the others to accept, with both sides aware that some solution is 
better than none.
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S chelling  in v e s t ig a te d  c la s s ic  co -o rd in a tio n  problems such as obvious 
j o i n t  ta sk s ,  and how they may be solved. When communication i s  
a v a i la b le ,  he proposed the  problem may be solved by e x p l i c i t
agreement, genera lly  based on f a i r  and s e n s ib le  f a c to r s .  For
example, two p a ra c h u t is ts  may arrange to  meet a t  the  v i l l a g e  church i f  
they should get separa ted  w hile  land ing  on a small is la n d .  However, 
i f  they were separa ted  without having any previous p lans then  they 
depend on t a c i t  knowledge, such as ex p ec ta t io n s  and c e r t a in
h e u r i s t i c s .  In f a c t ,  o f ten  when communication i s  a v a i la b le ,  as
Garrod and Anderson (1987) d iscovered , t a c i t  barga in ing  may s t i l l  come
in to  e f f e c t .
In t h i s  type of in terdependent s i tu a t io n ,  S che ll ing  proposed th a t  the 
co -o rd in a tio n  problem i s  solved by each person independently 
c a lc u la t in g  what a c t io n  they expect the  o ther to  take, tak ing  in to  
account what the o ther expects them to do, and so on. This occurs  
through h igher-o rder  expec ta tions  in  a r e f le x iv e  way. Furthermore, 
p a r t i c ip a n ts  must co -o rd ina te  or e lse  n e i th e r  w i l l  b e n e f i t ,  s ince any 
c o n f l i c t  over a p re fe rred  so lu t io n  i s  overwhelmed by the need to  solve 
the  problem.
S che lling  o ffe red  four h e u r i s t i c s  which gen era lly  in fluence  the  
dec is ion  to  co -o rd ina te .  These a re  sa l ien c e ,  precedence,
f a m i l i a r i t y ,  and uniqueness. With recourse  to  the  parachute problem, 
f a m i l ia r i ty  r e f e r s  to  choosing the  most well known spot on the  i s la n d ,  
while uniqueness invo lves  choosing the  most unusual or ou ts tand ing  
spot. The sa l ien ce  h e u r i s t i c  invo lves  u n i t in g  in  some obvious, 
prominent spot on the  is la n d ,  such as the  only house, s ince t h i s
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appears the most natural choice for both to choose. Precedence
involves following any previous solutions, since if the situation had 
occurred before and you had united at the small harbour, then this 
reinforces the repetition of this action.
Thus Schelling gave an account of co-ordination problems and discussed 
several solutions. Lewis (1969) adopted this scheme to account for 
the origins and maintenance of conventions in language.
Lewis viewed language as a type of co-ordination problem, and offered 
a general account of how the communication problem may be solved 
through conventions of meaning. Co-ordination problems were
described by Schelling (1960) as interdependent situations where the 
best course of action depends on the joint decision of those involved. 
According to Lewis these recurrent co-ordination problems were 
predominantly solved through conventions of behaviour or belief. He 
described a convention as:
"a general sense of common interest, a regularity in behaviour all the 
members of the society express to one another, and which induces them 
to regulate their conduct by certain rules, mutually expressed and 
known to both.”
In other words, it is an agreement, inherited from one generation to 
the next where its origins are often lost, such that it becomes common 
knowledge in a community that:
everyone generally conforms to X, everyone expects everyone else to 
conform to X, and everyone prefers to conform to X on the condition 
that the others do.
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Thus, members of the community develop a system of mutual knowledge 
where they share some convention and expect the  o th e rs  to  conform to 
i t .  Generally , conventions should be b e n e f ic ia l  to  the  community 
they serve, and depend on t r u t h .  Almost every aspect of our
behaviour and b e l i e f s  is governed by conventions, although we are  
usually  unaware of t h i s  and p re fe r  to  th in k  of ou rse lves  a s  f r e e  
th in k in g  in d iv id u a ls .  Most people conform to conventions of d ress ,
time, h ea lth , and so on, without even ques tio n in g  such p la t i tu d e s ,  and
non-compliers a re  o ften  re fe r re d  to  as  e c c e n t r ic s .
The o r ig in s  of most conventions used in  soc ie ty  are  gen era lly  lo s t ,  
perhaps d a tin g  back to  the whims of ro y a l ty ,  some government 
agreement, or some once lo g ic a l  so lu t io n  to  a re c u rren t  co -o rd in a tio n  
problem. For in s tance  the convention of d r iv in g  on the  le f t -h a n d  s ide  
of the  road in  B r i ta in .  This example c l a r i f i e s  L ew is 's  proposal of 
co -o rd in a t io n  problems being solved through conventions of behaviour 
or b e l i e f .
According to  the  R.A.C. the convention of d r iv in g  on the  le f t -h a n d
side  of the road in  B r i ta in ,  evolved from the days of the  Highwayman. 
Swords were genera lly  worn on the  l e f t ,  so lo g ic  suggested keeping 
h o rses  to  the  le f t -h a n d  side  of the t ra c k ,  s ince i f  a t tacked , the 
r id e r  was ready to f ig h t  -  sword in  r ig h t  hand, and l e f t  f lank  
p ro tec ted  by the wall or hedge. S im ila r ly  waggoners and coachmen 
g enera lly  s a t  on the  r ig h t  to whip f r e e ly ,  thus pu lled  in to  the  l e f t  
n a tu ra l ly  to avoid v e h ic le s  and view the c lea rances  between the  
coaches. The lo g ic  concerning why C on tinen ta ls  and o th e rs  d r iv e  "a 
l a  d ro i te "  i s  a lso  q u i te  s t r a ig h t  forward. For example, in  coaching
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days postillions were more common in America and Europe, where drivers 
sat on the left, astride the rear horse, since this was the best way 
to control the team. Thus it was most advantageous to pull into the 
right-hand side of the road in order to judge passing distances.
In this way, some population find themselves with a recurring co­
ordination problem, where each has to interdependently decide the best 
course of action to take. Each person tries to assess what action 
they expect the other to take, and aware that co-operation is 
essential for success.
The most logical solution to the problem is generally followed, and 
through time and the recurrence of the situation, this solution is 
repeated until the origins become lost. When this happens the 
solution becomes a convention, since those involved are relying on 
precedence to guide their behaviour.
The rational and theoretical basis for conventions are thus 
expectations and mutual knowledge. These are primarily higher-order 
expectations where one person calculates a causal chain of 
expectations regarding another person. For example, one of two 
people thinking "I expect that you expect that I will move to the 
left-hand side of the road", and so on, reasoning in this reflexive 
manner. This is not an interactive process but involves each person 
establishing their own set of beliefs and a certain degree of mutual 
knowledge through the convention. Apparently each believes their 
view is correct and shared by both (Vennemann, 1975).
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Lewis argued th a t  the general p r in c ip le s  of n a tu ra l  languages may be 
based on conventions, where languages evolve to  solve c e r t a in  co­
o rd in a tio n  problems of meaning. He proposed th a t  a l l  th a t  i s
req u ired  a re  basic  p r in c ip le s .  For example, conventions of ru le s  in  
a conversa tion , such as those of phonology, morphology, syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics, such th a t  th e re  e x i s t s  a precedence of 
ru le s ,  and not th a t  s p e c i f ic  sentences rep resen t  s p e c i f ic  meanings.
He s t re s s e d  th a t  conventions are  most important fo r  so lv ing  co­
o rd in a t io n  problems, as  w ell as d iscu ss in g  severa l o ther so lu t io n s .  
For example, e x p l i c i t  agreement involved a predefined s o lu t io n  such 
th a t  i f  a problem a r i s e s ,  then t h i s  course of ac t io n  i s  mutually 
expected. Salience  concerns choosing an obvious so lu t io n  such th a t  
you mutually expect each o ther to take t h i s  course of ac tio n .  
Precedence r e l i e s  on the  success of a previous so lu t io n  such th a t  i f  
the problem recurs  t h i s  so lu tio n  i s  repeated . Lewis b e l iev es  th a t  
communicants would be predisposed to  use the  previous so lu t io n ,  and 
thus i t  becomes the  most s a l i e n t  option  to  choose. Indeed th e re  i s  
evidence to  suggest th a t  exposure to  one type of fu n c t io n a l ly  
ap p rop ria te  so lu t io n  leads  those involved to  model the example fo r  
fu tu re  use (Nelson, 1985).
Lev/is b e l iev es  that convention evolves from the precedence h e u r i s t i c ,  
where a c e r ta in  course of a c tion  has been followed so re g u la r ly  th a t  
i t  i s  mutually expected when the  problem a r i s e s .  This in  tu rn  adds 
the  id ea  th a t  the  precedence so lu t io n  i s  taken to  j u s t i f y  the 
conventional choice. For example, the so lu t io n  i s  followed because 
everyone e lse  does so and has done in  the  p as t ,  and the f a c t  th a t  you
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were doing it, justifies this course of action. Thus precedence 
leads to the notion of justification. Lewis suggests that many other 
conventions may have evolved in this way, where everyone concerned 
mutually knows the convention exists, and conforms to it.
Schiffer (1972) used a similar framework to explain how communicants 
co-ordinate on the meaning of expressions. His principles of mutual
knowledge resemble Lewis's concept of common knowledge.
His example concerns how the noise *grrrf may have developed 
conventionally to imply *1 am angry', outlining the importance 
precedence plays. Through a lengthy process of person X uttering 
'grrr' and being angry, Y eventually learns that X means 'I am angry'
when they utter 'grrr'. This is reinforced by X only uttering 'grrr'
to refer to this, and not in any other situation. Schiffer
similarly arrived at a definition of conventions through the theory of 
games, where each person acts relative to what action they expects the 
others to take, although he does not consider it gives a complete 
account of conventions.
Despite the fact that conventions of meaning are essential to 
communication these theories understress the non-conventional side of 
language. As Clark (1985) commented:
"Conventions, however, are only one of the co-ordination devices 
people use in communication, a point that has been lost in most 
research on language and language use."
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Grice (1982) similarly emphasised the point that meaning is not 
necessarily connected to conventions, and i3 simply one way that word 
meaning may be fixed. It is by no means the only one.
Although conventions identify systems rather than arbitrary mappings 
between a word and its meaning, word meaning may also be fixed by 
definition which is less common. For example, once dictionaries fix 
meaning, the words become non-conventional since there is no easy 
option for adapting their meaning. Thus once a rule is imposed on a 
system it is not a convention.
2^ £0N£LIJSI0H
These theories treat language as a co-ordination problem and consider 
how word meaning may develop through conventions of use. They 
increase awareness of social-pragmatic factors for the development of 
meaning, and emphasise the way that interactors assess each others 
intentions, and attempt to synchronize their actions and thoughts.
However, whether this determines how meaning develops in the child is 
not apparent and will be investigated in Chapter 2. One should be 
extremely cautious when comparing the general origins of language with 
individual language development and everyday communication. Despite 
the fact that Lewis plausibly illustrates hew conventions work in a 
signalling system, a full blown natural language would be far more 
ambiguous and complicated.
Furthermore, some researchers stress that language and communication 
should be investigated as separate issues, since it is difficult to
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discover just what amount of the child's development is dependent on 
communicative pressure (Bierwisch, 1981). For example, some children 
can communicate well yet demonstrate many linguistic problems, while 
others produce adequate language even though exposed to a poor 
communicative environment. In addition, linguistic competence does 
not necessarily imply successful interactive ability. For example, 
linguistic competence has been judged adequate for grammatical 
purposes by the age of 3 to 4 years old, and almost fully developed by 
7 or 8, apart from vocabulary expansion or structural forms (McNeil, 
1966), yet the child's communicative competence indicates many 
deficiencies. Thus links between language and communication should 
be made with extreme caution.
The next section investigates how these general accounts of language 
explain semantic co-ordination in natural language. Definite
reference will be investigated which involves particular meaning where 
communicators generally choose expressions for specific recipients. 
This takes into account both the speaker and listener, their mutual 
knowledge, and the social context of the exchange. However, definite 
reference is only one of a number of co-ordination problems we may 
have looked at.
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C. SPECIFIC CO-ORDINATION PROBLEMS: THE CO-ORDINATION OF DEFINITE
REFERENCE
This sec t io n  dea ls  w ith s p e c i f ic  meaning and how speakers and 
l i s t e n e r s  co -o rd ina te  on a p a r t i c u la r  meaning of an expression . For 
example, where two people co -o rd ina te  on something in  the  ac tu a l  
world, such as re fe rence  which involves the  r e a l ,  so l id  world. This 
o b je c t iv e  measure of co -o rd in a t io n  hopefu lly  r e f l e c t s  t h e i r  mental 
world. This i s  opposed to  mental re p re se n ta t io n s  where two people, 
fo r  example, may co -o rd ina te  on a c e r t a in  id ea  or b e l i e f  in  t h e i r  
mental world which cannot be o b jec t iv e ly  measured.
While s ec t io n  B. d e a l t  w ith  semantic c o -o rd in a t io n  in  a more general 
sense, such as in  communities, and considered communication as  a co­
o rd in a tio n  problem solved through conventions of meaning, t h i s  s ec t io n  
in v e s t ig a te s  p a r t i c u la r  meaning between communicants. This comparison 
may c l a r i f y  the  ex ten t to  which the  general account of meaning 
conventions determines p a r t i c u l a r  meaning. Garrod and Anderson 
(1987) b e l iev e  th a t  a general account of meaning i s  not i n  i t s e l f  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  exp la in  semantic co -o rd in a tio n ,  and th a t  something e lse  
must be involved fo r  p a r t i c u la r  cases.
In t h i s  s ec t io n  i t  i s  argued th a t  r e f e r r in g  express ions  a re  in fluenced  
by the conversants  themselves, using t h e i r  mutual knowledge. I t  seems 
apparent th a t  speakers and l i s t e n e r s  g enera lly  co -o rd ina te  on the  
choice of r e f e r r in g  express ions , and choose d e f in i t e  re fe re n ce s  
f e l i c i t i o u s l y . For in s ta n ce ,  i t  i s  most un like ly  th a t  a person would
simply use an ambiguous term without having f i r s t  decided on the  
l i s t e n e r ' s  knowledge and t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  term. This 
suggests  th a t  a d d i t io n a l  soc ia l-p ragm atic  f a c t o r s  a re  a lso  req u ired  
fo r  success fu l communication.
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1x-THE_CH0ICE_0F_REFERENT
According to Lewis (1979) various expressions require some type of 
preceeding introduction and cannot be simply slipped into the 
conversation. Apparently this occurs in a rule-governed way during 
the on-going conversation, where one of the interlocutors exercises 
control over the other. Lewis noted that a definite control structure 
was evident during conversations, which was predominantly 
asymmetrical, where one party exerts influence over the other. He 
compared a well run conversation to a baseball game, in that it is an 
organised event with a definite control structure. For example, the 
"master11 marks out the boundaries of what is to be discussed, adapting 
this to fit their knowledge, with the "slave" conforming to these 
tacit demands. This process appears to occur automatically and 
unintentionally, with the interlocutors generally unaware of 
conforming to such structure.
Similarly Brown and Yule (1983) observed that what people say in a 
conversation is restricted by the preceeding speaker and existing 
framework. They refer to this as "speaking topically", where
interlocutors "pick up" elements from the previous speaker.
Conversational speech had often been viewed as unstructured, with few 
rules, perhaps due to the fact that writing and reading skills are 
taught in school whereas conversational rules are not. However, 
contrary to this view, Grice and others have demonstrated that this is 
not the case and that conversational speech is rule governed.
In general, speakers attempt to use specific terms to elicit the 
correct interpretation from the listener. This requires some type of 
mutual knowledge and a shared language in order to co-ordinate with 
the listener*s knowledge base. The problem then concerns what type of 
knowledge communicants require for successful interaction. This 
question has produced much controversy among researchers over what 
kind of knowledge is utilised in natural dialogue, and hew it is 
assessed and may develop during the course of the dialogue.
The research reviewed here explores mutual knowledge in relation to 
formulating definite reference which is only one of many issues which 
may have been considered.
For successful communication Clark and Marshall (1981) argue that 
speakers and listeners co-ordinate their knowledge in the formation of 
definite references. They propose that this requires something more 
that general global conventions of meaning. They suggest that local 
principles of interaction are required where speakers formulate their 
utterances for particular listeners, relying on the knowledge that 
they mutually share. At the same time, listeners deduce the meaning 
of expressions based on this tacit reasoning and both locally converge 
on the meaning of the expression. Clark (1985) states that:
"By the very nature of coordination the speaker and addressees both 
recognize that the speaker intends them to infer what she means on the 
basis of their common ground and nothing more. That is all that 
could be relevant and including anything else may even lead to 
error. **
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This implies that a certain degree of mutual knowledge has to be 
established prior to the interaction.
According to Clark and Marshall, people must ensure they have the same 
grounds in order to make a definite reference about a topic and 
discuss it. This implies that they must each refer to a huge section 
of knowledge to assess their common ground and choose an appropriate 
definite reference. Yet the reference is normally selected in a
finite time space. They refer to this as the "mutual knowledge
paradox", and argue that this is solved through the use of three 
heuristics. These enable interlocutors to infer their common ground 
quickly and efficiently choosing an appropriate definite reference for 
the listener.
Triple copresence is the first heuristic, where the speaker, the 
listener, and the object referred to, are physically present together. 
Each assumes the other has similarly observed the object, and that 
they may confidently refer to it, believing the other to share this 
knowledge. With the second heuristic, linguistic copresence, the 
speaker introduces the object into the conversation, where they can 
now assume the listener to be aware of it. Community membership is 
the third heuristic. A great deal of knowledge is presumed to be 
shared between the members of the same community, thus one may make a 
definite reference particular to the community, confident that the 
listener understands. Combinations of these can exist to infer
mutual knowledge.
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These heuristics require a memory organized by diary entries which 
contain specific encounters with people, and an encyclopedic section 
of general information. These encompass speaker and listener
models, and once formed are constantly revised to incorporate fresh 
information. For example, a person*s specific model concerning a 
close friend may store such information as their previous encounters, 
common interests, beliefs, and so on. In general, people usually 
prepare themselves for a conversational encounter, referring to their 
specific models and assessing their mutual knowledge store. Clark 
and Marshall propose that these models are formed through formal 
introductions and acquired information, and constantly updated as 
appropriate. Introductions often begin cautiously by attempting to 
discover occupations, status, political beliefs and so on, to enable 
some type of model to be constructed. Once some type of mutual 
knowlege is established, such as their political beliefs or interests, 
then one may confidently refer to this area. Almost all encounters 
involve assessing what knowledge we may share with our conversant.
Clark and Marshall disagree with general conventions of meaning such 
as those illustrated by Lewis and Schelling, arguing that they are 
insufficient in themselves to explain semantic co-ordination in 
everyday interactions. They also believe that mutual knowledge is 
essential prior to an interaction, yet fail to clarify the cognitive 
functioning of their copresence heuristics used to assess this 
knowledge, and assume a great deal of knowledge and processes. 
Furthermore, they treat mutual knowledge as an isolated problem, 
however, there is little evidence to suggest that such problems exist 
in everyday communication, or that we require such mechanisms to deal 
with them.
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Garnham and Perner (1986) agree that mutual knowledge is necessary for 
communication and that it is computed in a finite decision procedure, 
although they disagree with the heuristics put forward by Clark and 
Marshall. They attack the ambiguity of the triple copresence 
heuristic. For example, we can have mutual knowledge of the stars 
being out, without having any physical proximity or eye contact with 
someone (ie. talking on the telephone). Similarly, eye contact
would not be required in order to elliptically refer to a flash of 
lightning which occured in a friend*s presence, with a reference such 
as "Did you see that".
This evidence suggests that the copresence heuristics may not be 
sufficient or necessary to compute mutual knowledge. Clark and 
Marshall believe that establishing mutual knowledge is some type of 
conscious deliberate process, and that we are rational human beings. 
However, adults as well as children are egocentric, and not quite as 
rational as Clark and Marshall would have us believe. Indeed 
evidence to define so nebulous a concept as mutual knowledge has been 
difficult to find as the following research illustrates.
A process was offered by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1985) of how definite 
references may develop into mutual knowledge. They replicated Krauss 
and Glucksberg*s (1966) communication task, outlined on page 7 4  of 
this thesis, to discover that definite references were negotiated in 
an iterative way. This acceptance process involved one of the
conversants presenting a noun phrase into the conversation, and if 
appropriate for both communicants, then the next contribution was made 
towards the conversation.
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However, if the phrase was unsuitable, then the participants proceeded 
to repair, expand, or replace, the phrase continually, until a 
mutually agreeable version was reached. Thus any portion of the 
dialogue could be changed and updated in an on-going reciprocal way. 
In this collaborative process mutual understanding was established to 
the appropriate level. For example, the references used should be 
sufficient to convey the intended meaning, rather than assuming that 
it is precisely mutual. Explaining something to a novice, naive to 
the terminology, would typically require less detail than explaining 
it to a connoisseur of the field.
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs found a * trade-off* in effort between 
suggesting a definite reference and refashioning it. For instance, 
the more time and effort spent in choosing an appropriate definite 
reference for the listener, would presumably lead to less 
modifications. Thus, interlocutors should attempt to choose
utterances suitable for the recipient. Yet the spontaneity and 
dynamic nature of natural language gives us little time to plan ahead, 
coupled to the fact that we are often unaware of the specifications 
that would suit the listener. Thus Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs suggest 
that we may simply offer suitably sufficient phrases to start the 
acceptance cycle. Once underway the flow would modify itself. In 
this way, they offered some indication of how a mutually appropriate 
reference may be derived.
On the whole it appears that speakers and listeners must share certain 
ideas and knowledge for communication to succeed. Clark and Carlson 
(1982) investigated certain instances where shared beliefs among
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people were more pronounced. These involved 'joint acts’ where two 
or more people were in interdependent situations, requiring co­
ordination of actions for success. For instance, the playing of duets 
by musicians, where they argued that mutual belief is essential for 
the commencement of even the first note.
Clark and Carlson acknowledge the scepticism levelled at mutual 
knowledge processing because of its infinity of conditions. However, 
they argue that it is wrong to automatically assume some type of 
infinite series of steps in the mind. For example, as Schiffer, 
Lewis, and others have demonstrated, just one piece of the right 
information may be sufficient to assume mutual knowledge. So one 
action or expression may indicate that communicants have mutual 
knowledge on an issue without recourse to a list of inferences and 
heuristics. This implies that certain conditions may indicate mutual 
knowledge. These conditions themselves are finite, yet may be used 
to assess the infinity of conditions which mutual knowledge requires.
They argue that Clark and Marshall’s (1981) mutual knowledge belief 
induction schema is all that is required to assess mutual knowledge. 
That is:
a and b mutually know that p if and only if some state of affairs G 
holds such that:
1) a and b have reason to believe that G holds.
2) G indicates to a and b that each has reason to believe that G 
holds.
3) G indicates to a and b that p.
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For example, an agreement where two people believe some knowledge 
holds, without having to work out the logic why, and indicates the 
next gesture is for real. They believe that total mutual knowledge is 
not required for everyday conversation. Something less is probably 
sufficient, since mutual knowledge can vary in degree.
In everyday interaction, it remains debatable whether mutual knowledge 
is a pre-requisite for success. One aim of this thesis is to 
investigate what type of common knowledge may be required for language 
use, and hew it may develop. V/hile the above theories assume that 
mutual knowledge is required prior to the interaction, there seems 
little evidence to suggest that young children infer this knowledge. 
Rather, it may develop later. Furthermore, how is this knowledge 
utilised and assessed, and do children assess mutual knowledge the way 
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs and others have outlined?
Johnson-Laird (1982) remains sceptical on this issue, and proposes 
that mutual knowledge is not a pre-requisite for successful 
communication. He attacks the question of infinity of conditions and 
refutes Clark and Carlson’s belief in a mental primitive. For 
example, where mutual knowledge is devised through inference rules and 
certain evidence. While focusing on the mechanisms used to infer
mutual knowledge he noted much ambiguity, since there was no 
elaboration of how the three copresence heuristics may achieve mutual 
knowledge. In addition, he questions how this inference rule
develops, how children acquire it, whether it is innate, and why it 
evolved. Finally, he points out that if a person knows some 
information, it is not clear that they are aware of knowing they know
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the information, since speakers are not generally aware of employing 
such complex processes in the way that Clark and Marshall argued.
Johnson-Laird illustrates that mutual knowledge may not be required 
prior to communication, using an example of acquiring a theatre ticket 
for Macbeth. He states that one would presumably ask for a ticket 
for the performance without firstly establishing whether the ticket- 
vendor similarly knew this performance was playing. Thus formally 
establishing mutual knowledge seems to be necessary for guaranteeing 
communication, yet futile for everyday use. For instance, we do not 
normally require such formal rules to communicate, nor can we be 
confident of having mutual knowledge with our interlocutor.
As an alternative, Johnson-Laird points out that communicative success 
implies the existence of shared knowledge and understanding. This 
indicates that mutual ignorance may be an incentive to communicate, 
since one may use a definite reference in order to discover whether 
the listener has knowledge in this field. As Johnson-Laird (1982) 
notes:
"But if they start with completely mutual knowledge there might not be 
much point in communicating: they might be stating the obvious. As 
in the old drive-reduction theories of psychology, mutual ignorance is 
a drive that is a spur to conversation which in turn, reduces it; 
sometimes completely."
This suggests that communication can succeed without prior 
establishment of mutual knowledge, since alternative strategies may be
used to infer mutual knowledge where necessary. For example, the use 
of feedback and questions during the conversation. Indeed language 
systems must be designed to overcome problems in everyday 
conversations, and thus avoid the complicated process of establishing 
mutual knowledge.
Similarly, others have argued that the best evidence for mutual 
knowledge is not physical copresence but comprehension. Sperber and 
V/ilson (1982) discuss hew understanding is evidence that mutual 
knowledge exists between interlocutors.
Their evidence is of three types. Firstly they point out that 
although identifying mutual knowledge is a complex process, problems 
are not so apparent in comprehension. Thus mutual knowledge must be 
a simple, unanalysable concept, which does not involve complex 
calculations as Clark and Marshall proposed. Alternatively if 
misunderstanding occurs, one would request clarification, or simply 
misunderstand, discovering the incongruence through feedback, and so 
on.
Secondly they argue that mutual knowledge is not a sufficient 
condition for belonging to a certain context, since it is generally a 
small specific context that is referred to and searched - far smaller 
than the interlocutors common ground. Thus something more than just 
belonging to common ground must be involved to determine the actual 
context searched. It must be accessible and manageable, and involve 
a mechanism by which a specific incident can be located. Clark and 
Marshall’s process does not do this.
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Thirdly, they noted that mutual knowledge is not a necessary condition 
for understanding to occur, that is, understanding may still occur 
although certain things are in the context and are not mutually 
known.
Similarly Vennemann (1975) regarded interaction as a basic source for 
establishing mutual knowledge between speakers and listeners evolving 
during the conversation in the form of a "presupposition pool" 
containing information:
"constituted from general knowledge, from the situative context of the 
discourse, and from the completed part of the discourse itself."
General knowledge refers to knowledge that conversants presume they 
share with each other, such as various world-wide and important 
political events and history. The situative context of the discourse 
refers to present facts observed in the immediate context, such as the 
weather. Knowledge concerning the completed part of the discourse is 
simply information which has previously been mentioned in the 
conversation. According to Vennemann mutual knowledge is derived from 
these three sources and thereafter presumed to be known to both 
communicants.
In addition conversants assume they share a joint "presupposition 
pool", which contains these three types of knowledge, with each 
believing only one exists (their own), which is constantly updated as 
the conversation proceeds.
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The evidence appears to indicate that mutual knowledge may be 
unnecessary for everyday communication. It may be required in more 
formal situations such as with legal documents, Acts of Parliament, or 
statutory rules, where the message has to mean exactly what was 
intended. In these cases information has to be unambiguous and 
accurate, such that it may not be misinterpreted in any way. On the 
other hand, everyday interactions do not require such stringent co­
ordination of meaning, and are generally deficient in the necessary 
conditions to guarantee mutual knowledge, yet reasonable understanding 
is evident. Thus Sperber and Wilson propose that rather than mutual 
knowledge, Grice’s (1957) relevance principle may be more appropriate 
for successful communication. This states that communicants expect co­
operation where utterances are relevant to the listener's knowledge 
and current context and:
"The speaker tries to express the proposition which is the most 
relevant one possible to the hearer."
In this way, speakers and listeners believe that each conforms to this 
principle, and so the listener abstracts the most relevant meaning 
from their set of possible alternatives that the speaker could have 
meant.
Yet Gazdar and Good (1982) noted that this account involves relevance, 
and paradoxically suggests a type of mutual knowledge in itself. The 
mutual knowledge of relevance calculations presumes that the speaker 
calculates what the listener will take as most relevant from the 
expression, and similarly the listener assesses what the speaker meant 
the expression to refer to, and so on.
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Statistics to interpret so nebulous a concept are difficult to find, 
and since suggestions are not liable to empirical testing there is no 
reliable way of establishing relevance, as Moore (1982) appropriately 
noted. In this respect, researchers only have a partial
understanding of the factors involved in communication. However, 
mutual knowledge and co-operation appear essential for success.
Interlocutors appear to seek out their common ground in order to 
communicate effectively and understand each other. Grosz (1981) 
argued that the implicit goal of conversation concerns establishing 
commonality, or mutual knowledge, and considered the role of focusing. 
She defined focusing as:
"the active process, engaged in by the participants in a dialogue, of 
concentrating attention on, or highlighting, a subset of their shared 
reality."
She noted that the speaker and listener*s focus affects their 
interpretation, and what they say affects what is focused on. The 
experiment involved an expert instructing their apprentice on the co­
operative task of dis-assembling an air compressor. While doing so 
participants worked towards a shared perspective of the object and 
constantly checked that they had a common focus. The speaker chose 
appropriate definite references using redundancy, and shared 
knowledge.
In general communicants focused on only a small degree of shared 
knowledge at any one time, thus constraining the search area with
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g re a te r  chance of success. The speaker and l i s t e n e r  both assumed a 
common focus and problems only appeared when a discrepancy in  
understanding occurred. S im ila r ly , Venneman (1975) proposed th a t  each 
in te r lo c u to r  assumed a j o in t  p resupposition  pool throughout the  
in te r a c t io n .  This evidence appears to  re in fo rc e  the  assumption th a t  
mutual knowledge i s  not requ ired  p r io r  to communication, ra th e r  i t  i s  
assumed u n t i l  communication f a i l s .
Goodman (1986) used a s im ila r  ta sk  where an expert in s t ru c te d  an 
appren tice  on the  assembly of a toy water pump. Analysing the  extent 
of miscommunications, he noted th a t  a re fe rence  was e i th e r  im precise, 
confused, ambiguous, or over s p e c i f ic ,  and th a t  the l i s t e n e r  was 
considered to  the re lev an t  degree. Furthermore, he noted th a t
l i s t e n e r s  o f ten  found the  c o rrec t  re fe re n t  although the in s t r u c t io n s  
were f a i r l y  ambiguous, and explained  t h i s  due to "nego tia t io n " .  This 
takes  in to  account a l l  the language and knowledge th a t  they mutually 
share. This could e i th e r  be " e x p l i c i t  nego tia tion"  between
conversants where they genera lly  d iscuss  the  r e f e re n t ,  or " s e l f ­
neg o tia tio n "  where the  l i s t e n e r  examines the  re fe rence  in  more d e t a i l .
Goodman was a ttem pting  to  co n s tru c t  an e f f i c i e n t  na tu ra l  language 
communication system which could cope with miscommunication. When 
problems in  communication occurred, he considered severa l ways of 
re p a ir in g  the  breakdowns. For example, the l i s t e n e r  may make 
assumptions unconsciously in  a n a tu ra l  and automatic way. 
A lte rn a tiv e ly  they may ac t iv e ly  rep lace  the  sp eak e r 's  inform ation 
u n t i l  a s u i ta b le  a l t e r n a t iv e  i s  reached, or simply ask fo r
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clarification. More importantly they may be solved by using social 
conventions, and world and conversational knowledge. That is, 
linguistic, perceptual, discourse, hierarchical, and trial and error 
knowledge. For instance, in trial and error knowledge successful 
performance of the action is the best evidence of being correct.
The evidence seems to suggest that some type of mutual knowledge is 
required for successful communication, although exactly what type and 
how it may be enacted, processed, or develops, remain controversial. 
The contradiction appears to be whether mutual knowledge is assessed 
prior to communication through various heuristics, or whether 
communication itself evidences mutual knowledge.
Perhaps investigating hew young children communicate may shed some 
light on this debate. In general there appears to be some disparity 
between how Clark and Marshall (1981) think children should 
communicate, and what they actually do. It seems fairly complex for 
a child to be computing various strategies to assess mutual knowledge. 
Rather, they may simply be conversing without taking into account the 
listener*s perspective. This would contradict proposals that mutual 
knowledge is a pre-requisite for communication.
The mutual knowledge process may even develop later in children, 
promoted by our society, which places great value on identification 
with others and the role of shared knowledge. Indeed children who 
have a great overlap in shared knowledge may not encounter critical 
communication problems, and this may be the reason why they prefer 
similar others. This is not only apparent in children. Adults
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prefer conversing with similar others with whom they share some common 
bond, whether it be similar political beliefs, intelligence, 
interests, or background.
In accordance with the above hypothesis, Ladd and Emerson (1984) found 
that children are attracted to similar others. They investigated 
shared knowledge in childrens friendships as a function of age, and 
the type of friendship maintained, and suggested that shared knowledge 
is a determining factor in the development of mutual attraction and 
close friendship.
According to Duck et al (1980), friends appear to develop shared 
knowledge by collecting evidence from mutual exchanges and shared 
activities. They use this to form a reciprocal awareness of each 
other in terms of similarities and differences. In this way, 
children who discover a high degree of similarities between 
themselves, may be mutually attracted, leading to close friendship. 
Alternatively they may become mutually aware of their differences.
Selman (1980) discovered that children in the age range 4 to 9 years 
old, use the self as a reliable scale to judge others against. 
Positive characteristics were evaluated as those similar to the self, 
and negative ones as those different from their own. A fundamental 
difference with older children from around 6 to 12 years old, was 
their appreciation of characteristics which were different from their 
own.
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Shared knowledge (common or overlapping knowledge) thus appears to be 
a determining factor in the formation of children’s friendships,
although with development they were able to appreciate differences.
Ladd and Emerson reinforced this claim with evidence that greater 
shared knowledge exists between mutual friends as opposed to 
unilateral ones who, as expected, did have a lesser degree of shared 
knowledge. Using 48 pairs of children, they assessed shared
knowledge by using a picture-sort procedure where:
’’Friends selected items that were most descriptive of themselves and 
their friend. Shared knowledge was indexed by summing the number of 
items that were chosen by both partners as a) descriptive of 
themselves and their friend, and b) descriptive of themselves but not 
their friend."
Results were in accordance with Selman - of a decrease in partner 
similarity with increasing age - and were consistent with that of Duck
et al. Thus shared knowledge was related to close friendships in
children, and mutual friends knew more about each other.
This appears perfectly rational, since those children with increased 
similarities may communicate without having to assess mutual 
knowledge. For instance, their definite references should be 
understood without recourse to mutual knowledge. On the other hand, 
those children from different cultures or background, may encounter 
communication problems, since they may use terms their partner does 
not understand. When misunderstanding occurs, they may drop the
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subject completely, or simply leave the situation, failing to elicit 
the correct adult social response.
These observations appear to reinforce the assumption that children 
communicate prior to establishing mutual knowledge. The computation 
of mutual knowledge requires such complexities that it seems 
remarkable that young children are using it in communication. Yet it 
has been suggested that mutual knowledge processing may be innate, 
since the child similarly learns language, which is also a highly 
complex process. Alternatively, they may not be establishing mutual 
knowledge, but communicating successfully with others who share 
similar knowledge, such as parents, siblings, and close friends. In 
this way, discrepancies may not be noticed, since mutual knowledge is 
already established in many areas. The process may even occur later 
though pressure from parents and society to take the role of the 
other.
Shatz (1978) noted that children have many problems in discovering 
what is mutual knowledge for a listener, and what should be 
communicated. With exophoric reference they have been found to check 
that the listener has also viewed the object, as Clark and Marshall 
proposed (Flavell, 1978a). However, many problems are encountered 
with endophoric reference where the task is considerably more complex 
and involves memory, discourse inferences, and inferences concerning 
the listener’s knowledge. As Shatz pointed out:
"Thus although children may be able to take account of listener
characteristics that are readily observable, taking account of more
covert characteristics may prove too difficult."
44
Perhaps they infer mutual knowledge by conventions, since these have 
proved extremely useful in language, and give a default type of rule 
when the child’s knowledge is lacking. Furthermore, society
determines most of these conventions, which we acquire through 
experience and direct intuition from parents.
Indeed Schieffelin (1979) discovered that this occurred overtly in 
some cultures, where the mother gives explicit examples in the 
teaching of the social rituals to the child. Similarly, the Japanese 
education curriculum includes social studies and moral education, 
instructing children on such things as moral dilemnas, cultural values 
and non-verbal communication (Lynn, 1988).
Grief and Gleason (1980) discovered that prompting by parents, greatly 
increased 2- to 5-year-olds use and appreciation of social 
conventions, such as greetings, leave-takings, thanks, goodbye, and so 
on. They noted that children used ’hi* and ’goodbye* only about one 
fourth of the time it was required, and ’thanks' around 7% of the time 
they should, although their parents use of the terms were much higher. 
However, these rates increased when they were prompted by their 
parents. This evidence suggests that children are learning the 
appropriate conventions for their culture, since they often fail to 
respond on certain occasions. This may be the case with mutual 
knowledge where children gradually learn conventions and social rules 
through experience.
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Dt CHAPTER., CONCj^ygJQN
This chapter investigated the development of communication skills as 
they relate to language. In particular, how speakers and listeners 
co-ordinate on the meaning of natural language expressions, and how 
shared and mutual knowledge are utilized in the process. Social- 
pragmatic aspects of natural dialogue were discussed, such as the 
users of the language and their mutual knowledge. It was argued that 
communicators use the interaction to infer the meaning of expressions 
in this dynamic way. This interactionist approach takes into account 
the speaker and listener, their common knowledge, and the wider social 
context of the exchange. The literature review then explored this 
approach in more depth, as well as covering the traditional approach 
to meaning.
The interactional approach relates meaning to the users of the 
language both at a general and local level. For example, at a local 
level groups tacitly devise the meaning of the expressions they are 
using relative to their specific environment and needs.
This leads onto the problem of what type of knowledge is required for 
successful communication, and how speakers and listeners co-ordinate 
on the meaning of natural language expressions during the interaction. 
Semantic co-ordination was considered at a general level in relation 
to populations, where some such as Schelling (1960), and Lewis (1969), 
argued that word meaning may develop through conventions of use. 
Specific meaning was then investigated and how speakers and listeners 
correspond on the particular meaning of expressions, such as in 
definite reference. According to Clark and Marshall (1981), and
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others, this co-ordination problem is not simply solved by general 
meaning conventions as discussed by Schelling and Lewis. For 
successful interaction Clark and Marshall argue that mutual knowledge 
is required prior to the interaction since communicators must ensure 
they have the same grounds to discuss some issue. They argued that it 
is inferred by certain heuristics. However these were thereafter shown 
to be inadequate by other researchers. On the other hand, Johnson- 
Laird (1982) argued that communicative success in itself implies 
shared and mutual knowledge between communicators, and therefore this 
knowledge is not required prior to the interaction. In fact he stated 
that mutual ignorance is actually an incentive to communicate to 
discover what knowledge we have in common with others. As well as 
this he pointed out the inadequacies of the mechanisms put forward by 
researchers to infer mutual knowledge.
This thesis is concerned with the type of knowledge required for 
language use and hew it may develop. To solve semantic co-ordination 
in particular cases it would appear that communicants require some 
type of shared knowledge and ideas, and rely on co-ordination, memory, 
conventions, knowledge assessments, and inference, which all develop 
with communicative experience. Co-ordination and mutual knowledge 
appear fundamental to communication, although whether mutual knowledge 
is required prior to or during an interaction remains debatable. 
Total mutual knowledge may not be necessary for everyday 
communication, and probably an impossibility, however, it appears that 
communicants require some degree of common ground to communicate. 
Yet the processes to infer this remain inconclusive.
Regarding development, the enigma involves whether children use mutual 
knowledge in communication, and how it may develop. Young children 
communicate most successfully with their parents, siblings or close 
friends, where there is already a great deal of shared knowledge, thus 
the assessment of mutual knowledge may not be required. It may 
develop later due to pressures of society to identify with others.
Chapter 2 will discuss some of these issues further and concentrate on 
the development of communication skills in young children.
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A, INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the development of communication skills as they 
relate to language, and discusses the role of social-pragmatic aspects 
of dialogue for this development. Some of the relevant background 
issues concerned with the development of communication skills will be 
reviewed in this section. The first part will outline what is
involved in communication, before considering how the child develops 
and acquires these abilities. For example, the child must learn the 
vocabulary of the society in order to comprehend and produce the
language, and utilise various coping strategies for deducing meaning. 
This chapter explores, how the child learns to use terms in a shared 
and mutually effective way.
1. COMMUNICATION
In order to communicate effectively the child has to calculate how to 
map their ideas into words. They have to discover the sound system, 
the relevant semantic and syntactic rules of the linguistic community, 
thematic rules, speech acts, rules for sentences, along with the
appropriate rules of conversation. Most importantly they have to 
acquire a shared system of/ meaning to comprehend and produce terms. 
This concerns such areas as language, social behaviour, and
development.
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E f f ic ie n t  communication re q u ire s  the  speaker to  account fo r  the 
l i s t e n e r ' s  capac ity  to  understand, and d i r e c t  t h e i r  message a t  the 
l i s t e n e r ' s  knowledge s t a t e .  Rommetveit (1983) proposed th a t
understanding  a message suggests  some co m p a t ib i l i ty  between the 
communicants in te rn a l  knowledge r e p re se n ta t io n s ,  whereas 
misunderstanding i l l u s t r a t e s  some degree of in c o m p a tib i l i ty .  In t h i s  
way, communication involves co -o rd in a tin g  mental re p re se n ta t io n s ,  
where the  l i s t e n e r ' s  re co g n it io n  should merge w ith  the speaker’s 
in tended meaning. Sharing a mutually accepted code i3  a r e q u is i t e  
f o r  t h i s .  Nelson (1985) d esc rib es  a h ighly  conventionalized  system 
of meaning a s :
"an in te rn a l iz e d  system of knowledge re p re se n ta t io n s  -  semantic and 
conceptual -  th a t  correspond to  those of the c u l tu r a l  group."
As we have e s tab lish ed  in  Chapter 1, communicants depend on 
conventional communicative systems which re ly  on s ig n s ,  to  express 
inform ation  to  one another. According to  Grice (1967) there  are two 
main types of s igns used f o r  communication, n a tu ra l  and conventional 
one s .
Natural s igns  have s e lf -e x p lan a to ry ,  obvious forms of meaning which 
are  almost u n iv e rsa l ,  such as c e r t a in  f a c i a l  expressions (fo r  
exam ple,crying or smiling (Ekman, 1971)). Conventional s igns, on the 
o ther hand, are  based on c u l tu r a l ly  determined s e t s  of ru le s  which 
have to  be l e a r n t  by the c h i ld .  These are  the most common type of 
s ign  used everywhere in  so c ie ty ,  and include any term whose meaning 
cannot be i n tu i t i v e ly  deduced. Yet n a tu ra l  s igns  may a lso  be used 
conven tiona lly  such as in  s a r c a s t ic  3miling and so on, in  order to  
convey some o ther message. 50
This implies that an arbitrary relation exists between most words and 
their meaning, arising by accident or convention rather than anything 
else. Nelson (1985) noted that for successful communication,
children have to learn and mutually accept a system of shared meanings 
used in the community, where the terms used create a similar 
conceptual representation in the listener.
The following sections outline various other aspects of language which 
are central for successful communication. This illustrates some of 
the complex skills the child has to acquire and develop.
Two essential skills for communicating language are comprehension and 
production. As Clark and Clark (1977) explained:
"Comprehension requires that listeners take in an utterance, analyse 
it, construct an interpretation, and utilize what they have understood 
in the way the speaker intended."
While production concerns planning and organizing the message for the 
listener. Unfortunately there is no straight forward relationship
between the two, and generally the child uses a word as soon as they 
become familiar with it (Bloom, 197*0. This often suggests a
deceptively more complex level of language development than actually 
obtained. For example, young children can often repeat songs and
stories from picture books with complete accuracy, yet not properly 
understand what they have produced. To add to the problem the child 
is clearly able to comprehend far more than it can produce, and often
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may understand a parent when only able to produce a few one word 
utterances themselves. Similarly, adults can comprehend many terms 
they have never used themselves, although they seldom produce terms 
they do not understand.
Communication requires the acquisition of a language system with many 
highly conventionalised components. Communicants must be able to 
both comprehend and produce terms while learning a vocabulary, and as 
noted above these involve different processes.
The first few words generally appear in a child*s production 
vocabulary between the age of 12 to 18 months, based on familiar and 
close objects. For example, food, toys, and animals, expanding to 
bodyparts, household items, clothing and people by the age of two 
years old (Nelson,1973). This is followed by a rapid proliferation, 
so that around the age of 3 years onwards, parents have difficulty 
knowing exactly what words their child understands (Miller, 1986). 
This is complicated by the fact that the child appears to understand 
more than it can produce. Yet to use or respond to a word does not 
necessarily evidence knowledge of the intended adult interpretation, 
since the child* s first appreciation of a word vary greatly from the 
adults.
Templin (1957) carried out extensive cross-sectional studies on the 
growth of the child*s vocabulary to conclude that a 6-year-old child 
of average intelligence knows some 13 000 words, and an 8-year-old 
some 28 300 words, and so in this period the child learns an average
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of 21 words per day. However the words a re  not l e a r n t  in  an
a r b i t r a r y  and unre la ted  fash ion . They are  l e a r n t  through
concep tua lly  r e la te d  p a t te rn s .
M ille r  (1986) d iscussed the importance of con tex t and the use of 
conceptual p a t te rn s  to  in te g ra te  new words, whose meaning gradually  
develops. He defines  a vocabulary as "a coheren t, in te g ra te d  system 
of concepts" where most words are  l e a r n t  in  con tex t and not nearly  as 
ambiguous as  d ic t io n a r ie s  would lead  us to  b e l ie v e .  P rin ted
d ic t io n a r i e s  are  l e x ic a l  databases where words and th e i r  meaning are 
arranged and deduced through a lp h ab e t ic a l  order and r e t r i e v a l ,  and 
defined  by o ther word3 th a t  describe  t h e i r  meaning. In  c o n t ra s t ,  our 
su b jec t iv e  d ic t io n a ry  can be accessed v ia  the sound, or meaning of a 
term, phonologically  and sem antica lly , in to  semantic f i e l d s .  Related 
concepts a re  l e a r n t  toge ther and not as a r b i t r a r y  l i s t s  of f a c t s .
n. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT FOR DEDUCING MEANING
In r e l a t i o n  to  vocabulary expansion the main i n t e r e s t  i s  how ch ild ren  
acqu ire  new words and le a rn  th e i r  meaning. For both c h ild ren  and 
a d u l ts  a l ik e ,  the process i s  tw o-fold. F i r s t l y  they must recognise 
they have a word, and secondly they must recognise  i t  i s  a word w ith a 
c e r t a in  meaning. Since ad u lts  do not e x p l i c i t l y  teach  c h ild ren  word 
meaning then the only way i t  can be achieved i s  through con tex tual 
in fe ren ce .
I t  appears th a t  young ch ild ren  are  extremely in ven tive  and a c t iv e  when 
computing word meaning and communicating inform ation . They combine 
con tex t and language in  an extremely e f f e c t iv e  way to  understand the
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meaning of terms, and make the most of their limited linguistic 
resources by utilizing various coping strategies. For instance, they 
often devise their own means prior to the appropriate conventional 
skills developing, such as repetition, pointing, grasping or reaching 
methods, and multiple meaning one-word-utterances (Carter, 1975). 
They rely on non-linguistic evidence, such as gestures, gaze- 
direction, and context, to interpret what adults say, and use 
guesswork to abstract the most plausible alternative from the context 
(Clark and Clark, 1977).
Clark and Clark (1977) believe that when the child first acquires a 
word, they enter the meaning into their mental lexicon. This 
gradually develops until the meaning of new words eventually coincides 
with the adult version through prior experience and contextual cues. 
They point out:
"In forming their initial hypothesis, they select a possible meaning 
from their encyclopedic knowledge and from that derive a strategy for 
using the word."
Thus children use their prior knowledge and the immediate situation to 
deduce meaning. This gradually adjusts to merge with the adult 
version, while their existing vocabulary is utilised to the full.
Shatz (1978) carried out several experiments with children under 4 
years and proposed that they comprehend in terms of an "action-based 
strategy". In one experiment children were presented with sentences 
which could be interpreted as a request for more information, or for
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the  ac t io n  to  be demonstrated. For example, the  sentence "Can you 
t a lk  on the  telephone?", would be presented in  two d i f f e r e n t  con tex ts , 
b iased toward each of these r e s u l t s .  That i s ,  e i th e r  spoken in  as  
n eu tra l  a context a s  p oss ib le ,  or presented  i n  con tex ts  of ac t io n  and 
in fo rm ative  g es tu res .
She found evidence th a t  ch ild ren  ad ju s ted  t h e i r  behaviour to  the  
l i n g u i s t i c  context of the sentence. However, they a l l  p re fe rred  to  
ac t r a th e r  than give more inform ation , reg a rd le ss  of the context. 
Shatz thus suggested th a t  the c h i ld 1s communicative response may 
depend more on p r im it iv e  response s t r a t e g i e s  than on any complex 
d iscourse  in fe ren ces  or the p ro p o s i t io n a l  content of the u t te ran ce .  
This im p lie s  th a t  ch ild ren  ac t according to  a d e fa u l t  a c t io n  response 
s t ra te g y ,  whose importance appears to  decrease as  the  ch ild  g a th ers  
more inform ation  on language and context to  in d ic a te  which response i s
req u ired .  Thus ch ild ren’s response and ev a lu a tio n  s t r a t e g i e s  should
not au tom atica lly  be assumed to  be s im i la r  to the  a d u lt  i n t e r p r e ta t io n  
of the  expression .
Nelson (1973) considered t h i s  is su e  fu r th e r ,  where ch ild ren  may focus 
on the  fu n c tio n  of o b jec ts  and form concepts through an a c t io n  based 
s t r a te g y .  She discussed how word meaning may be derived from
experience with the word, in te r a c t io n  with the  o th e rs  in  t h e i r
l i n g u i s t i c  community, and through the context of the exchange. For 
example, changes in  context or q u es t io n  format g re a t ly  a f f e c t  the  
c h i ld 1s i n te r p r e ta t io n .
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5 .  C A T E G O R I C A L  DEVELOP MENT
This vocabulary system, along with word meaning, is not just composed 
of arbitrary relations, but is organised in a very sophisticated 
manner, grouping terras into various categories. Learning a system 
does not just involve arbitrary relations. For instance, with colour 
vocabulary it is not sufficient to determine what red means in 
isolation since the addition of further colours, such as orange, may 
modify the definition.
Categorization involves the organization of the acquired lexicon, and 
as this expands then the child's awareness of communication grows 
accordingly. Some of the issues in categorization involve taxonomy, 
while others involve thematic categories. Taxonomy concerns
organizing words according to their label - that is, grouping things 
in terms of semantics. Thematic categories concern grouping things 
in terms of the context in which they are used. Thus categorical 
development is important from a semantic point of view, and different 
from thematic relationships. Evidence suggests a developmental 
preference, where children prefer thematic notions of meaning, and 
then taxonomic relationships,
Markman and Hutchinson (1984) found that before 6 years of age, 
children generally used thematic relations between objects rather than 
the appropriate taxonomic category. For example, to associate dog 
with bone, or toys with play. Yet, when the child believed they were 
learning a new word, they often used categorical organization, and 
after 6 years of age generally used categorical relations when 
appropriate.
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Since young ch ild ren  f in d  them atic  r e l a t io n s h ip s  most s a l i e n t ,  Markman 
and Hutchinson in v e s t ig a te d  hew ca te g o r ic a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  may develop. 
In one experiment they gave pre-school ch ild ren  a ta rg e t  word, such as 
dog, and then  presented them with a them atic  a s s o c ia t io n ,  such as 
bone, and a taxonomic one, such as c a t .  The ch ild  had to  choose the  
one most s im ila r  to the ta rg e t  o b jec t .  The younger age groups of 
2 /3 -  and 4 /5 -y e a rs  old, p re fe rred  a word w ith a them atic  r e la t io n s h ip  
r a th e r  than the  appropria te  taxonomic category. However, when the  
ta rg e t  word was unknown, they attempted to  choose taxonomic 
a s s o c ia t io n s .  They appeared to  search fo r  l in k s  to  t i e  t h i s  new word 
in  w ith  c a te g o r ie s  they already have, or attempted to  form a new 
category to accom ^ate  the  word.
Children of around 7 years  of age, however, were e f f e c t iv e  in  so lv ing  
the  ta sk ,  and capable of segregating  a mixture of f r u i t  and v e h ic le s  
in to  ap p ro p r ia te  c a tego rie s ,  whereas the  younger age groups genera lly  
arranged the  o b jec ts  in to  p a t te rn s .
From t h e i r  an a ly s is ,  Markman and Hutchinson concluded th a t  r a th e r  than 
anything e ls e ,  the c h i l d ' s  a t t e n t io n  to c a te g o r ic a l  r e la t io n s  changes 
most w ith  development. This may be p a r t ly  due to experience in  ear ly  
language, and p a r t ly  inna te . For example, while the  youngest
c h ild ren  used few ca teg o rica l  r e s t r a i n t s  on word meaning, the 4 /5 -  
year-o ld s  s e t  some r e s t r a i n t s ,  and the  older ch ild ren  s e t  in c reas in g ly  
ap p rop ria te  ones. Children focused on the  context and g e s tu re s  of 
the speaker to deduce the  meaning of express ions , and attem pted to 
ass ign  new words in to  already e x is t in g  c a te g o r ie s  where p o ss ib le .  
With younger ch ild ren  thematic a s s o c ia t io n s  were most s a l i e n t  which
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progressed to the appropriate taxonomic categories with development. 
This shift from thematic to taxonomic categories involves a progress 
from non-linguistic organisation based on events occurring in a world, 
to a linguistic system where language is used to discuss the world.
Thus young children appear effective in segregating words into
semantic categories and distinguishing between them. When Carey and 
Bartlett (1978) requested 3-year-olds to assign novel words to a
category, they discovered that children were well adapted to this
task. A single exposure to a new word was sufficient to start a re­
organization of the specific category. Carey (1974) suggested that 
this requires a two-step process. Firstly they attempt to assign it 
to a semantic category, and secondly they learn the difference between 
words they have assigned to the same category.
St-QQNSLgSIQH
This section concerned the development of communication in relation to 
language, and explained several main aspects of communication. To 
communicate effectively the child must acquire a mutually accepted 
conventional meaning system based on the vocabulary of the community, 
along with the ability to deduce word meaning, and produce and 
comprehend terms.
Hence the question is how the child readily acquires these skills and 
a highly conventionalised meaning system in what would appear an 
extremely short period of time. This development may appear
intuitive to the layman, yet has proved an enigma to psychologists, 
linguists and philosophers for years. Some of these issues will be
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discussed in next, especially the development of this representational 
capacity and whether the roots are innate or lie in the infants early, 
pre-linguistic experiences.
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INTRODUCTION
This section outlines some theoretical issues on the development of
communication skills, such as how the child develops a shared meaning
system, and the necessary interactional skills to cope with
communication in dialogue. Some of the theories assume that the
child has a specific disposition to learn a language, while others 
regard environmental factors and parental encouragement as most 
important. This contrasts the individual with an innate ability to 
acquire a language on the one hand, with environmental factors on the 
other. However, this distinction alone is far too abstract, since 
many varied and complex factors influence language under each section 
which are often taken for granted. For instance, the individuals 
culture is often stated as a main environmental influence yet to 
define what this entails is rather more complex. One should 
investigate the opportunities for the child to grasp a language, where 
interacting with those representative of the culture play an important 
role, as well as many other more obscure factors.
These open empirical questions of human understanding do not clearly 
serve to identify the physical mechanisms involved in communication, 
however they have led to an increasing awareness and better 
understanding of the inner mechanisms of the mind.
^-AH-HISTQBICAL SEYIEM
Language and communication have proved elusive issues throughout 
history, when attempting to understand the essence of a language and
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how that may develop. Since Plato's doctrine (427-347 BC) that
learning is recollection, dependent upon the existence of innate 
ideas, the view that language may be pre-determined has held its 
ground. Plato believed that knowledge is part of the essential 
nature of the soul, and that we are born knowing things. Thus to 
learn something is simply to recover from your mind, knowledge that 
you had before you were born.
This belief in innate capacities directly opposes that of empiricism - 
the view that our minds, wholly empty at birth, obtain all knowledge 
from post-natal experience.
In modern times Rene Descartes (1596-1650) may be viewed as starting 
the first cognitive psychological revolution. He was concerned with 
the idea that there was no certain way of acquiring knowledge and 
considered hew human beings could get to know anything for certain, 
and how. This involved self-inquiry and introspection to deduce 
"what can I know". Whereas Descartes discussed the theory of
knowledge, researchers today are more concerned with logistics and 
linguistics, investigating the theory of language rather than the 
theory of knowledge.
One of the first attempts to give a detailed account of human language 
and understanding was made by the English philosopher John Locke. 
His "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1690) gave a critical 
assessment of the origins, nature, and limits of human reason in an 
empiricist way. The central proposal was that words only indicate an 
idea in the mind of those that use them, and his main principles paved
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the way for other empirical philosophers to base their thought, such 
as Berkeley, and Hume.
John Stuart Mill (1806-73) considered a different view of language and 
meaning, and proposed that ’names name things’ and not the idea in our 
mind. For example, he stated;
’’There seems good reason for adhering to the common usage, and calling 
the word sun the name of the sun and not the name of our idea of the 
sun. For names are not intended only to make the hearer conceive 
what we conceive, but also to inform him what we believe.”
Mill empasised the common usage of words and language. Cherry (1971) 
clarified this when he pointed out that the word communication evolves 
from the Latin word 'communico', which means to share, and is indeed a 
shared social process of mutually accepting signs and co-operating to 
use them in a common way.
Many of these beliefs in innateness remain popular today. Chomsky 
(1957) argued that languages have underlying structural similarities, 
that they are extremely complicated and universal, and that we are 
born with knowledge of this ’universal grammar’. According to Chomsky 
this would explain hew children readily produce and understand new 
utterances on the basis of an acquaintance with only a few. In 1957 
he stated:
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"that the whole framework of grammar may be innate, and language 
learning may simply involve calibration to the local conventions and 
the acquisition of a vocabulary."
Chomsky argued there is only one core grammar, which is innate, plus a 
number of variations, where external factors tune into this. In 
addition, he believed that children would learn a fundamental 
linguistic structure by the same age period, regardless of the 
language learning environment. He described languages as an internal 
infinite number of procedures and to know a language involves 
acquiring and mastering this code of generative procedures.
Chomsky's studies revolutionised the scientific study of language, 
with his belief that in learning a language we acquire tacit rules 
concerning its syntax and semantics.
More recently Chomsky (1988) argues that languages must be innate, 
since if we were to design a language we would presumably make it easy 
to acquire and use. On the other hand, he argues that languages are 
not designed for ease of use. For example, sentences are not easily 
parsed and language design makes it difficult to say what we mean and 
express our intentions correctly. Furthermore, we have many unusable 
expressions and only practice the usable ones, and it has proved 
difficult to learn a second language. Regarding the theory of 
evolution, he argues that it is not obvious how the brain could have 
produced such a system. Languages go beyond the survival level, and 
are not always functional. However, this stance directly opposes the 
biology of language since contemporary biologists argue that
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relationships between function and structure are very complex and 
obscure, and one should not expect a simple relationship. For 
example, Chomsky believes the function of language and its structure 
should be clear.
However, Chomsky concludes that he will continue to argue that 
language learning is innate, until it is proven that languages evolve 
through experience, or otherwise.
More recently Gould and Gould (1986) have applied some of Chomsky’s 
ideas in relation to areas outside language. They suggest that 
difficult tasks are more likely to be innate, since they require much 
more time to solve, yet certain species perform complex tasks quite 
naturally and without much training. For example, they argue that 
language may result from a type of innate, instinctive learning, since 
children:
"unattentive, distractable, and often, as adults, very slow in other 
ways - learn language effortlessly, without the need for formal 
instruction or reward.n
They discuss hew many animals and birds are born with innate prewired
programs of how to carry out tasks which are important for their
survival and existence. For example, robins start to build their
nests with sticks and mud finishing with grass, whereas other species
use lichen backed with cobwebs. Commonsense assumes they observe
their birth environment and somewhat improve on it. However, Gould
and Gould argue that they are born with a pre-wired behavioural
program which determines what they learn.
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They compare t h i s  w ith  le a rn in g  o ther ta sks  which prove impossible f o r  
many spec ie s .  For example, they consider the  labo rious  teach ing  
e f f o r t  and feedback req u ired ,  when teach ing  c h i ld re n  a r i th m e tic  a t  
school s ince  the c h i ld  i s  not in n a te ly  pre-wired to  acqu ire  maths.
Yet Gould and Gould may be s im plify ing  the  is su e  s l i g h t l y ,  s ince 
mathematics or ca lcu lu s  may be regarded a s  a language in  a te ch n ica l  
sense, where the  c h i ld  s im ila r ly  has to  l e a r n  the  symbols and ru le s .  
And i f  a so c ie ty  was based on a mathematical language code, then t h i s  
would presumably be l e a r n t  e a s i ly .  Or perhaps we have to  l e a r n  a 
n a tu ra l  language f i r s t  before we can put numeracy in to  pe rsp ec tiv e .
Although, it may appear that children 'learn language effortlessly1, 
one must consider the strenuous effort parents take while teaching the 
child a language, which Schaffer and others have stressed. For 
example, adults modify their speech for the child, use short 
sentences, repeat themselves, and use attention holders such as high 
pitched voices and gestures (Clark and Clark, 1977). They encourage 
the child to take communicative turns, providing what Clark and Clark 
refer to as: "language lessons in miniature" on such things as words, 
sentences, and conversations. In their opinion the child is not born 
with a mental lexicon but has to acquire it by attaching meaning to 
words.
Yet while Chomsky argued that language on the whole is innate, 
Schaffer (1979) proposed that the innateness may be in the 
interaction. Schaffer argued that it is the capacity to interact in 
the communicative process that is innate, which goes beyond language.
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He proposed that the child is born with some innate capacity to 
interact, which is encouraged and developed through parents, elders, 
and schooling. For example, elders modify their speech to suit the 
child, talk in the 'hear-and-now’, and use slow and simplified terms. 
In this way the infant is viewed as an interactive organism looking 
for social exchanges with support from the parent through reciprocal 
patterns. Schaffer comments:
"If babies had no pre-adaptation for interacting with others, social 
development could not take place as quickly as it does."
He discussed hew the co-operational turn-taking behaviour of 
communication is enforced by the child*s pattern of behavioural on/off 
cycles which regulates their breathing, digestive, and other systems. 
For example, the infant may go into a burst of sucking behaviour where 
the parent remains quiet. Then the infant may pause, where the 
parent takes the opportunity to stimulate the baby by stroking or 
chatting. In this way, communication is already established, through 
mainly gestural channels, before the child can use the language.
Video recordings have illustrated this co-ordinated timing. Schaffer, 
Collis, and Parsons (1977) observed how the parent would monitor the 
direction of the infant's gaze and elaborate on the focused object by 
stating its name, colour, and other relevant details. They maintain 
the behavioural interactions based on good timing and mutual 
integration, to ensure knowledge overlap, adapt to the infant's time 
cycles and stimulate them in relation to these. This oo-operative 
turn-taking behaviour may thus set the structure for alternating
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conversational patterns of dialogue. Dialogue patterns appears to set 
in at a very early age since they have been found when 2-year-olds 
interacted with 1-year-olds (Schaffer,1979).
Furthermore, if communicants are not mutually aligned then this may 
affect communication ability. Michaels and Collins (1982) noted that 
ethnic children in particular, were not developing adequate literacy 
skills of basic adult competency. They proposed that this was due to 
differences in oral discourse style associated with the teacher's 
expectations. For example, many ethnic children would be
misunderstood or interrupted at the wrong point, thus deprived of the 
benefits of synchronized collaboration.
Nelson (1985) proposed that the infant does not begin life endowed 
with such a system of communicative skills but has to learn how to use 
that language. She believes that the child's language system begins 
as a two-person idiosyncratic code and gradually progresses into a 
complex multi-contexted conventional language system. This develops 
through years of accumulating knowledge of such things as syntax, 
semantics, phonetics, and world knowledge, and is not simply innate as 
others have argued.
Nelson also proposed that the child requires three types of meaning 
for successful communication. That is subjective meaning, which 
develops inside the individual's meaning system, shared meaning which 
develops among two or more interactants within some given context, and 
objective meaning, which comes from the individual^ culture. 
According to Nelson, a theory of meaning development must consider the
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child's cognitive system, the communicative context, as well as their 
linguistic, and social development.
She discusses hew the child's language is influenced by several main 
environmental factors, such as the objective, cultural, and social 
contexts of the child. For example, whether they grew up in a rural 
village or city suburb, whether their culture is that of the city 
street with its computers and filofaxes or village life with tractors 
and harvest implements, and the structure and learning environment of 
the family. There are many factors that influence the child's 
language development and vocabulary, however, Nelson proposed that 
these are the main areas in which the child interacts and develops a 
common language system.
According to Nelson the child learns conventionalised community 
meanings through context and interaction with the members of their 
society whose language system is gradually transferred to the child. 
Especially since most meanings are conventional and cannot simply be 
deduced from the situation or word itself. Languages are thus 
inextricably linked to societies and cultures as a whole, where the 
meaning of terms used will denote the necessary functions of that 
society. Thus the child must not only acquire a certain language but 
also a sound understanding of their culture and its particular 
requirements for successful communication.
On a more extreme level Channel Four recently showed a programme 
called 'Hot House People' (1988), which insinuated that any child, 
given intensive early parental training has the opportunity to become
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extremely gifted and highly intelligent. Yet this directly
contradicts the well established notion that intelligence and talent 
depend primarily on mental abilities governed by hereditary factors.
Thus although parental encouragement and early education can reap 
exceptional benefits (Bloom, 1985), Lynn (1988) points out that this 
recipe will not automatically produce a genius.
Lynn states that the child*s early background with parental 
ecouragement provides a positive foundation for learning, and if 
consistent can be extremely beneficial. Indeed most exceptionally 
gifted adults were generally encouraged early on from one or more 
adults. Thus, early training can produce long-term gains of which 
many can be major. Certainly with language development, parental 
encouragement produces substantial gains (Fowler, 1983). As Lynn 
(1988) points out, parents who chat to their babies from birth 
onwards, often learn to communicate much earlier than infants who were 
not exposed to this environment.
Finally, he points out that parents should give this very complex 
issue much thought, since early pressures to succeed may often be 
detrimental to many other social skills equally as important for 
success, such as self-direction, self-confidence, and patient 
persistence. The high rates of child suicides in Japan point to the 
worst extremes of child pressures to succeed in the educational 
sphere, however, they have also produced extremely high educational 
standards (Lynn, 1988).
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This evidence appears to suggest that parents play an important role 
in guiding and shaping the child's development, which take place 
within communicative experiences in the cultural environment. 
However, one cannot simply rule out the underlying hereditary 
influence which plays a more obscure role in the child's development.
axJ&HOiSSiaH
The research concludes that the child acquires a language through 
parental encouragement, certain innate co-operative behaviours, and 
exposure to the communicative environment. It also indicates the 
continuing debate between innate abilities and environmental factors, 
since both are, and will continue to be important in their own right. 
However apart form the work by Schaffer and a few others, the debate 
tends to overlook the importance of interactional abilities, which is 
a very central component in language use and communication. The 
debate tends to focus on learning the language and grammar and not on 
the development of interactional skills.
Section C. will attempt to fill this gap by investigating issues which 
relate to interaction. For example, the child's ability to
communicate a message to a listener, the listener's ability to 
comprehend utterances, the use of questions and interrupts, and the 
ability to jointly negotiate reference.
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This section concentrates on the development of interactional skills 
for communication in dialogue. The debate on the importance of innate 
versus environmental factors for language development illustrated how 
interactional skills have been under-rated on either side. These 
skills were largely ignored at the expense of studying the development
of meaning, syntax, morphology, phonology, and so on.
The studies reported next are all based on interactional aspects of 
dialogue and those developmental processes which reflect the 
interaction between communicators.
This section will investigate some of these issues such as the
interactional skills the child possesses and how others may develop, 
the reasons for communication failure, what measures may improve
performance, and the child’s evaluation of messages and ability to 
monitor content.
1. REASONS FOB CQtOfflKJCATIPN . fAftV.pg
Young children have demonstrated many problems while interacting, 
although their performance does improve over age (Krauss and 
Glucksberg, 1969). Various reasons have been offered for their poor 
interactive ability.
However, one of the earliest and most influential was that of Piaget's 
egocentrism principle where the communication failure was attributed 
to the child's inability to adopt a listener's perspective.
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lxl_lHJL eg0CENTRIC_ CHILD
Piaget (1926,55) argued that pre-school children already have their 
concepts and picture of the world and their problem concerns how to 
communicate. According to this egocentrism argument, children are 
poor interactors because their early speech is essentially private, 
and fails to take the addressee into account. Piaget (1955) produced 
evidence that around 50£ of pre-schoolers speech (of age around 18 
months to 7 years old) was neither adapted nor addressed to a 
listener’s requirements. While some of their speech was addressed to 
a specific listener, a fair percentage was addressed to anyone in the 
receiving area, and gave no indication of listener awareness.
Comparing structural differences in communicative behaviour between 
adults and children, he noted that children repeated words that served 
no useful social purpose and often talked to themselves in monologues. 
Furthermore, they generally continued to do so even when aware of a 
listener's presence. Piaget concluded that the child's speech was 
generally private and egocentric, without any social consideration. 
He hypothesized that this reflected cognitive limitations on the 
child's part and explained their poor communicative ability.
Piaget believed that the child's early speech directly reflected their 
thought processes, which only later developed into private speech. 
On the other hand, Vygotsky (1962) argued that language precedes 
thought and not the other way around. Vygotsky noted that egocentric 
speech increased with the difficulty of tasks as a type of "thinking
72
aloud”. Hence he proposed that egocentric speech was a precursor to 
verbal thought and with development went "underground", as thoughts to 
plan and guide our verbal thinking. In this way the timing of 
private speech changes, such that it precedes the child* s actions 
rather than accompanying them.
Although both researchers emphasized the significance of egocentric 
speech, Piaget believed it to be a hindrance for the child, eventually 
developing into social speech, while Vygotsky suggested it may 
actually have a self-regulatory function, and simply become silent 
rather than developing into anything else.
Other researchers have observed that private speech co-occurs with 
difficulty in cognitive tasks. Beggs and Howarth (1985) for example, 
suggest that it parallels reading aloud with expression, and found a 
critical period it develops. They proposed that children generally 
acquire inner speech around 8 to 11 years, and both slow and fast 
readers demonstrate similar acquisition patterns. Apparently the 
main function allows the reader to build prosodically sound 
utterances, internally, which adds meaning to incoming information. 
Prosodic cues, such as intonation, have been found to assist the 
listener with the acquisition of new information (Lieberman, 1967).
Piaget was essentially investigating how children use words in general 
and carried out several experiments on egocentrism outside of 
language. He explored egocentric speech in a number of cognitive 
activities and believed it to be a plausible explanation for the
73
child1s poor communication ability. This was endorsed by future
studies which concentrated on particular skills to provide a more 
specific test of egocentrism. For example, Glucksberg, Krauss, and 
Weisberg (1966) devised a task to study the child*s awareness of 
message adequacy and concluded that children displayed many egocentric 
qualities. Their basic referential communication task has since been 
used widely, which involves subjects describing some visible external 
referent. In this case communicating reference basically involves:
"an action by which one person tries to focus the attention of another
person on a certain part of the environment".
Referential communication involves utilizing shared knowledge to 
identify referents in terms of their locations, or other
characteristics ameniable to the listener (Asher, 1979).
The task developed by Glucksberg et al involved two subjects 
positioned at opposite ends of a table with a screen between them to 
prevent any visual contact. One child has a dispensor and received 
one of six novel forms to be described in such a way that their 
partner can choose the object from a comparable set and stack it on a 
rod. The novel forms were a collection of building blocks, each 
displaying a certain picture, and the aim of the task was for dyads to 
finish with the same order of blocks on their rods. The main focus 
fell on the ability of the describer to provide sufficiently 
informative messages for the listener. To be informative it was 
proposed that the speaker should compare the referent with the 
nonreferents, perceive the listener*s needs, and evaluate the contents 
of their message.
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Results indicated that this process, often automatic and unconcious to 
adults, posed great problems for the developing child. For example, 
on the first trials with the novel pictures all children in the age 
range 4 to 10 years performed poorly. However, the older children 
improved markedly with practice, while the younger age groups 
continued to make errors. These younger children, in the age range 
33 to 63 months, generally gave uninformative messages, consistently 
preventing the listener from choosing the correct block. 
Furthermore, earlier pre-tests had indicated that all the children 
were able to solve this type of task, since success was high when the 
blocks displayed pictures of animals.
On further analysis, Glucksberg at al discovered that the younger age 
groups often used references which had private meanings rather than 
public or conventional ones. For example, they described a novel 
form with expressions such as "Mummy's hat".
In their second experiment, they reversed the role for the describer, 
so that the child was presented with their own initial description 
(eg. "Mummy's hat"), and asked to choose the correct block. 
Consistently the child knew which block to choose. Thus the 
descriptions were sufficient for their own discrimination, yet 
ineffective for the listener. This confirmed the hypothesis that 
children were displaying egocentric qualities, and using language in a 
private and egocentric way. One explanation may be that the child 
believes the information to be mutually known to the listener 
(egocentrism), and thus what the child has to learn is to distinguish 
mutually shared information from the rest (Perner and Garnham, 1986).
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However, this phenomenon did not persist for long. For instance, 
Glucksberg et al discovered that if the example such as "Mummy's hat" 
was presented to its author two weeks later, it failed to produce the 
correct reference in that child. This would suggest that memory 
cannot accomodate private speech for any great length of time. Thus 
young children often produced messages that were ultimately 
uninformative even for themselves.
Using the same task, Krauss and Weinheimer (1964, 1966) noted that 
adults used more complex, specific descriptions on their original 
encounters with the novel forms, such as:
"It's an upside down cup. It's got two triangles, one on top of the 
other",
leading to more economy when the referent had been successfully 
located, producing for example:
"an upside down cup", and then simply "the cup". Communicants 
appeared to be negotiating and developing private two-person 
idiosyncratic codes where they alone shared the specific meaning of 
the references.
Such a progressive reduction is consistent with Zipf's (1935, 1949) 
observation that the most frequently used English words have only one 
syllable, and that frequency and length are inversely correlated. 
For example, as a word becomes more frequent, perhaps due to technical 
or cultural changes, it tends to be shortened (eg. 'moving picture' to 
movie, 'television' to TV, 'telephone' to phone, and so on). In this
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more general sense, the population as a whole adapts vocabulary to 
suit the function.
Regarding the negotiation of definite reference, Krauss and Weinheimer 
suggested that children may be incapable of establishing a suitable 
joint nomenclature in a short space of time, since their descriptions 
predominantly had private rather than public meaning. Children may 
not have developed the necessary skills to co-operate with one another 
and produce joint descriptive codes, where they adapt to the 
listener's contribution and accomodate their views.
This suggests a plausible alternative explanation for poor referential 
communication, to the effect that children may attempt reasonable 
descriptions but fail due to their lack of appropriate cognitive 
skills. For example, they may not have the necessary vocabulary or 
expertise to respond appropriately.
A further explanation for the child's poor referential communicative 
ability may be the fact that they are ignoring the nonreferents and 
simply focusing on the referent in isolation (Asher and Oden, 1976). 
If this was the case then subjects might attempt to describe the 
referent, at the expense of the nonreferents, and so produce ambiguous 
descriptions in that context.
Olson (1970) argued that successful reference depends on contextual 
differentiation, and that our language relies on the listener's 
knowledge and experience. Thus according to Olson words do not
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specifically refer to objects, but provide information relative to the 
set of alternatives. In this way, the context of the referent 
determines how it is described, and as Olson states:
"semantic decisions are not determined by either syntactic or semantic 
selection restrictions but by the speaker's knowledge of the intended 
referent."
Olson (1970) reports a number of studies to support this view. In his 
main experiment a gold star was placed under a white wooden block, and 
one subject had to describe to the other where it was placed. On 
each trial the star remained under the same white wooden block, 
however, the number and types of other blocks present were 
manipulated. This greatly affected the descriptions generated. As 
the number of alternatives changed in colour and shape, then the gold 
star block was described differently in order to differentiate it from 
the other shapes present.
Thus it is possible that young children produce poor descriptions 
because they overlook the nonreferents and simply concentrate on the 
referent in isolation.
To investigate this further, Asher and Oden (1976) used the standard 
referential communication task, where pairs of children were divided 
by a screen. Each child was presented with two words such as OCEAN- 
RIVER, with the speaker having one word underlined. The task was to 
communicate the underlined word in a one-word-message, using a 
different word from that underlined. The paired words were
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deliberately similar in meaning, such that successful differentiation 
depended on the subject taking the nonreferent into account, and 
giving clear descriptions.
In this case perhaps ‘waves', 'ships', or 'Atlantic', would 
differentiate ocean from river, however, children appeared to simply 
focus on the referent, describing it by 'boats', or 'fish*. This 
failed to specifically differentiate it from river. Yet when the 
target word was paired with a dissimilar word, such as HOUSE,
their partner had little difficulty solving the task and choosing the 
correct word.
There could be at least two reasons for this poor communication of 
reference. Firstly, that children were ignoring the nonreferent and 
concentrating solely on the referent, and secondly that they were 
using egocentric forms of comparison with private rather than DijfrXic 
differentiation. To clarify this, Asher and Oden gave subjects their 
original inadequate description, in order to determine if the message 
differentiated the two words for themselves. For example, they might 
give the subject 'boats' or 'fish* to discover if this uniquely 
identified OCffAN.
The results suggested that this was not the case. So they concluded 
that the child's problem may indeed be one of failing to compare the 
referent with the set of alternatives which, as Olson pointed out, is 
crucial to the specific identification of the referent. Thus 
children were not necessarily displaying egocentic qualities but 
rather attempting to describe the referent at the expense of the 
nonreferents.
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In the main, studies of this sort produced evidence that pre-school 
children were poor communicators of reference but this gradually 
improved over the school years. The reasons for their poor 
communication fell into several main categories. One, that they 
provided private messages, two, that they failed to take account of 
alternative possibilities, and three, that they were incapable of the 
joint negotiation of schemes. It is possible that young children 
have not yet developed a whole system of communicative skills to 
distinguish between good and poor messages, and determine such things 
as word choice, and informativeness of various expressions over 
others. The next section will discuss the skills the child uses 
effectively to communicate with others.
The studies described above illustrate how communication failure has 
often been attributed to Piaget’s egocentrism explanation. This 
assumes that the child is ignoring the listener’s perspective and 
failing to provide sufficient audience related information. For 
several years Piaget's view has dominated research in this area.
More recently, however, a growing number of studies have found 
evidence for a somewhat different explanation. These studies generate 
evidence of two sorts (1) that children as young as 2 or 3 years old 
are capable of taking another’s perspective, and (2) that young 
children can successfully communicate referentially with a listener 
under certain special circumstances. That is with simple tasks, and 
when they are aware of the skills to use. Thus poor communication
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ability should not simply imply egocentrism. The next section will 
investigate this evidence in more detail and highlight the skills that 
the child does possess.
2jl1_£0MPLEXITI_0£.1A^
Whitehurst and Sonnenschein (1981) suggested that children may be 
capable of producing adequate descriptions but lack the appropriate 
vocabulary and language skills to do so. They carried out a similar 
comparison study as Asher and Oden (1976) but in addition administered 
pre-tests to ensure that the children possessed the necessary lexicon 
to express their intentions. They then investigated whether children 
were comparing and contrasting the referent with the nonreferents.
The trials could range in complexity, from using two triangles which 
could differ in terms of colour, size, or pattern. In the simpler 
conditions (eg. where the triangles differed by colour alone) it was 
found that children could produce informative messages, sucessfully 
comparing the referent and nonreferent, but this was not the case for 
more complex material (eg. where the triangles differed in all three 
aspects).
Thus the results indicated that children as young as 4 to 5 years old 
were capable of comparing stimuli and producing informative messages, 
provided that the task was simple in terms of vocabulary and cognitive 
demand. Although this does not necessarily imply an ability to take 
the listener into account, it does indicate that children may not have 
the appropriate vocabulary to carry out certain more complex tasks.
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2^2 TA^K AWARENESS
This demonstrates that children often perform well with simple tasks, 
however they could only succeed if they were aware of the skills to 
use. Thus task content in itself is insufficient to produce
successful performance.
The results of these experiments implied that the child's initial 
descriptive deficits may not be due to communicative restraints, since 
they could respond correctly at other times, especially when prompted. 
Thus the problem may lie with the child's ability to detect the task's 
requirements, such as the unique identification of a specific 
referent. The child may already possess these necessary skills, but 
be uncertain about when to apply them. So young children may not 
possess the experience to infer what is required in certain tasks, 
especially in the expected adult way.
Further studies support this conclusion. For instance Ackerman 
(1981a) found evidence that 5-year-olds could detect referential 
ambiguity, although success was lower on more difficult tasks, and 
Whitehurst and Sonnenschein (1981) noted that once the task was 
clearly defined, the child often demonstrated the appropriate skills. 
This would tend to suggest that children have not learnt a new skill 
but how to apply an existing one. So with simple tasks and a clear 
grasp of what is required, successful communication was often elicited 
from the child.
These various alternative explanations for the child'3 poor 
communicative ability demonstrate the problems attributing cause to
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effect. Thus, rather than the child simply displaying egocentric 
speech, they may fail to judge the correct amount of information 
required to specifically identify some referent. Alternatively, they 
may be unaware of the nature of the task, or limited by their 
cognitive processing capacity. They may not yet possess the
appropriate skills to identify specific referents, or the younger 
listeners may be unattentive, the describers non co-operative, or 
perhaps older children are just more garrulous with a larger 
vocabulary. These are just some of the reasons for possible
communication failure. Thus inability to solve a task should not 
simply be attributed to communicative ignorance or inefficiency, since 
many alternative explanations may hold.
Analysing the volume of communication studies carried out, Dickson 
(1981) suggested that various basic communication skills could be 
taught to children to assist them with communication and language 
development. For instance, the importance of comparing the referent 
to the nonreferent for unique identification, to ask specific 
questions when they fail to understand a message, that communicative 
failure may be due to the speaker as well as the listener, and so on.
Although it may be beneficial to educate the child in this way, 
Whitehurst and Sonnenschein (1981) comment:
"the distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing when 
to do it, is subtle but important."
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Role-taking concerns the child’s ability to take the point of view of 
the other, for example, for the speaker to note any knowledge 
discrepencies between themselves and the listener and so improve the 
message. The speaker should be able to recognise the listener's task 
and thus provide appropriate information. Role-reversal presumes
that adopting the role of the speaker once one has been the listener 
for example, should make one more aware of a listener's needs, and 
become more sensitive to the demands of each role. This investigates 
a more specific version of egocentrism where speaker and listener 
should be aware of each others role and the different tasks they have 
to carry out. This section discusses whether children are effective 
at role-taking and able to take the view of the other, rather than 
being classed as egocentric.
There are a number of studies which indicate that young children 
adjust their speech while talking to listeners of a younger age. 
These studies consider the extent to which the child is able to take 
into account the listener's perspective.
These experiments concentrate on more natural forms of speech 
production in less structured settings, such as in playschools, 
compared to the more rigidly controlled tasks investigating specific 
skills in the laboratory.
Evidence indicates that young children are aware of their 
conversational responsibilities. For example, they talk louder to a 
person who is hard of hearing, or limit their speech to topics a
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listener understands (Shatz and Gelraan, 1977). Even by the age of 19 
months they make attempts to maintain discourse, and by the age of two 
years generally attempt to respond when required. This illustrates a 
sensitivity to their role in a conversation (Bloom, 1976).
Shatz and Gelraan (1973, 1977) in particular, found substantial
evidence that U-year-olds could adapt their language to 2-year-olds, 
as compared to adults. While explaining the workings of a toy to a 
younger child, they were found to use a fewer number of sentences, 
which were shorter and syntactically simpler, as well as more prosodic 
cues such as stress and intonation, and more explicit requests and 
attention holders. This was not evident in their speech to the adult 
subjects, or their peers, and occurred whether they had a younger 
sibling or not. The results indicated an awareness to adjust to 
listeners of different ages, which is inconsistent with Piaget's 
notion of egocentrism.
One criticism levelled at this explanation is that the child may 
simply be imitating the way their parents communicate with them. 
Tomasello and Mannle (1985) investigated 3- to 5-year-old's ability to 
adjust structural characteristics of their speech for younger 
listeners. They discovered that children did not adjust the length 
and complexity of their utterance over time, whereas their mothers 
did. This suggested that the young child's apparently social speech 
may stem from imitating their parents, as well as being encouraged by 
the younger conversational partner. Yet even at this superficial 
level these children were attempting to modify their speech to take 
the listener into consideration.
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Further studies indicated that children adjust their speech to the age 
of a listener, and talk more to adults than their peers. Camaioni 
(1979) noted a developmental change in the child's behaviour from 
around 2 to 4 years old, where the child changed from a parallel play 
to a more co-operative one. In addition, the child displayed a 
similar pedagogical relationship towards a younger child, as an adult 
would.
Garvey and Hogan (1973) found children to be "sociocentric", and 
capable of "genuinely social behaviour and interpersonal 
understanding", since when socially engaged they generally adapt to 
others. Their evidence stemmed from videotaping 18 dyads of
children, aged 3.5 to 5 years old, in 15-minute play sessions. 
Although private speech was evident, Garvey and Hogan emphasised the 
point that social behaviour was also predominant in young children.
Evidence of social communicative skills in young children have been 
replicated elsewhere. For example, Mueller (1972) videotaped 24 
pairs of children, in the age range 3.5 to 5 years old, to discover 
that social behaviour was generally the rule and not the exception. 
62% of all utterances were successfully reciprocated by the child, 
where they responded in some definite way, compared to 23% 
intermediate responses, and only 15>6 classed as failures where the 
child did not respond. Mueller discussed how the success of the 
interaction may be dependent on other social variables. For example, 
their social response may depend on their physical distance from the 
speaker, or the listener's visual attention at the beginning of the 
utterance, or the technique used to catch their attention, such as 
"Look" or "Listen", and so on.
These studies demonstrate that children are able to adjust their 
speech when communicating with younger children of lesser linguistic 
competence, as opposed to their speech being egocentric. This 
questions the importance of egocentrism in general and inability to 
take roles in particular, to account for the young child*s poor 
performance.
Dickson analysed studies on referential communication to conclude 
that:
"the pattern of results gave little support to the view that 
referential communication performance is influenced to any great 
extent by egocentrism or role-taking".
£x!^ 0N£LJJ2J0N
The studies reviewed in this section produced evidence that young
children are able to take another’s perspective, and that referential
communication is possible under certain conditions. For example, with
simple tasks and a clear awareness of what is requested from them,
children were able to contrast referents with nonreferents to produce 
informative messages. Thus errors may not be caused by egocentrism 
but rather the fact that they lack the appropriate vocabulary and 
language skills to complete certain referential communication tasks.
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It-BgNEf JTg., Qg.. SOCIAL , INTgMglIPB
The above evidence from referential communication studies, illustrates 
that young children have difficulty providing adequate messages. 
While investigating this issue Deutsch and Pechman (1982) noted that 
social interaction could alleviate many of the initial deficits and 
improve performance. In connection with this they asked 3- 6- and 9- 
year-olds, to choose a gift from eight alternatives, and offered 
feedback whenever necessary. Results were then compared to a group 
of adults choosing a gift.
In accordance with previous results, children, as opposed to adults, 
produced equivocal descriptions of the gift. Yet the messages 
improved markedly with interaction. For example, if the speaker gave 
an ambiguous description, and the experimenter repeated it in question 
format, the adults, and the 6- and 9-year-olds, then described the 
referent correctly. Even with the 3-year-olds, interaction led to 
89% adusting their descriptions.
Further studies in this field have produced similar evidence where 
children (although generally over 4 years old) respond favourably when 
given structured advice for more effective communication (Cosgrove and 
Patterson, 1978). Increased interaction proved beneficial where the 
listener would point out ambiguities, and request more information 
when required. This also decreases processing demands on the part of 
the speaker, who is now aware of the listener’s active participation 
to query them at any point and highlight any misunderstanding.
88
This type of situation mirrors real life interaction where feedback is 
the rule and not the exception. On the other hand, traditional 
referential communication tasks often involved communicators having 
fairly well defined speaker and listener roles devoid of visual 
contact. Although these are often necessary for certain descriptive 
tasks they neglect the benefits of natural feedback and visual 
information.
4. THE,, ABILITY .TO^EyA^yATE MEggAQES. £N£>.MONI^OR CQNTENT 
There appear to be clear age divisions in children's ability to 
evaluate and monitor the contents of information (Markman, 1976), 
which depend on the child's developmental stage. Thus the child's 
interpretation of certain situations may be very different from that 
of adults.
Markman (1976, 1981) noted specific age divisions in children's
appraisal of information. In one experiment, she gave children 
essays to evaluate, which were composed of glaring inconsistencies, 
such as the following, and asked them if they made sense:
"Fish must have light in order to see. There is absolutely no light 
at the bottom of the ocean. It is pitch black down there. When it 
is that dark the fish cannot see anything. They cannot even see 
colours. Some fish that live at the bottom of the ocean can see the 
colour of their food."
These were often judged comprehensible by children, who failed to 
notice the errors of consistency. Markman concluded that children are
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often  unaware of whether they have understood something c o r r e c t ly .  
Mot only ch ild ren ,  but a d u l t s  a lso  overlook in c o n s is te n c ie s  in  t e x t s .  
Sanford (1981) found th a t  a d u l t s  f a i l e d  to  draw the co rre c t  
conclusions when presented  w ith  c e r t a in  r id d le s  and examples. I t  i s  
thought th a t  when t e x t s  con ta in  sound s t ru c tu re  then people f a i l  to 
process the  inform ation  fu r th e r  and draw deep conclusions. In a d d i t io n  
people genera lly  view te x ts  as  authoritative and thus a re  l e s s  l ik e ly  to 
re -q u es t io n  c e r ta in  p a r ts ,  perhaps be liev in g  i t  was an overs igh t on 
t h e i r  own p a r t .
Yet, t h i s  lack  of understanding may not be the  only explanation  fo r  
the c h i ld ’ s poor comprehension m onitoring. For example, ch ild ren  may 
not have read the  passage c a re fu l ly  enough and overlooked a c ru c ia l  
l in e ,  or they may lack the  confidence or a s s e r t io n  to  p ro te s t  and 
question  the  experim enter’ s a u th o r i ty .  Children, as w ell as a d u l ts ,  
are s e n s i t iv e  to the ex p er im en te r 's  demands and a re  o ften  in fluenced  
by n o n - l in g u is t ic  devices which in d ic a te  the d es ired  experimental 
outcome, ra th e r  than using t h e i r  own in t u i t i o n  and grammatical ru le s .  
Thus re sea rc h e rs  should work w ith  g rea t  s e n s i t i v i t y  when a t t r i b u t i n g  
meaning to  the  c h i l d ' s  a c t io n s .
Even though a l t e r n a t iv e  exp lana tions  fo r  Markman’ s r e s u l t s  are  highly 
p la u s ib le ,  o ther s tu d ie s  have in d ica ted  the  c h i l d ' s  apparent 
in s e n s i t i v i t y  to the  q u a l i ty  of a message and t h e i r  dependence on cues 
from the experimenter. For example, Finn (1976) noted th a t  ch ild ren  
were s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in fluenced  by p a r a l in g u is t i c  cues. He asked 5- to 
8 -year-o ld  ch ild ren  s trange  qu es tio n s  in  order to in v e s t ig a te  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  to monitor the  incoming inform ation  and note in c o n s is te n c ie s .
90
They were presented with questions out of context, such as: "Are there
more Wugs or more Glugs?"
and generally replied normally such as:
"There are more Wugs".
When asked to defend their answers, they would often justify this with 
answers such as:
"Because they*re taller".
Finn then asked the children if these were "good or silly" questions, 
with most children believing them to be "good" questions. 
Paralinguistic cues were very important to their decision, since 
results depended whether the experimenter asked the question in a 
serious or humorous way. For example, with an 8-year-old:
Adult (laughing): Have you seen many talking cars?
Child: No.
Adult: Is that a good or silly question?
Child: Silly.
Adult: Why?
Child: * cause.
Adult (normal voice): Have you seen many talking buses?
Child: No.
Adult: Is that a good or silly question?
Child: Good.
Once again the importance of context and the speakers gestures play a 
crucial role in the child*s deduction of meaning.
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In an extensively cited number of studies the Robinsons 
(1976,77,81,85) investigated the child’s ability to monitor the 
contents of information and their awareness of message inadequacy. 
They proposed that successful communication requires the appreciation 
of how effective a message is, in terms of potential ambiguity and 
informativeness.
In their basic experiment, the Robinsons used two sets of cards with 
single pictures on them, giving one set to the subject (the listener) 
and one to the experimenter (the speaker). The speaker then chose a 
card and described it in such a way as to enable the listener to 
choose the same one from a comparable set. However, on certain 
trials the experimenter would engineer a communication breakdown and 
then ask the child who was to blame. The child could then choose the 
listener, the speaker, or both, as responsible.
The Robinsons found major age-related differences in children’s 
perception of who was to blame. For example, children around 5 years 
generally blamed the listener suggesting that they should ’listen 
harder’, whereas around 7 years, ’speaker blamers* were more common, 
and all the 11-year-olds consistently blamed the speaker when 
appropriate.
There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that young 
children believe they are responsible for the failure, since they may 
be familiar with their parents instructing them to concentrate and pay 
more attention (Pratt and Nesdale, 1984). In addition, young 
children often use the age of the speaker rather than the message
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itself to evaluate the contents (Sonnenschein, 1986). They regard 
adults as good models of communicative ability, and are more ready to 
accept their messages. On the other hand, older children may focus 
more on the quality of the message itself, with less emphasis on the 
speaker.
The child could choose the speaker, listener, or both, as responsible 
for the failure yet consistently chose the listener. This suggests 
that the younger * listener blamers' fail to appreciate that inadequate 
messages are responsible for communication breakdowns. They are 
unaware of the essentials of a good message, and when their messages 
failed as speakers, they required substantial prompting before 
improving the contents. Deutsch and Pechman (1982) similarly noted 
that their 3-year-olds were generally oblivious to the adequacy of 
their descriptions, and often blamed the listener for the 
communication failure and not the speaker. The older age groups, on 
the other hand, produced references that were more successful, using 
greater redundancy. Yet the 3-year-olds did supplement their message 
with feedback and prompting from the experimenter.
This unawareness has been replicated elsewhere, along with failure to 
supplement their message when the experimenter stated they did not 
understand. Cosgrove and Patterson (1977) report that even when the 
problem was highlighted, the child often failed to improve their 
message. However, when the appropriate action was indicated, such as 
the need to ask questions, an increase in content appreciation was 
evident for children over 4 years of age (Cosgrove and Patterson, 
1978, Robinson, 1981). This implies that the child may be aware of
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communication failures, however, not know how to cope with them. This 
illustrates the contrast between the identification of a problem and 
how to deal with it.
In a further study the Robinsons noted the response of mothers after 
their children described some referent inadequately. They then 
investigated the same children on their sixth birthdays. Those 
children who had assistance on the inadequacy of their message, by 
explicit discussion, now had some definite awareness of message
inadequacy, with greater content appreciation and interactive
improvement. However, one problem concerns whether the skill would 
generalise to another study such as the one carried out on their sixth 
birthdays. And if the same study was used, then perhaps the child 
has just learnt how to act in this specific situation.
One reason for poor communication monitoring may be the child's 
inability to differentiate between speaker and sentence meaning.
Robinson, Goelman and Olson (1983) argued that children fail to
appreciate the message because they confuse what was meant with what 
was said. They found that children as young as 4 years, could 
differentiate between good and poor messages. Yet failed to do so 
when the meaning of two sentences were similar but worded 
differently.
Thus it appears that young children either fail to monitor messages 
adequately, or monitor them but fail to note any inadequacies, or note 
inadequacies but fail to act upon them unless prompted by an adult. 
These skills have been found to develop anywhere between 4 to 8 years,
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at around the same period that conventional definitions begin to 
appear.
■Ll_COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES IN TASK-ORIENT?? QAMES
Perhaps a comparison between successful and unsuccessful communicants 
would indicate what poor communicators fail to do, or are doing wrong. 
Brown (1986) investigated the listening comprehension of over 700 
pairs of same aged 13- to 16-year-olds, and compared the strategies of 
successful and unsuccessful subjects. She similarly noted that poor 
communicators generally had difficulty identifying inadequate messages 
and giving appropriate feedback. Furthermore, many of these problems 
were caused by the conceptual content of the material rather than 
anything else.
In her experiment, two subjects sat at either side of a screened 
table, and each had a similar map in front of them. These maps were 
composed of familiar named features such as a waterfall, church, house 
and so on. One subject had a route through the map to instruct their 
partner how to replicate it on their map. Subjects were told that the 
maps were slightly different.
Communication ability was measured by calculating response times 
during certain sections of the game, and the number of utterances 
generated in certain problem conditions. In this way, areas which 
give rise to problems could be highlighted and compared over different 
pairs of subjects.
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Brown noted various differences emerging between good and poor problem 
solvers. For example, successful listeners appeared to recognise 
when a definite problem existed and what it was. As Brown explains:
"A good listener is not simply a passive recipient but is actively 
seeking to construct a coherent self-consistent mental representation 
and is actively seeking to eliminate inconsistencies."
Successful communicators were less prepared to accept their partner1s 
more ambiguous directions, and would directly request more information 
and elaboration. Unsuccessful ones on the other hand, often detoured 
off the route completely, without the slightest hesitation, in order 
to reach some point their partner had mentioned, even though this was 
inconsistent with previous descriptions.
Thus Brown concluded that there appeared to be fundamental differences 
between good and poor communicators. For example, good communicators 
actively evaluate incoming information, monitoring any inconsistencies 
between their comprehension and the message content, and promptly gave 
relevant feedback. Whereas less successful ones generally fail to 
ask appropriate questions when the message is inadequate.
Using a similar type of task, Lloyd (1985) compared the development of 
communication skills in same age pairs of 7- and 10-year-olds, and 
adults, while giving route directions by telephone. Subjects were 
placed in separate rooms and given identical maps of a community with 
familiar features marked on such as churches, houses, and garages, 
where each feature could be uniquely identified by colour or pattern
96
(see page 123 , Figure 3.6). One player's map was covered by a 
perspex overlay with a route drawn on, which they had to communicate 
to the other, to enable them to mark this route onto their map. The 
speaker and listener roles would then be reversed on the following 
game.
Lloyd found that 7-year-olds produced significantly less adequate 
descriptions than the two older groups, with equally poor performance 
as listeners and speakers. The 10-year-old group, on the other hand, 
made twice as many errors when they were listeners compared to 
speakers. In comparison, adults were far more efficient in terms of 
precision and uniqueness and produced more economic descriptions.
Lloyd used a turn to measure the amount of conversation for each move, 
which was the amount of speech bounded by the other player's 
contribution. He discovered that 7-year-olds take the fewest turns 
with an average of 4.4 turns per move, compared to the 10-year-olds 
with an average of 8.3 turns, and the adults with 6.1 turns. It is 
intuitive that amount of speech should correlate with success, however 
since adults produced less speech than the 1o-year-olds, he concluded 
that the youngest group were not giving enough information, while the 
middle group have much redundancy, and the adults produced more 
efficient and economic descriptions.
In addition he discovered that subjects used various descriptive 
strategies to give route descriptions, and that different age groups 
preferred different strategies to describe points on the map (see page 
I24 for a full discussion of these descriptive types).
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A.H. Anderson (1988) carried out a similar type of shared task to 
investigate conditions which may produce more active and successful 
communication between dyads. Pairs of 14- to 15-year-old native
English speakers were positioned across a partitioned table to avoid 
visual contact, and each given a map marked with several familiar 
features as shown in Figure 2.1. In the first condition one subject 
had a route marked to describe to the other who had to replicate the 
route on an identical map. While in the second condition one subject 
had two parts of the route on their map and their partner had the 
other two. This joint problem involved communicating each section to 
establish a complete route. These two conditions were repeated using 
maps which were slightly different.
To establish communication efficiency Anderson calculated the number 
of words each subject produced in certain areas of the map, as well as 
the number of conversational turns. Results indicated that more 
difficult map conditions generated the most communication. For 
example, when the maps differed the subject with the complete route 
produced the greatest amount of speech, compared to when the maps were 
similar. This increased further when both subjects had parts of the 
route on their map, and again in this condition when the two maps were 
incongruent.
To investigate the speaker's performance in more detail, Anderson 
devised map protocols. These documented which features the speaker 
should mention and the direction of the route in relation to these, to 
allow an accurate representation of the route. This provided an 
objective record of the speaker's instructions. Results indicated
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that incongruent features generally produced more effective 
descriptions. Yet on some occasions where more dialogue was evident 
for incongruent features, this did not necessarily imply more 
effective instructions since subjects were simply repeating 
information.
This research is useful in illustrating what conditions may produce 
more active behaviour in joint communication tasks. As Anderson 
concluded:
"It seems that the most difficult tasks produce the most talk from 
listeners*, and if we want to encourage their participation, we 
should increase not decrease the demands the tasks make of them."
In contrast to previous research these task-oriented games stress the 
interaction between pairs of subjects while solving a joint problem. 
They highlight what is involved in successful communication and 
identify good and poor communicators due to their interaction. 
Furthermore, the studies illustrate how both the speaker and listener 
have an active role to play in successful interaction. And Anderson 
discovered certain conditions which increased communication and 
participation from both speakers and listeners.
P ^ c h m JER_conclusion
This chapter in v e s t ig a te d  the  development of communication s k i l l s  in  
r e l a t io n  to  language. The f i r s t  s e c t io n  gave a b r i e f  account of what 
communication in  language invo lves , and then  considered how the c h ild  
may develop and acquire  the  necessary s k i l l s .  The main in f lu en ces  
focused on the  debate between in n a te  or environmental fa c to rs  i n  the  
development of communication s k i l l s .  However, i t  was argued th a t  t h i s  
debate under s t r e s s e s  the  importance of in t e r a c t io n a l  s k i l l s  fo r  t h i s  
development. The sec tio n s  t h a t  followed then  discussed th e  
development of communication s k i l l s  in  d ia logue and how the c h ild  
performs in  in te r a c t io n a l  s i tu a t io n s .
Young ch ild ren  have demonstrated many problems w ith the development of 
meaning and in t e r a c t iv e  s k i l l s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  
communicate inform ation to  a l i s t e n e r .  However, these s k i l l s  improve 
over the school years .  The s tu d ie s  in d ic a te  th a t  young ch ild ren  a re  
d e f ic ien t  in  severa l  main communication s k i l l s ,  such as the a b i l i t y  to 
provide e f f e c t iv e  messages, to ev a lu a te  the  con ten ts  of inform ation, 
the awareness and d e tec t io n  of communication f a i l u r e s ,  and the  a b i l i t y  
to respond a p p ro p r ia te ly  to in form ation .
Many exp lana tions  have been given fo r  t h e i r  poor communicative 
a b i l i t y ,  however, the e a r l i e s t  and most dominant one was th a t  of 
P ia g e t 's  egocentrism p r in c ip le .  This a t t r i b u t e s  the  f a i lu r e  to  the  
c h i ld 's  i n a b i l i t y  to adopt a l i s t e n e r ' s  p e rsp ec tiv e .
Past research  commonly a t t r ib u te d  th e  c h i l d ' s  communicative f a i l u r e  to  
P ia g e t 's  egocentrism p r in c ip le ,  although the research  ou tlined  here  
has shown the  l im i t a t i o n s  of th is  approach. As Shatz pointed ou t,
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communication is far more complex than the earlier Piagetian theories 
assumed. Yet this work has been exceptional in stimulating research 
on language development for several decades.
Some of the studies concentrated on the child*s ability to communicate
a reference to another, heralded by Glucksberg et al's referential 
communication paradigm. Their study indicated that young children 
were indeed exhibiting egocentric qualities, since they generated 
private one-person descriptions. Yet, future studies indicated that 
this was not the case. For example, Asher and Oden (1976)
demonstrated that children often produced messages that were even 
inadequate for themselves, thus they could hardly be labelled
egocentric.
Reasons for the child’s poor referential ability were then attributed 
to many other complex and varied sources. For example the
complexities of the task itself, and the limitations of the child’s 
cognitive and attentional capacities on such things as vocabulary, 
expertise, and comprehension. As well as this, it was noted that 
communication draws on many sources of information, which may be 
governed by the limitations of the individual’s processing system.
Other possibilities were the fact that young children may not possess 
the necessary specific language skills to develop joint two-person 
codes for describing reference with a partner (Krauss and Weinheimer, 
1964, 1966). In addition, several studies indicated that children 
apppeared to be describing the referent, while ignoring the 
nonreferents, and thus producing poor identification relative to the
101
set of alternatives (Asher and Oden, 1976). This reflects a general 
failure to attend firstly to the totality of a situation, such as the 
context of reference, and secondly to take the listener’s view of the 
context into account. These two explanations, however, are not 
totally inconsistent with egocentric speech.
Yet later research demonstrated that young children could indeed 
compare the referent with the nonreferents, producing informative 
descriptions, providing the comparison task was simple in vocabulary 
and cognitive demand (Whitehurst and Sonnenschein, 1981). In less 
complex conditions 4- to 5-year-olds were capable of producing 
informative messages, comparing the referent with the nonreferents. 
Indeed they were often successful at comparison activities providing 
the experimenter clearly outlined the task. This implies that the 
child is unaware of the experimental demands, since with feedback and 
prompting (as would be natural in real life situations), communication 
skills improved. Thus many communication skills were available but 
not enacted.
The research that followed clearly demonstrated that children were 
able to communicate information to a partner. This indicated the 
inadequacy of simply attributing any communication problems to 
egocentrism, but rather to other aspects of communication.
A second major attack on the egocentrism principle were a range of 
experiments which demonstrated that far from giving isolated 
soliloquies the young child was able to adapt their speech to their 
listener's needs appropriately taking the other's perspective. Video
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recordings illustrated 4-year-olds adapting their speech to 2-year- 
olds, as compared to chatting with adults (Shatz and Gelman, 1973,77), 
and children as young as 3 years were shown to be capable of social 
interactions and mutual understanding (Mueller, 1972, Garvey and 
Hogan, 1973). Social behaviour was indeed the rule and not the 
exception. Furthermore, a number of studies indicated that as early 
as 2 years old, children show some idea of conversational 
responsibility, where they attempted to respond when required (Bloom, 
1976).
Thus Piaget*s theoretical framework for communication appears
outdated, and no longer sufficient to explain the child’s
communication development, since it overlooks many other important 
language issues. In addition, it holds constraints on the
development of conventions and communication on the whole, since 
language is a social phenomenon, learnt through interactions. The 
speaker and listener are part of the whole interactional unit, and not 
independent, isolated entities, as the concept of egocentrism 
requires.
Thus when children fail to perform as expected, it does not 
necessarily demonstrate an absolute inability to solve the task. 
They may indeed possess the necessary skills but misunderstand what is 
required of them. Furthermore, when children do succeed on other 
tasks, it should not be assumed that they have done so in the same way
as adults. Childrens performance varies in different tasks, and in
some appropriate contexts they have performed extremely well.
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The task itself and the measures employed may often determine if a 
skill exists. One criticism levelled at this task-specific approach 
is that perhaps the skills used by the child are unique to that task, 
and not generalizable to other situations where they use natural 
language.
The bulk of research carried out has demonstrated further complexities 
and problems with the investigation of language development, although 
the more knowledge that accrues should eventually lead to some general 
language development framework. However, it appears that the
acquisition of meaning and communication skills develop with the 
growing body of knowledge in a variety of different areas, especially 
the cognitive, social, and linguistic ones. Furthermore, with the
expanding number of cross-cultural studies on more primitive 
societies, and non-Western cultures, the definition of any broad, 
general communicative abilities should become clear.
More recently communicative competence is viewed as uniting a variety 
of subskills, each of which is necessary for successful communication. 
Thus lack of one of these skills in the child's knowledge base, leads 
to inadequate communicative ability. Although seemingly plausible, 
objective proof of this explanation is not readily accessible.
Alternatively, something between structural change and processing 
demands may be more adequate to assess the child's communicative 
competence.
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As fo r  the  development of the  c h i l d ' s  communicative a b i l i t i e s  and 
meaning s t ru c tu re ,  severa l th ings  have become c le a r .  F i r s t l y  th a t  
the pa ren ts  play an important ro le  i n  guiding and shaping the  c h i l d ' s  
development, and secondly th a t  these  developments take place w ith in  
communicative experiences in  the  c u l tu ra l  environment.
These earlier studies appear to view language development and 
communication as a * one-shot' activity at describing some referent. 
For example, where the speaker produces some single utterance that is 
judged as either effective or not. In contrast, later research places 
more emphasis on the interactional possibilities of the exchange where 
both speaker and listener negotiate certain solutions, and the 
reference may be distributed over a whole series of interactional 
turns. Thus speaker and listener use the interaction to clarify 
messages and so produce greater understanding. These later studies 
consider whether children are able to use the interaction to their 
advantage, since studies on referential communication indicate that 
young children have difficulty providing adequate messages. Deutsch 
and Pechman (1982) found evidence that young children were capable of 
this. They demonstrated that children of 3» 6, and 9 years improved 
their messages with feedback and prompting from the experimenter. 
This implies that any initial deficits could not be due to linguistic 
constraints, since children responded favourably with assistance.
Studies conducted independently by Anderson, Brown, and Lloyd, 
investigated interaction while pairs of children attempted to solve 
some joint problem. Although subjects are restricted by the task 
itself, they are left to discuss the problem as they wish and in how
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much depth and detail. To encourage free interaction the tasks are 
generally fairly long, and involve interaction with a peer. This 
allows an investigation of the interactional process and such things 
as the distribution of information over turns, the involvement of both 
speaker and listener, the number of interrupts, queries, and feedback 
occurring, and so on. These tasks allow an objective measure of 
communication through a standardized task and involve more naturally 
occurring dialogue.
Studies concerned with the development of communication skills 
generally investigate children from 6 to 13 years old since this is 
where interactional skills appear to develop and consolidate. Thus 
although children are capable of communication and demonstrate 
conversational responsibilities from an early age such as 2 and 3 
years old, their ability to perform successfully in communication 
experiments does not appear to develop until much later. For example, 
younger children generally give a relatively poor communicative 
performance, improving steadily over a long age range. However,
although they are not always totally successful in these experiments, 
it is still clear that they can communicate, since in many situations 
they perform well. For example, with their parents who generally use 
the interaction to motivate the child, and maintain the conversation.
The work carried out in this thesis is concerned with the development 
of interactive communication skills, and the next chapter outlines the 
computer maze-game task used on 7 to 13 year old school children who 
communicate with a same-aged partner. In this respect the task is
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more realistic in terms of everyday communicative situations than 
previous studies conducted by those such as Piaget, or the Robinsons, 
where the subjects had a specific problem to solve with the 
experimenter present throughout. A task based game has the advantage 
of promoting natural and extended dialogue yet within a very 
restricted reference domain. Topically subjects become involved in 
solving the task and thus less aware of the dialogue they produce. 
This contrasts with earlier communication tasks where subjects were 
explicitly instructed of the task requirements, such as with the 
referential communication tasks of Glucksberg et al, Asher and Oden, 
Krauss and Weinheimer, and so on, where subjects would be more aware 
of the dialogue produced. The computer maze-game enables an 
exploration of how children deal with extended conversation within the 
wider and more natural interactional framework of a game. The game is 
so devised to produce location descriptions from the children, yet 
’hew1 and 'when' is totally dependent on the subjects themselves. In 
this respect the task provides a more sponataneous and dynamic 
situation compared to recent task-based experiments of say Lloyd or 
Brown, where one subject was predominantly the speaker while the other 
predominantly the listener throughout the task.
The rich data base produced from the computer maze-game allows one to 
explore many aspects of communication, in particular how subjects co­
ordinate their interpretations of maze locations and develop 
restricted interpretations for the language they are using. The maze- 
game is basically a co-operative one which raises questions concerning 
mutual knowledge and semantic negotiation, with an added advantage of 
investigating referential communication in a wider and more extended
interactional setting than earlier research experiments allowed.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF SIMILAR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
The experimental studies reported in this thesis explore the processes 
of semantic co-ordination in natural dialogue and how they develop in 
school-age children, using a specially designed computer maze-game. 
The advantage of the maze-game over the other experimental tasks which 
we have discussed, is that it enables an exploration of extended 
interaction within the framework of a wider communicative setting. 
Children are involved in a co-operative game with a same-aged 
partner, where either subject may describe points as they choose, 
rather than instructed to describe a series of reference. 
Furthermore, children are not restricted by role or specific task 
requirement, nor was the experimenter present throughout. Several main 
developmental issues, which were discussed earlier, may be 
investigated from the game, such as the ability to provide adequate 
information and describe locations on a maze spatial array, the 
listener's ability to monitor the information and provide appropriate 
feedback, subjects' joint ability to develop and negotiate restricted 
interpretations for describing maze locations, the type of 
descriptions and schemes used to describe positions, and so on. 
Section A. will briefly explain the experimental computer maze-game in 
more detail, while the following sections will review similar 
experimental research.
A, OVERVIEW OF THE COMPUTER MAZE TASK
The computer maze-game, which is used in the main study, was developed 
by Garrod and Anderson, and programmed by Mullin, Glasgow University. 
It involves pairs of subjects attempting to solve a joint co­
ordination problem, by spontaneously describing positions on a maze.
10B
Subjects are seated in separate sound-proofed computer booths, in
front of a VDU, and communicate through headphones and microphone. An 
identical maze-shape appears on each player’s screen, as shewn in
Figure 3.1, and the game involves manoeuvring the X through the maze 
to the *. Each subject's X and * are in different locations from 
their partner's, and they are unaware of each others position on the 
maze unless verbal descriptions are given. In addition a number of 
barriers block the paths, (small vertical or horizontal lines across 
paths), and a number of switch nodes (small s) are distributed on both 
mazes in different positions. Players can only see their own
configuration of these. Players move alternately from one node to 
another along the paths and have to get to their * as quickly as 
possible, incurring few penalty points.
Subjects should proceed towards their goal until they encounter a 
barrier. If they attempt to pass it they rebound back to their
initial position and two penalties are incurred against their joint
penalty score. In addition there is a joint move score shown on each 
screen. To overcome the barrier, the player must locate their
partner's position on the maze, and direct them into one of the 
troubled players s nodes. When they move into this designated node 
the troubled player's gate state reverses. That is, all their
previous gated paths are now open, and all previous open paths are now 
gated. In this way, the blocked player may now proceed towards their 
goal, along this specific path, until another barrier is encountered 
and the whole process repeated. Players may also move into a node 
where one of their partner's switches lie and so unintentionally
reverse the others barrier configuration.
s
a.
x
U  J
h r h r n,ir— r n.
i— 1__r n
_r h r h r l
lr J— IT J— U
FI
GU
RE
 
3.
1
EX
AM
PL
ES
 
OF 
TH
E 
TW
O 
MA
ZE
S 
FO
R 
PL
AY
ER
S 
A 
AM
D 
B 
AT 
TH
E 
BE
GI
NN
IN
G 
OF 
A 
GA
ME
Thus players are not instructed how to describe points or indeed that 
they have to, such descriptions occur spontaneously as a direct 
consequence of the task itself. Each game generally generates 
several maze location descriptions and this allows for an analysis of 
the dynamic development of description schemes within dialogue pairs.
Several tasks have been developed which share certain features with 
the maze-game. They involve either co-operative games, explicit 
description from spatial arrays, or just constrain the topic of 
discourse in some other way. Each will be examined in turn to 
highlight certain aspects of the experimental maze-game.
Co-operative tasks depend on the individual’s cognitive skills and 
their ability and readiness to communicate and take the view of the 
other. Some studies have indicated that co-operation is more 
effective than individual efforts, and that co-operative groups do 
better than competitive ones. Yet group performance is often less 
than that of the best individuals (Georgas, 1985, 1986). Evidence 
suggests that co-operative ability develops with age, evolving from 
the individual’s competence to reflect upon the nature of knowledge, 
and decentralise that knowledge (Reith, 1988). As with egocentrism, 
problems are not confined to childhood and are also apparent 
throughout adult communication.
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Schelling (1960) investigated problems of co-ordination, where 
subjects were in interdependent decision making situations. This 
involves situations where the best course of action for each person 
depends on the expectations and decisions of the others involved. 
For example, deterrence concerns the prevention of an action occuring 
by way of a threat which is believed to hold, or as Schell pointed out 
with failed deterrence:
"He, thinking I was about to kill him in self-defence, was about to 
kill me in self-defence. So I killed him in self-defence.11
Schelling discussed hew people reach agreement when communication was 
not available. For example, two parachutists landing on an island 
without arranging a meeting place, or two nations with conflicting 
views, deciding what action to take once communication has broken 
down, and wishing to produce some agreement.
In these situations, Schelling proposed that a decision is generally 
reached by tacit bargaining. This relies on mutual belief and 
certain heuristics which influence their choice of action. For 
example, each person calculates what action they expect the other to 
take, taking into account what the other expects them to do, and so 
on, ad infinitum. This process is not interactively formulated, but 
calculated individually via higher order expectations, in a reflexive 
manner.
According to Schelling, the heuristics which influence the decision 
are salience, familiarity, uniqueness, and precedence. The salience
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heuristic involves choosing the most obvious and natural solution to 
the problem, whereas uniqueness involves the most prominent solution. 
While precedence involves following any previous solution. As we have 
already seen in Chapter 1, this may develop into a convention where it 
becomes common knowledge between those involved that this is the best 
course of action. Familiarity is similar to this heuristic where 
the solution which is most well known is followed. Furthermore, any 
conflict over what solution one would prefer is overwhelmed by the 
need to reach a common solution.
The computer maze-game used in this thesis involves a co-ordination 
problem, where players are in an interdependent situation, although 
communication is constantly available. The game allows an
investigation into co-ordination problems and how they may be solved. 
For example, the use or preference of certain heuristics may be 
examined, and whether the solution evolves explicitly or tacitly. 
There are a variety of different mazes shapes used in the game, and if 
one is predominantly row based where lines are the most salient 
feature as in Figure 3.2, we may investigate whether subjects are 
influenced by this (salience). And if they are, then will they 
continue to use this strategy in the second game as a precedent, or if 
the maze is now most salient in terms of figures as in Figure 3.3* 
would they change their descriptive strategy to accomodate the figural 
shape? These are just some of the issues which may be investigated 
with the computer maze-game.
Schelling1s account provided a general explanation of co-ordination 
problems and how they may be solved in a theoretical way. The
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experiment reported next provides an early example of interdependent 
de ci si on- raaki ng.
Deutsch and Krauss (1960,1962) investigated bargaining agreements, co­
operation, and conflict, between individuals, where interdependent 
decisions had to be made. This produced interesting results for 
world-wide communication, since they were essentially interested in 
the effects of communication on bargaining, and the role of threat in 
influencing people to make decisions. Similar to the computer maze- 
game, players were in an interdependent state where co-operation was 
necessary to solve their problem, however in the above experiment 
there was also a degree of conflict present.
The task took the form of a * trucking game* where two players were 
assigned the names Acme or Bolt, and had to organise a trucking 
company where goods were driven from location A to B via a set-up 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. Players could deliver the goods via the 
short route, which was a one-lane stretch of road, or via a route 
which was 56$ longer and thus less lucrative in terms of delivery 
costs. For example, one delivery gave a subject 60 cents, however, 
operating expenses were deducted from this figure at one cent per 
second, thus shorter routes were most lucrative.
Subjects were seated in separate rooms and could view the development 
of each game on a panel, and instructed to gain as many cents as 
possible. All money, however, was imaginary.
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To induce elements of threat two opposing trucks could not pass each 
other on the one lane stretch of road, thus producing competition to 
travel on this stretch. Furthermore routes could only be changed at 
their starting points - such that if they are on the one lane stretch 
and have to change route, they have to reverse to the starting square 
and then change. In effect, the players must overcome this
competition, and co-operate to solve each game.
Deutsch and Krauss were interested in discovering the role of 
communication and threat in alleviating conflict and so manipulated 
these two variables, and examined the effect on bargaining 
agreements.
With the communication variable, each game could have: no
communication; optional communication where subjects may interact if 
they wish; or instructed to talk on every trial in the compulsory 
communication condition.
In the threat condition Deutsch and Krauss manipulated the use and 
control of two gates. These could only be closed on the one lane 
stretch yet opened wherever they were on the route. There could be: 
no threat during a game where the gates were not used; bilateral 
threat where both subjects control their gates; and unilateral threat 
where one subject controls their gate while the other did not. The 
dependent variable was their joint payoff.
Deutsch and Krauss found convincing evidence that levels of threat 
affected agreement since agreement between the players was most likely
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in the "no threat" condition, where there were no gates available to 
the subjects. It was more difficult to reach in the unilateral 
threat condition, since if conflict arose threat would be used, and 
most difficult to accomplish in the bilateral condition.
Communication was then introduced to determine its influence on 
reaching an agreement. In the optional communication condition very 
little interaction actually occurred. Compulsory communication was 
most effective in influencing subjects to reach an agreement, where 
joint payoffs increased significantly in the unilateral threat 
condition, but not the bilateral one.
Thus, when both subjects could use threat, compulsory communication 
did little to alleviate conflict, since competition was already high 
between them. Compulsory communication only helped subjects reach a 
decision when one could use threat over the other. In the no threat 
condition, communication had no effect. Players who could use threat 
generally did better than those who could not, since if a conflict 
occurred threat would be used where possible, where the threatened 
party generally felt hostile to this.
Deutsch and Krauss were primarily interested in bargaining and threat, 
and so their dialogues were not coded further. They noted that 
communication was functional and generated for a purpose, such as co­
ordinating plans, developing agreements, and issuing threats.
In connection with the computer maze-game both tasks involve 
interdependent situations where players should co-operate to solve
115
their problem. In the trucking game an element of competition was 
present through individual money tallies, and threat and communication 
were manipulated. While in the maze-game task, competition is not 
present and subjects have a joint total number of penalties and move 
score. They are instructed to co-operate with one another to reach 
their goal positions. External threat is available in the form of 
the "monster", however this threatens both players and often produces 
greater unity to help overcome it. Thus although both tasks share 
certain similarities they are essentially investigating different 
aspects of communication.
Another aspect of the computer maze-game is that it involves subjects 
describing points from spatial arrays in order to progress to their 
goal. Other researchers have investigated this issue and considered 
hew subjects describe spatial arrays and points within them.
For example, Linde and Labov (1975) requested residents of New York 
City to describe the spatial layout of their apartment. In this way, 
speech is constrained to that of apartment layouts, and descriptions 
can be more reliably quantified and compared.
They discovered that this monologue condition generated well-formed 
speech acts, since subjects described their apartments in two main 
ways. The "tour" was the most popular category as:
"a speech act which provides a minimal set of paths by which each room 
could be entered."
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97$ of the descriptions generated fell into this class of imaginary 
tours where spatial layouts were transformed into organized, linear 
descriptions. For example, one subject gave the following tour type 
analysis:
"You walked in the front door. There was a narrow hallway. To the
left, the first door you came to was a tiny bedroom. Then there was 
a kitchen, and then bathroom, and then the main room was in the back, 
living room, I guess."
In addition, they noticed that within this tour descriptive category 
were sub-sections. For example, people generally began describing 
their apartment from the front door, and when they reached a fork they 
described one branch first, and then jumped back (in one step) to the 
fork and described the next branch.
They named the second description type the "map", which constituted 3$ 
of all the layouts. This concerned a global description of the 
apartment, which was further analysed into more detailed local 
descriptions by top down processing. For example:
"I'd say it's laid out in a huge square pattern, broken down into 4 
units... Now on the ends -uh- in the two boxes facing out in the 
street you have the living room and a bedroom."
From this evidence, they concluded that people basically use fairly 
consistent patterns to assist them in describing spatial arrays based 
on rules of social interaction, social conventions, and abstract
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discourse processes . This im plies  th a t  inform ation  i s  not simply
stored in  a t o t a l l y  confused manner, ra th e r  th a t  we a l ig n  f a c t s  in  a 
co n s is ten tly  ordered way.
In a s im ila r  type of constra ined  speech production ta sk , Levelt (1982) 
asked su b jec ts  to  describe  simple two-dimensional networks to  t h e i r  
pa r tne r .  He was p rim arily  in te r e s t e d  i n  l in e a r i z a t io n ,  the  way in  
which incoming s p a t i a l  information may be organized seq u en tia l ly .  
Previous work in d ic a ted  th a t  su b jec ts  use co n s is ten t  s t r a t e g i e s  in  
l in e a r i z a t io n ,  such as Linde and Labov's  to u r- ty p e  s tra teg y  where 
m ateria l i s  organized in  a well s t ru c tu re d  l i n e a r  way.
The ta sk  involved changing a two dimensional input in to  a l in e a r  
d e sc r ip t io n  -  o rgan is ing  the  inform ation  in  a s tep  by s tep  ca teg o rica l  
way. S ta r t in g  from the arrow on the  diagram in  Figure 3 .5 ,  sub jec ts  
had to  describe  the  s t ru c tu re ,  to enable a l i s t e n e r  to draw the 
network when presented with the d e sc r ip t io n  on audio tape.
Levelt proposed th a t  the  l in e a r i z a t io n  process occurred in  two main 
ways fo r  genera ting  d e sc r ip t io n s ,  one being predominantly 'speaker-  
o r ie n te d 1 (which Linde and Labov had d iscovered),  and the  l a t t e r  
predominantly ' l i s t e n e r  o r ie n te d . '
In the  'sp e a k e r -o r ie n te d '  model, su b je c ts  described  p o in ts  by
following a tour of the a rray , where each point was c lose ly  connected 
and followed a c c u ra te ly .  Where fo rks  occurred in  the  diagram,
sub jec ts  would describe  one fo rk  f i r s t ,  and then go back to  the other 
point in  one s tep .  The d if fe ren ce  w ith the  ' l i s t e n e r - o r ie n te d
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model’ i s  here , su b jec ts  did not simply jump back to  the  unfin ished  
poin t, but m eticu lously  re traced  t h e i r  s tep s ,  s tep  by s tep , thus 
lengthening th e  d e sc r ip t io n  by anything up to  50$.
Regarding s u b je c ts '  d e sc r ip t io n s  a t  these choice p o in ts ,  Levelt noted 
th a t  th e re  were e i th e r  global or lo c a l  c o n s t r a in t s  on d e sc r ip t io n s ,  
where su b jec ts  could r e l a t e  to  the  whole network, or simply describe  
the immediate a rea .
L evelt’ s experiment c l a r i f i e d  the  two main l i n e a r i z a t i o n  models, and 
e s tab lish ed  th a t  th e re  were d i s t i n c t  l in e a r i z a t i o n  types, since 33 out 
of 53 su b jec ts  ex c lu s iv e ly  jumped back to  the  unfin ished  choice 
po in ts , while 16 out of 53 exclusive ly  moved back s tep  by step .
In comparison with the  computer maze-game both in v e s t ig a te  
d e sc r ip t io n s  generated from s p a t i a l  a r ray s .  Furthermore, they take 
place w ith in  r e s t r i c t e d  re fe ren ce  domains, and in  Levelt*s case the  
f ig u re  i t s e l f  i s  composed of nodes connected by paths, s im ila r  to  the  
maze s t ru c tu re .  These experiments concluded th a t  su b jec ts  g enera lly  
describe p o s i t io n s  in  co n s is ten t  ways. As w ell as t h i s ,  Linde and 
Labov's to u r  type d e sc r ip t iv e  s tra teg y  shares  s i m i l a r i t i e s  with 
Anderson’ s (1983) path type category re fe r re d  to  on page I37and  Table 
3 .2 , where d e sc r ip t io n s  s t a r t  a t  a predetermined p o in t ,  and move 
through the s t ru c tu re  on a d e ta i le d  to u r ,  to the  point in  q u es t io n .  
However, in  th e  computer maze-game Anderson found fou r  main ways of 
describ ing  p o in ts  on th e  maze. As w ell as t h i s ,  the  computer maze- 
game takes  place i n  an i n t e r a c t i v e  communicative environment, whereas 
the above ta sk s  invo lve  monologue cond itions , devoid of n a tu ra l  
in te ra c t io n  and feedback.
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^  REFERENTIAL COMMUNJgATTQty TA?KS
A further aspect of the computer maze-game is that it is a task based 
approach. Brown, A.H. Anderson, Shillcock, and Yule (1984) have used 
similar communication tasks in educational settings to assess language 
and communication ability. They believe that communication skills 
(especially the ability to transfer information), should be taught to 
children at school in a similar way that reading and writing skills 
are. They stressed the importance of effective communication and 
discussed a number of common interactional problems.
Brown et al noted that teachers often investigate language ability by 
requesting each child to discuss some topic such as a hobby. They
point out the pitfalls of this assessment since the free talk
situation often proves surprisingly difficult in terms of cognitive 
demands. For example, in such situations the child has to structure 
and organise a previously unstructured event and it may be unclear 
what knowledge the class shares on any topic. Furthermore, the 
teacher cannot reliably compare language ability across children if 
the topic of discourse is not constrained.
In order to constrain the topic of speech they used co-operative tasks 
where two subjects have some joint problem to solve. For example, 
where one has a simple diagram, and should communicate some
information to the other, in order to replicate the diagram. A pre­
determined set of instructions would be available, outlining the main 
information to be transmitted from the speaker, for the listener to 
successfully replicate the information. This scoring protocol would 
allow communication skills to be reliably assessed and qualified such 
that problem areas could be identified in a more meaningful way.
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In addition, Brown discussed how tasks could vary in difficulty and 
type, and how within each task there could be a graded scale. For 
example, simple tasks would involve describing objects with static 
relationships between them, while more difficult ones would concern 
dynamic objects, and abstract ideas.
One main advantage of these tasks is that thay can be employed over a 
wide range and type of subject group and reliably compared.
For example, Blakar (1973) used a similar referential task to examine 
normal and pathological dyadic communication. In his experiment 
subjects participated in pairs, seated at a table with a low screen 
between them to allow eye contact. One subject was requested to 
communicate a route through a city to another, who had to reproduce 
this route.
In one condition the maps were identical, while in the other they were 
slightly different, such that only a street or two differed on the 
listener's map. This difference should be identified in order to 
resolve the conflict and solve the task. Pairs of subjects, who were 
acquainted with each other, were given 40 minutes to solve the task. 
Failing this time limit, the game was terminated.
Blakar discovered that there was a great variation in the time taken 
to complete the task. Furthermore, subjects used various contracts 
to organize communication, which developed and changed over time.
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This task has al30 been used to examine sex and communication 
(Pedersen,1980), clinical psychological aspects, and social 
psychology, among other things. For instance Solvberg and Blakar 
(1975) investigated communication skills in parents of schizophrenics 
compared to a control group with non pathological off-spring, using 
the task. They discovered that on 4 out of 5 times, the parents of 
schizophrenics failed to solve the task in the 40 minute time limit, 
whereas all of the control group did.
Both Brown et al (1984), Lloyd (1985), and A.H. Anderson (1988), have 
used similar co-operative tasks to investigate many aspects of 
communication. For example, how instructions are conveyed, the 
ability to detect incompatible information, the use of feedback and 
interruptions, and how subjects co-operate towards some joint 
solution.
In one experiment Brown et al (1984) used the task based approach to 
investigate listening comprehension of native English speakers, 
listening to their own language. While comparing successful and 
unsuccessful communicants they hoped to highlight differing 
communicative strategies.
In the experiment two subjects were given similar maps of familiar 
features and told that there may be some differences between the maps. 
One had a route marked on it to be described such that a listener 
could replicate it on their map.
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Using over TOO pairs of subjects of age 13 to 16 years old, Brown 
assessed communication by measuring such things as response times and 
amount of utterances generated in certain conditions. This enabled 
an investigation of communication in problem areas.
Brown noted that successful listeners appeared to recognize a problem 
existed and regard it positively by clarifying their uncertainties. 
They were less likely to accept ambiguous descriptions and requested 
more information when necessary. On the other hand, unsuccessful 
students were more passive, and often accepted highly ambiguous 
descriptions, even when inconsistent with previous ones. From this 
Brown concluded that there were fundamental differences between good 
and poor communicators in identifying inadequate messages and giving 
appropriate feedback.
Lloyd (1985) investigated children*s ability to produce and comprehend 
verbal messages using a similar task. He used pairs of 7- and 10- 
year-olds, compared to 12 adults, where same aged subjects had to 
communicate information to each other.
Two subjects were placed in separate rooms and given identical maps of 
a community, where each familair feature could be uniquely identified 
and described by colour or pattern (see Figure 3.6). One player had a 
route drawn through their map to communicate to the other, to enable 
them to mark this onto their map. The roles would then be reversed. 
The communication took part via telephone, and Lloyd video- and audio­
taped the games, and made full verbal transcripts of the dialogues.
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Results indicated that the 7-year-olds offered significantly less 
adequate descriptions than the two older groups, producing an even 
performance as listeners and speakers. While children of 10 years
made twice as many errors when they were listeners compared to 
speakers, and the adults produced far more efficient and precise 
descriptions.
Concerning the amount of discussion, the 7-year-olds said the least, 
compared to the 10-year-olds who produced more speech that the adults. 
Lloyd concluded that the youngest group failed to provide sufficient 
information, while the middle group demonstrated much redundancy, and 
the adults produced more economic descriptions.
While investigating the way subjects described the route Lloyd noted 
four main strategies emerging. Other strategies were used, however, 
they were far less frequent and only accounted for less than 3% of all 
the descriptions.
These strategies were primarily descriptive ones, and not conceptually 
differentiated in terms of underlying categories. Yet they indicate 
differing ways that subjects* chose to describe points on the map, and 
furthermore the age of subjects appeared to influence their choice of 
description.
The minimal strategy (M) involved the speaker simply referring to 
various parts of the map, without concentrating on specific locations. 
They considered the area in question, but not how to move there 
through the map. For example:
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A Right you1re at school 
B 14m hmm
A Go all the way to the garage 
B Yeah
A Up to the church 
B Yeah
When additional information was given it was generally limited and 
ambiguous.
The numerical strategy (N) basically concerned counting out the 
various moves. For example:
A From the first garage you go up, you go up and then
you turn to the third church
B The third church?
A You go up to the fourth house.
A common error with this strategy involved the describer failing to 
give their initial counting spot.
The components strategy (C) gave more consideration to the listener*s 
needs, with a more detailed account of the route, while pointing out 
alternative routes. In addition, information was given in workable 
units while waiting for confirmation at each part. For example:
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A Right, then is a house, two houses, right?
B Yeah
A On each side, now there1s, there's one with a, er, 
aerial in't there?
B Right, where?
A On the chimney 
B Yeah
The directional strategy (D) discussed straight forward directions, 
without reference to distance or features on the map. For example, 
'left1, 'up1, 'straight down', and so on.
Lloyd found that the 7-year-olds preferred the M strategy, and used C 
and N strategies as well, but rarely D. The majority of their
descriptions were inadequate where they displayed lack of co­
ordination between pairs, lexical errors, attentional lapses, and 
provided inadequate listener feedback.
The 10-year-olds used mainly the C strategy, where the listener's 
needs were now taken into consideration. They provided more
successful descriptions, with little difference from the adult group, 
yet they were similar to the youngest group in terms of the mean
number of strategies used.
Adults, on the other hand, preferred the D strategy, as well as the C
and N strategy. On the whole they used multiple descriptive
strategies, such as DfC or DfN. In comparison the children were more 
rigid and usually used one descriptive strategy at a time. For
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example, only two children used multiple descriptive strategies. Thus 
adults appear to be more flexible, choosing the most efficient 
strategy to describe the route, which was generally dual ones. Lloyd 
suggests that the younger children may be incapable of this due to the 
processing demands on providing such information as speakers or 
interpreting it as listeners.
These tasks share certain similarities with the computer maze-game, 
since they are co-operative tasks, and speech is constrained to the 
domain of the task itself. However, all three involve asymmetrical 
role assignment since in each condition one subject is predominantly 
the speaker, and the other the listener. Thus although communication 
is constantly available to both subjects, their role as speaker and 
listener are pre-defined, and speech is often uni-directional. On 
the other hand, the maze-game allows subjects to communicate and 
describe points when and as they wish, thus their roles, as well as 
the objectives of the experiment, are fairly ambiguous.
Nevertheless, these tasks have provided very interesting results for 
communication ability and illustrate the advantages of a task based 
approach for comparing a large number of subjects from different 
groups and varying age.
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iL-£PNCLUSION
The tasks reviewed here share certain features with the computer maze- 
game used in this thesis. For example, they either are set in a 
restricted reference domain; involve describing points from spatial 
arrays; or investigate interdependent decision making. However, the 
computer maze-game cultivates multiple aspects and combines elements 
from each area to produce an effective task to investigate natural 
dialogue. The review was intended to give a brief history of the 
progression of communication tasks to illustrate the advantages of the 
maze-game in view of previous communication research.
The maze-game involves an interdependent decision making situation 
where pairs of subjects attempt to solve a co-ordination problem. 
Schelling (1960) discussed co-ordination problems in interdependent 
situations, although he was primarily concerned with how they were 
solved when communication was not available. For instance through 
mutual beliefs and the use of certain heuristics. An early example of 
co-ordination problems was that of Deutsch and Krauss (1960,1962) who 
used a co-operative game to investigate the effects of communication 
and threat on reaching agreement in conflicts. In this
interdependent situation, subjects were competing against each other, 
and not together as in the computer maze-game, and Deutsch and Krauss 
were not interested in coding the actual dialogues generated. They 
found that agreement between two aggressors was most accessible where 
neither could use threat over the other, and most difficult when both 
parties had the ability to use threat. Compulsive communication was 
most effective in the unilateral threat condition, but not in the 
bilateral threat condition.
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Another aspect of the computer maze-game task involves spatial 
descriptions. Linde and Labov (1975), and Levelt (1982),
investigated hew subjects describe points from spatial arrays, using a 
content analysis on the descriptions generated. However, both were 
monologue conditions, and subjects were specifically instructed to 
describe points in the array. These studies concluded that subjects 
describe in a consistent and organised linear way, since several main 
ways of describing structures evolved from the analysis.
More recently communication has been investigated via referential 
tasks, where subjects communicate pre-determined information to each 
other. In this way, dialogue is restricted to a specific reference 
domain, and subjects are instructed what is required of them but not 
hew to do it. Blakar (1973), Brown et al (1984), Lloyd (1985), and 
A.H. Anderson (1988), have all used such tasks to investigate 
communication ability.
A.H. Anderson et al argued for the superiority of the task based 
approach within a restricted reference domain, since a series of tasks 
may be devised with a pre-determined scoring protocol in order to 
assess communication ability.
This referential communication paradigm, first devised by Glucksberg, 
Krauss, and Weisberg (1966) and explained on page 74, has been used 
widely to investigate communication ability. The experiments 
generally involve pre-determined situations where subjects are 
instructed what is required of them with the experimenter present 
throughout. However, one should be wary of extrapolating from
129
certain task specific situations since this may only tap the child's 
ability to solve a specific task. The strategies employed may be 
unique to the experimental situation, and not generalizable to natural 
language use and communication on the whole.
We should attempt to study real life communication in natural 
situations. Yet it may prove difficult to quantify unconstrained 
speech in a reliable and consistent way. For example, if we study 
general conversation, hew can we compare and contrast different 
dialogues? A controlled experiment on the other hand, involves
excluding irrelevant variables and precisely studying others, which 
often involves concocting a situation unlike the real world. Thus an 
experimental task is required where dialogue is constrained, yet in as 
natural a way as possible. In addition, the basis of the task should 
be disguised and incorporated into a broader interactional framework, 
to obscure the communication task as such and make participants less 
aware of themselves as the object of linguistic analysis.
The computer maze-game attempts to fill this gap with a task where 
pairs of subjects have to co-operate to solve a joint problem. A 
task-oriented experiment has the advantages of promoting natural and 
spontaneous dialogue, while some aspects of the artificiality of the 
situation are removed. For example, most subjects typically become 
involved in solving the task to the extent they are unaware of 
themselves as the focus of interest. Thus dialogue is unrehearsed so 
that what fliih-tftftt-.H discuss is pre-determined but not how they discuss 
it. Thus the maze-game is not a descriptive task as such since it
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goes beyond context, and subjects may choose whether to describe 
locations or not. And when points are described speech is constrained 
to the restricted reference setting of the maze domain. In this way, 
the dialogue may be reliably quantified and assessed across any 
subject in the experiment and a large number of subjects may now be 
compared.
Furthermore, the maze-game gives a record for each game, coding the 
maze shape, gate reversal states, each move and time from a zero 
baseline, time taken to solve the task, number of moves, and number of 
penalties incurred. The record can be directly correlated with the 
dialogue itself since at each move a tone is put on the tape. This 
gives an independent source of data to the dialogues recorded.
One further advantage of the maze-game is the fact that the 
experimenter does not need to be directly present throughout the task, 
thus keeping the experimenter effect to a minimum. For example, 
subjects are instructed on the rules of the game, and then placed in 
separate computer booths and left to communicate with their partner. 
Since the experimenter can follow the games in a separate computer 
booth, their presence is minimal, only appearing when problems arise, 
or when requested. This may be evidenced by the freedom of the 
dialogue and acute change when the experimenter entered one of the 
subject booths. To this extent, the dialogues generated remain as 
natural as possible in this type of laboratory setting.
The experiments reviewed in this section were presented in order to 
give the computer maze-game a historical background, by way of
131
illustrating similar research areas. The review is by no means 
exhaustive, nor was it intended to be, and simply serves to highlight 
several main features of the task. For example the aspects of 
interdependent decision making, restricted reference domains, and 
spatial descriptions.
The next section investigates work by Anderson (1983), and Garrod and 
Anderson (1987), who used the computer maze-game on adult subjects. 
It provides a useful background to this thesis since many of their 
assessment procedures have been followed. Furthermore, it illustrates 
the flexibility of the task to be used over a wide age range of 
subject groups, to produce a rich corpus of data which can be reliably 
compared.
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C. CO-ORDINATIOM OF MEANING IN ADULT DIALOGUES
1. INTRODUCTION
Anderson (1983), and Garrod and Anderson (1987), used the restricted 
context of the computer maze-game to investigate the extent to which 
adults negotiate a common semantic system during the course of a 
dialogue. They argued that the meaning of expressions in everyday 
use are often tacitly negotiated by the dialogue partners themselves. 
Thus, although conventional meanings underpin all communication, they 
found evidence that speakers engaged in any extended dialogue develop 
restricted interpretations for the expressions they are using. 
Typically these are related to their particular function in that 
interaction, and are dependent on the social context. This suggests 
that the semantics of natural dialogue may be more flexible and 
subject to the local interaction between speakers than has generally 
been assumed. Indeed they conclude that their research:
"certainly suggests that general conventions of meaning serve only as 
starting points for interpretation, perhaps giving default meaning 
which may be overwritten by more local and transient conventions set 
up during the course of the dialogue."
Anderson (1983) used the computer maze-game to analyse the semantic 
and social-pragmatic nature of meaning in natural language 
expressions. He focused on the descriptions generated during the 
game, in order to determine the effect of pragmatic factors on the 
development of meaning in expressions.
The main findings and conclusions from this research have been 
summarised in Garrod and Anderson (1987) (see also Anderson and
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Garrod, 1987), and are reported in the next section of this chapter, 
however, there are other aspects of Anderson's (1933) thesis which are 
of interest and will be reported here.
2._PR0SLZH, SOL V I3G_ ll}_ THE. COMPUTER, MAZS^GAME
Anderson analysed data from 28 pairs of same sex undergraduates from 
Glasgow University, who played two computer maze-games each, producing 
a total of 56 games. lie had four main experimental conditions. The 
first *was a baseline condition and involved pairs of subjects simply 
playing two computer maze-games on symmetrical mazes. He then 
compared earlier playec games with later played games to investigate 
’whether practice effects the players' efficiency in solving the task.
The second condition analysed the effect of a maze monster on 
subjects behaviour and generation of descriptions. The maze monster 
takes the form of a small 'M' on each subjects maze, and moves once 
for every three moves of the players. Its aim is to foliow one of 
the players until it occupies the same node, where the game terminates 
and player 3 have failed. Players succeed if they reach their 
respective goals before the maze monster reaches them. Thus players 
should avoid the monster at all costs to prevent termination of the 
game.
The third condition Anderson analysed was the effect of various maze 
shapes on subjects behaviour and dialogue. He devised specially 
constructed maze shapes, such as composed of predominantly columns or 
rows, or figural ones which had less paths and nodes to traverse. In
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this way Anderson could examine the effect of the various mazes on the
generation of descriptions. For example, if a predominantly row
based maze is used, one can ask whether subjects describe points in 
terras of rows, or continue using the descriptive scheme that they had 
used previously (ie. in the previous game).
The fourth condition was a reassignment manipulation where Anderson 
matched certain subjects depending on their previous descriptions. 
These subjects had already played two maze games and were reassigned 
depending on the descriptive strategies they used.
To compare the various conditions Anderson used four main measures. 
These were the number of moves by players to achieve a solution, the
time taken to reach the solution, the rate of moving (that is the
number of moves per minute), and the mean number of utterances by both 
players between successive moves (an utterance was a players 
contribution bounded by their partners). These measures were readily 
accessible since each maze-game produced a computer printout, giving 
details of the maze used, gate reversal states, move number, and time 
of each move from a zero baseline. (A similar analysis was carried 
out on the child sample used in this thesis, see Chapter 4, Section
B.).
In the baseline condition, Anderson compared the first and second 
games in order to investigate whether any practice effect was 
occurring in solving the task. From the four measures taken, he 
concluded that a practice effect was evident, since players were 
becoming more efficient at solving the task from their first to second
135
game. For example, later games required significantly fewer moves to 
reach the solution, implying increasing efficiency between subjects. 
With this control data at hand, Anderson could compare the other three 
conditions with this. The results of these four conditions are 
summarised in Table 3.1.
In the monster condition, he found a significant effect of slowing 
the subjects rate of moving, as well as producing a significant 
increase in utterances between moves. Anderson expected such
results, since monster games were strategically more difficult, 
requiring increased planning and co-operation in order to defeat the 
monster and avoid its path. Thus one would expect fewer moves per 
minute and more utterances in order to plan ahead.
Similarly, Anderson found a significantly slower rate of moving on the 
specially constructed mazes. This again may have been expected since 
fewer path-ways on more difficult mazes would presumably lead to more 
planning and less moves. Yet he found a non-significant difference 
between the number of utterances between moves, although they were 
higher than the baseline condition.
With the final condition, Anderson discovered that changing partners 
did effect the dialogue generated. For example, the reassignment 
study shewed a slower rate of moving than the baseline study, as well 
as a higher mean number of utterances. Both of these differences 
were significant, thus proving the importance of pragmatic factors in 
the generation of dialogue. Compared to the baseline study there was 
an immediate effect from the manipulation of subject variables. One
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might have expected less of a difference, since in effect subjects 
have had more experience on the maze-game. However, the manipulation 
of subject variables had such an effect as to significantly reduce 
their efficiency on the task.
3 f SEMANTIC.AND _PRAGMATIC.ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTIONS 
Anderson carried out a cluster analysis on the main semantic analysis 
of the 1356 descriptions generated. Four different basic schemes were 
found for describing points on the maze, which are illustrated in 
Table 3.2. In this classification scheme each descriptive type relies 
upon different conceptions or mental model of the maze onto which 
language may be interpreted. For example, path descriptions depend 
upon a path network model of the maze, whereas line and co-ordinate 
descriptions rely on a set of models in which collections of nodes are 
organised into horizontal, vertical or even diagonal vectors. On the 
other hand, figural descriptions require the identification of complex 
patterns of nodes such as "T-shapes" or "rectangles” or "right 
indicators". To this extent, the various descriptions are both 
conceptually and semantically distinct from each other (see Chapter 5, 
Section A. for a full discussion of the descriptive types).
Anderson suggested that the descriptions used may be determined by the 
various restricted models people have, and that once formed these 
models are used for reference. Thus interlocutors appear to agree on 
a spatial conception of the maze which they would then use for 
reference. As Garrod and Anderson (1987) state:
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T A B L E  3 . 2
E X A M P L E S  OF T H E  F O U R  D E S C R I P T I V E  T Y P E S  G I V E N  B Y  G A R R O D  
A M D  A N D E R S O N  ( 1 9 8 7 )
(1) Path network
"See the  bottom left, go  along four and up one  
that's w here  I am"
(2) Co-ordinate
"I'm on the  third row and fifth column"  
or
"I'm at D five"
(3) Line
"I'm on  th e  third level, s e c o n d  from the  right"
(A) Ficnirai
"See th e  middle right indicator, well I'm on the  
left of it"
"pairs of speakers are able to negotiate both the form of model 
underlying their descriptions and the way in which the language maps 
onto this model."
Furthermore, they noted that there was a strong social-pragmatic 
factor present within pairs of subjects where they often entrained 
each other, and ended up using the same terms to refer to the same 
concepts. Thus although a great variety of descriptions were used 
across pairs of speakers, within a given pair the descriptions were 
unusually similar. Thus speakers were conceptualizing the mazes in a 
similar way and converging onto idiosyncratic schemes depending upon 
special restricted codes.
Garrod and Anderson noted that on several occasions the players 
explicitly discussed what a term referred to, however, on the whole 
the mutually shared reference evolved tacitly. This process
eliminated any ambiguity as to what certain terms referred to, and 
aided efficient comprehension. Thus dialogue partners were co­
ordinating their language through tacit negotiation, to define 
mutually acceptable descriptive codes and their extensional 
semantics. That is, the things they can refer to. This appeared to 
be a product of the interaction itself, rather than the physical 
context of the situation.
In addition, Garrod and Anderson observed continuous improvement in 
co-ordination of descriptive types from game one to game two, which 
produced greater entrainment. For example, in game one, 10 out of 
the 21 dyads shared a predominant descriptive type, while in game two
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19 out of the 21 dyads shared the same predominant type. And the 
descriptive type used in game one may not be the same as that adopted 
in game two, by the same pair of interlocutors. For example, there 
was a tendency for dyads to shift from perceptually salient schemes to 
more abstract ones, at the same time producing greater co-ordination. 
In this way, they often dropped path and figural descriptions in 
favour of co-ordinate or line type, as the dialogue proceeded.
jL_gQLyi^g..ISg-CQr.QPJNATJON_pROPLEM
The computer maze-game involves a joint co-ordination problem, which 
basically requires the establishment of a mutual base of conception 
and language to refer to locations on the maze. As illustrated 
earlier, this co-ordination problem may be solved through explicit 
negotiation, where interlocutors openly discuss the type of scheme to 
use. Garrod and Anderson found this to be particularly evident with
their co-ordinate descriptive scheme, where interlocutors often
negotiated a particular code system to uniquely describe each point on 
the maze. However, this solution did not appear popular from their 
transcripts. Instead it occurred predominantly after some problem in 
communication cropped up, where there had been difficulty reaching a 
mutually suitable descriptive scheme. They discovered that when a 
scheme had been explicitly negotiated between communicants it was
often abandoned thereafter, especially when problems developed.
Therefore, they concluded that explicit negotiation did not play a 
great part in solving co-ordination problems.
Alternatively, Garrod and Anderson (1987) proposed that interlocutors 
solve the co-ordination problem in a more flexible and cost effective
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way. They proposed a simple language convergence control principle, 
termed output/input co-ordination which results in a joint referring 
expression in a relatively short period of time. Following this 
principle, speakers should always attempt to equilibrate processes of 
production with those of comprehension within any given exchange. 
Thus in the computer maze-game context, a speaker formulating any
description should employ the same model and construal of the language 
against this model, as that which yielded a satisfactory
interpretation of the last relevant utterance by his or her partner. 
If both participants do this, they will quickly converge on a
mutually satisfactory description scheme without having to engage in 
any explicit semantic negotiation. Thus interlocutors establish a 
mutually shared meaning system, with the minimum of collaborative
effort. Furthermore, both interlocutors are involved in generating 
the dialogue. As Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1985) and others have shown 
(see Chapter 1), this minimisation of collaborative effort appears to 
be crucial to theories of this type, since dialogue occurs 
spontaneously and dynamically in actual use.
Garrod, Anderson, and Sanford (1984), (see also Garrod (1987)) were 
able to simulate many adult description sequences with a computer 
model following this principle. However, they also discovered some 
of the limitations associated with the principle.
First, they discovered that rigid adherence to output/input co­
ordination blocked the development of novel description schemes, since 
introducing any new schemes once co-ordination had been achieved, 
requires at least one participant to violate the principle. This
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implies that once a descriptive strategy is adopted it will be 
difficult to change. Hence, it did not account for the co-ordinated 
development of novel schemes within the strict constraints of
output/input co-ordination. They noted, however, certain
interactional strategies that speakers may adopt to overcome this
limitation. One particular strategy required the pair to accept an 
implicit division of labour and epistemic control, whereby one speaker 
acts as arbiter over the scheme while the other agrees to accept
arbitration.
Thus communicants allow a system of * master and slave1 (Lewis, 1978) 
to control the interaction, where the 1 master1 controls the 
descriptive strategy adopted, determining any changes, while the 
’slave* accomodates to these requirements. As Garrod and Anderson 
state :
"In this way, one of the participants will adapt to the other, who is 
free to introduce any modifications in the scheme used by the pair."
Indeed they noted that among adults it was not uncommon to see 
dialogues where sill new description schemes were only introduced by a 
single speaker and subsequently followed by their partner.
Furthermore, they found that if the follower attempted to introduce 
any description which failed to match that used previously by the 
leader, this was queried in some way.
A second limitation of their principle concerned the way it searched 
out mutual knowledge of the scheme. They point out that in
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interpreting any description, a listener presumes that the speaker 
shares the same scheme just so long as the description is 
interpretable against their own one. In other words, output/input
co-ordination only guarantees mutual knowledge in a falsification 
definite way. Thus, one may only be certain that their partner has 
a different scheme (ie. when interpretation fails) but never be 
certain that they have the same scheme. For instance, they point out 
that within a co-ordinate scheme the same location in the centre of 
five-by-five maze, can be given the same description (say C3) 
according to at least four different co-ordinate subschemes (starting 
at the top, bottom, left, or right). This means that output/input
co-ordination is a poor mechanism for co-ordinating on the more 
abstract schemes, at least in the absence of strong circumstantial 
evidence.
Garrod and Anderson used the computer maze-game to demonstrate that 
local conventions can be built up during the course of a conversation. 
They found that adult pairs demonstrated strong evidence of co­
ordinating their descriptive schemes. Thus within a particular dyad, 
interlocutors entrained each other such that they would end up using 
the same scheme.
Furthermore, this co-ordination increased across games, where subjects 
were using dialogue more like their partner as the interaction 
progressed. They formed particular idiosyncratic codes,
synchronizing their intentions and thoughts, to produce increased co­
ordination from the interaction itself.
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Garrod and Anderson also discovered that adult speakers steadily moved 
from relatively concrete schemes, such as path or figural, toward more 
abstract ones, such as line or co-ordinate. For example, 50'^  of 
adult pairs used a different scheme predominantly in the second versus 
first game, and most adults who shift schemes did so as a pair. In 
other words, most speakers did not shift to a scheme used by the other 
member of the pair in game one, but rather shifted together to a new 
scheme. For example, 7055 changed scheme as a pair.
This evidence demonstrates a general convergence on a similar 
description scheme across the dialogue, with progressively increasing 
co-ordination. This was linked to the steady development of more 
abstract and generally more efficient languages of description.
In conclusion they discovered that communicants generally do not 
explicitly discuss how to describe points on the maze, rather the 
descriptive code evolves tacitly. They offered a language
convergence principle, pointing out both its advantages and 
limitations, which explains how a joint referring expression may be 
formulated in a short space of time.
The study reported in this thesis sets out to discover if young school 
children can co-ordinate their use of language and interpretation in a 
similar way. Semantic co-ordination is an essential process in 
learning to use any language, since the child has to enter into a 
system of shared conventional meanings while engaged in the primary 
task of conversing. This aspect is investigated while using some of 
the above measures used by Garrod and Anderson.
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This experimental study explores the development of semantic and 
conceptual co-ordination between speakers and listeners in the context 
of a specially designed computer maze-task. Pairs of same-aged 
school children were asked to solve the joint task, which elicits 
spontaneous dialogue yet within a very restricted domain. The 
dialogues typically contain a number of location descriptions which 
enables an investigation of semantic negotiation and the emergence of 
co-ordinated description schemes. This may provide some insight into 
how young children negotiate towards a mutual conception of the 
meaning of expressions and enter into a shared system of meaning.
This section discusses the procedure through which this development 
was investigated, while the following two sections document some of 
the more general findings from the research, such as subjects* 
efficiency at solving the task, and their basic language performance. 
This present section will begin by considering the experimental 
hypotheses behind the investigation.
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The study was directed at three main questions:
a) the general question of the degree to which the different age 
groups co-ordinate their language while engaged in solving the joint 
problem of the maze-game. If dialogue partners were co-ordinating 
their interpretation, each should predominantly be using the same 
language code as the other. This involves investigating 
descriptions generated within a given dialogue, and determining the 
extent to which communicants employ the same language to describe 
points on the maze, as compared with other members of their group.
It was hypothesized that older children may negotiate and fix onto a 
common descriptive scheme with less difficulty than younger children.
b) It was hypothesized that the dialogue co-ordination between players 
should increase over the games. Research by Garrod and Anderson 
(1987) has demonstrated that adult subjects produce a reliable 
increase in co-ordination during several interactional tasks.
c) The pattern of convergence and ohange of description schemes across 
games was investigated. It was hypothesized that younger children 
will demonstrate a more rigid appreciation of descriptive schemes, 
adhering to certain successful schemes and failing to adapt and 
improve their scheme over time. Garrod and Anderson (1987) observed 
that adult speakers tend to change their descriptions between the 
first two games, steadily moving from relatively concrete schemes 
(such as path or figural) toward more abstract ones (such as line and 
co-ordinate) •
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To investigate these hypotheses the following computer maze-game was 
used which will be explained in full detail below.
Two subjects were seated in separate sound-proofed computer booths, in 
front of a computer terminal, and each wore a set of headphones and 
microphone for communication. They were then instructed on the rules 
of the game indicating the specific features on the maze. The
experimenter stressed that they were not competing against each other,
but co-operating to solve a joint problem where they have a joint
penalty and number of moves score. Subjects were asked to repeat 
parts of the rules to the experimenter to ensure adequate
understanding.
If subjects appreciated the rules, they were then given three more 
computer maze-games. If not, they were either given further
instructions, or their data was disgarded from the sample, after
participating in the games.
An identical maze-shape appeared on each player's computer screen - 
the players' position indicated by the X on their maze, which they 
have to manoeuvre along the paths to their goal position, denoted by
an asterisk * (see Figure 4.1). Each players X and * were in
different positions and they could only see their own, thus they were 
naive to each other's position unless verbal descriptions were given.
They were instructed to move towards their goal as quickly as 
possible, incurring minimal penalty points, and that the game only
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terminated when both were in their respective goals. Players moved 
alternately from one node to another, and could only do so when their 
X flashed and at no other time, nor could they forfeit their turn. 
Thus if one player reached their goal first, the two had to continue 
to take turns until their partner also entered the goal.
To complicate matters a number of obstructions were in the paths of 
subjects. For example, approximately half of their available
pathways were blocked by small vertical or horizontal lines 
perpendicular to the direction of the pathways. These prevented the 
subject from traversing this path. To compensate, approximately one 
third of available nodes were switoh nodes, represented by a small 
ns", which could be used to switch the gate configuration over. The 
operation of these "s" nodes are explained below. Players could only 
see their own configuration of barriers and nsM nodes.
If a player attempted to traverse a gated path they would rebound to 
their initial node and two penalty points would be awarded to their 
joint penalty score. This score was displayed at the bottom of each 
player* s screen. In this way, players could use the barriers to 
remain in the same location. Players also had a joint total moves 
score which indicated the number of moves made by both players to that 
point in the game. It was expected that these joint scores might 
produce a measure of co-operation rather than competition.
As we have already indicated in Chapter 3 and section A, subjects 
would thus proceed towards their goal until they encountered a 
barrier. In order to overcome this barrier, they require the oo-
148
operation of their partner since the "s" nodes may only be operated 
this way. For example, if player A is blocked by a gate they must
find player B's position on the maze, and then direct B into one of
A's nearest "s" nodes. When B moves into this designated node with
A's directions, then A’s gate state reverses as indicated in Figure
4.2. That is, all previously gated paths are now open, and all 
previously open paths are now gated. In this way, the player may now
proceed towards goal along this specific path until they encounter
further gates, requiring the generation of further maze location
descriptions. Each player sees their own configuration of "s" nodes
and nothing results when they move into their own. However, if one 
of the players moves into a node where the other has an "s" then this 
would unintentionally reverse the barrier configuration for that 
player. Such accidental gate reversals were common.
After each game, subjects were given a quick "memory test" for the 
maze configuration. Their computer screens were dimmed to prevent 
them viewing the maze, and they were given a 6X6 photocopied maze 
shell, composed only of nodes (see Figure 4.3) and instructed to draw
in the missing paths in the form of the maze just viewed. This was
an attempt to gain insight into how they conceived the overall shape 
of the maze. For example, if they were using a horizontal line-type 
strategy to describe points on the maze (see page 2I2L), then perhaps 
they would see the maze as a configuration of parallel, horizontal 
lines and so emphasise this in their drawing.
It is important to note that children were not instructed to describe
points nor told how to describe them, rather this occurred
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spontaneously as a result of the task itself. Thus dialogue would 
typically consist of descriptions from the maze-game and success would 
depend, to a certain extent, on the formation of a co-ordinated 
description scheme between two players, where they co-ordinate their 
language to express positions in the maze.
SUBJECTS
14 pairs of 8-, 10-, and 12-year-old school children participated in 
the maze-game from Hillhead Primary and Secondary School, which have a 
local catchment area of Hillhead, Glasgow. Both schools have a 
substantial proportion of ethnic minorities with around half of the 
children being indigenous white. The children who played the maze- 
game had English as their first language, and were drawn from both 
populations. No attempt was made to control for the social and 
economic background or academic ability of the children, and both 
subject populations have a mixed spread of social class and income 
background. Children were randomly paired by their teacher, who 
worked through each class on the basis of those children who had 
returned their permission slips. This procedure exhausted the 
available subject population at the Primary school, but not the 
Secondary school where teachers randomly selected the pupils who would 
play the maze-game. There was an equal number of male, female, and 
mixed pairs throughout the three age groups of children.
APPARATOS
The computer maze-game task was developed by Garrod and Anderson
and consisted of using three Apple11 computers and a four-
track tape recorder. The maze programme was written by Mullin, from
the Psychology Department, Glasgow University. Subjects sat at a
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terminal in separate sound-proofed computer booths, and all 
communication took place through headphones and microphone, which was 
connected to a TEAC A-3340 four-channel tape recorder. Two tracks of 
the tape-recorder were used for recording each subjects speech, and 
the other two for each subjects distinctive tone, which occurred 
every time they moved on the maze. All dialogue was recorded on EMI 
and BASF 6 inch reel tapes. In addition, the speech was recorded onto 
a portable Philips audio tape recorder, using 90 minute BASF tapes. 
The third Apple'll computer was in the experimenter's control room,
along with the four-track tape-machine. On this master computer the
experimenter could view the development of the game and monitor all 
speech.
To move their X through the maze, subjects used a four-way push­
button box, where the four buttons corresponded to up, down, left and 
right.
A computer printout was available for each maze-game played, which 
documented: every move made by the players (and the monster when 
used), the time of each move relative to a zero baseline and total
game time, the maze shape with "s" positions and gate states, total
number of moves and penalties incurred by both players (see Appendix 
B). The printout thus indicated successive game states, and could be 
used to relate any verbal description to the point being described on 
the maze.
After each game, subjects were given a photo-copied maze-shell diagram 
and coloured markers, and asked to construct the shape of the current 
maze. They were then given school utensils for participating in the 
study. 151
BffgJgN AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
There were a number of independent variables which could be 
manipulated in the maze-game. These were the shape of the maze used, 
the distance from start to goal, partner variables, and whether to 
include the maze-monster in the game. The monster was optional and 
represented by an wMn on both subjects mazes. The nMn moved once for 
every third move of both players, and followed one player at a time 
abiding by their maze configuration of barriers, and attempting to 
occupy the same node position. If it succeeded, then the game 
terminated and players had failed.
Subjects were introduced to the maze task by a simple practice game 
where they could view each others position on the maze, and which was 
not audio-taped. In this game their start and goal positions were 
located nearby so that they had only two or three barriers to overcome 
to reach their goal.
The first game was a baseline one played on a square type maze where 
subjects X and * were placed a reasonable distance apart, and the 
monster was not present. It was expected that later games might be 
solved more efficiently than earlier games due to a practice effect.
The second condition used the maze monster to investigate the effect 
of a threatening force on players behaviour, using more complex maze 
shapes. It was hypothesized that the monster should increase co­
operation between the players and lead to more planning and discussion 
in order to avoid its path. Monster games were expected to take 
longer than baseline ones, except in the case where one of the players 
was defeated by the monster.
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The third manipulation involved the effect of the maze shape on
subjects descriptions. A variation of maze shapes were used in this 
study and Appendix A contains all mazes used in this study. These 
varied from the symmetrical square maze shape, to the more complex 
column or row based mazes, to the figural star type shapes.
The more difficult mazes had fewer paths to traverse, and were
expected to lead to more problems, forcing subjects to depend more on 
their partner, rather than avoiding a barrier by taking an alternative 
route to their goal. Thus we may expect more time and detailed
planning in order to succeed, with a slower rate of moving in these 
games.
Furthermore, the effects of the maze shape on subjects' descriptions 
could be investigated. For example, if rows were the most
predominant feature on the maze would subjects describe points based 
on a horizontal line descriptive category? In addition, the role of 
precedence could be investigated. For example, if subjects played 
their first game on a column based maze and described points in terms 
of columns, would they continue using this strategy in the next maze 
game even if it was not the most efficient strategy to use? These 
conditions were ordered alternately over players.
Thus each pair of subjects played one short practice game which was
not audio-taped, followed by a first baseline game, a second monster
game on a slightly more complex maze, then a third monster game on a 
more complex maze.
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All speech frcxn the games was transcribed, documenting the players 
name, age, and the specific maze used for that game. Players were 
easily discriminated from the audio-tape recordings since each was on 
a separate track, and would be transcribed in different coloured inks
to differentiate clearly between the two. In addition each turn was
numbered so that specific parts of dialogue could be clearly 
identified. In this way each game was transcribed as a unit. The 
dialogues produced in each game were generally several minutes long 
and contained a number of location descriptions. These were
highlighted and abstracted for further analysis.
JZGQIffiL
A minimum of coding was used in the transcriptions, generally for 
abbreviations such as LHS, RHS, for left and right hand sides, or C 
for corner. Since pauses were not the main focus of this analysis 
they were not timed and only represented by a + sign. Thus anything 
over one second of a pause during a players speech was noted, ignoring 
the pause where one player ended and the other began. Overlapping 
speech was noted in the transcriptions, in the following way.
Player A: I’m not sure what you mean)
Player B: Oh I know)
It’s the first line, at the top
Interruptions were also coded, where one player abruptly cut the other 
off, in  the fo llow in g  way.
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Player A: I know it's/
Player B: Oh I've got it
Once all the dialogue had been transcribed in this way, the 
experimenter carefully read over the transcripts highlighting the 
descriptions (see page 201 for a full account of a description).
^  THE SUBJECT'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMPUTER MAgE^gAME 
In order to fully understand the joint task imposed on subjects, an 
account will be given from their perspective which may apply to any 
player on the computer maze-game.
After being instructed on the rules of the game, the player was seated 
alone in a sound-proofed computer booth with a set of headphones and 
microphone, in front of a computer terminal. A maze shape with an X 
and * was displayed on the screen as shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 
4.5. At this stage, players joint penalty and number of moves score 
are at zero since no moves have been taken. Furthermore, they have 
no indication of their partner's X, *, gate state and "s" 
configuration. Occasionally both subjects switches or barriers 
coincide, hcwever, this is accidental and may occur from time to time 
with gate state reversals.
Thus both players have identical maze shapes, however, they are aware 
that their X, *, barriers, and "s" nodes are in different positions. 
The first player to move (player A), would see their X flashing on the 
screen. This flashing would continue until player A moved the X from 
one node to the other. It was compulsory to move when the X flashed
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and the only time that players could do so. From the position on 
Figure 4.4, player A could either move up one towards their goal, 
rebound off a barrier, or move down one. Since the aim is to move 
towards the goal and incur as few penalties as possible, moving 
upwards is the best solution. When player A moved upwards then both 
subjects see a tally with Move 1 at the bottom of their screen. This 
node is one of player A's "s" nodes, although it will not affect the 
game in any way unless player B also had an "a" node here. Players 
cannot affect their own gate configuration wherever they move on their 
maze.
Now player B's X would flash indicating their turn to move. Player A 
may decide to take advantage of this move since they require a barrier 
removed in order to proceed towards their goal. Since player B is 
unaware of the location of player A1 s "a" nodes, they have to be 
directed into one, preferably one in the intended direction of player 
B. Thus player A should first find player B's location on the maze, 
and goal position, and then direct them into player A’s nearest "s" 
node. From Figure 4.5 player B may move downwards or leftwards 
towards their goal, however, since player A requires an "s" node 
activated, then they should direct player B d o u n u a r d s  . Once player B 
moves into this specified node they are one move nearer to their goal, 
and have also reversed player A* s gate state. Thus all player A1 s 
previously gated paths are now open, and all their previously free 
paths are now gated. Now player A1s X will be flashing, and they may 
proceed towards their goal as further barriers permit in Figure 4.6.
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FIGURE 4.6
PLAYER A‘S MAZE 
X = POSITION MARKER 
$£= GOAL POSITION
This next node that player A moved into housed one of player B’s "s" 
nodes, thus unintentionally reversing player B's gate state, 
detrimental to their current position, as indicated in Figure 4.7. 
Thus it may be in their joint interest to constantly check each others 
position and intended moves to ensure that no accidental gate state 
reversal occurs. Now player B's X is flashing, however, barriers
prevent them from progressing towards their goal. Thus they decide to 
rebound off the barrier to remain in the same node. They require 
assistance from player A and do not wish to move upwards and thus 
further away from their goal. To attempt to traverse a blocked path 
results in their X rebounding back to their initial position, and both 
players incurring two penalty points against their joint penalty 
score. Thus their joint number of moves score will be at 4 and their
joint penalty score at 2.
Now player A's X is flashing. Player B finds player A1 s position and 
goal, and then directs them r i g h t  one,int° one of player B's "s" node. 
Once player A moves into this designated node as shown in Figure 4.8, 
player B’s gate state is reversed to their initial gate state as 
indicated in Figure 4.9. Player B's X is now flashing and they may 
proceed along another path towards their goal position. Their joint 
number of moves score will display 6, and penalties remain at 2.
This demonstrates a typical maze sequence and illustrates the
interdependence of players throughout the game. Thus the rules of 
the game generally ensure co-operation and description generation 
between players to overcome their barriers and reach their goals.
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The computer maze-game allows an investigation of joint language codes 
where subjects describe points on a structured array. Players have a 
co-ordination problem to solve, and in doing so must describe points 
on the maze, and it is these terms and what they refer to which are 
investigated as well as the underlying conceptual categories which may 
emerge.
By developing joint descriptive codes, subjects can create a system of 
shared meaning in which the interpretation of any expressions is 
mutually recognised.
The descriptions generated may be further analysed in terms of their 
semantic and pragmatic qualities, and the role shared and mutual 
knowledge play in communication. Indeed this thesis aims to
investigate the extent to which mutual knowledge is required for 
communication, whether prior to, or during an interaction, and hew it 
may develop in the course of an interaction, as well as over age.
Furthermore, we can investigate how communicators cope with, and often 
overcome, the initial difference in their descriptive strategies. In 
addition, many other questions may be addressed such as the efficiency 
of various game types and partners, the prevalence of any memory 
effects from one game to the next, any definite control structures 
that may emerge throughout the games, the effect of different maze 
shapes on descriptions generated, and the monster's influence on co­
operation.
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The following section discusses subjects* overall performance on the 
task, while the next deals with more detailed analyses of language 
performance investigating the actual descriptions generated.
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b t general performance measures
1. INTRODUCTION
This section deals with subjects’ ability to solve the computer maze- 
game task and investigates their general performance. The task 
involves a joint co-ordination problem where pairs of subjects have to 
co-operate with each other to manipulate their barriers and manouevre 
their X to their * position. Since it was obviously important that 
subjects of all ages were able to solve the task and that there were 
no major developmental differences across the age groups, several 
overall performance measures were calculated. These were success 
rates, time taken to solve the game, rate of moving, and the number of 
utterances between moves.
The first analysis concerned the success rates for each age group on 
solving the task. There were three groups of 8-, 10-, and 12-year- 
old school children, and two types of game - those with the monster, 
and those without. Monster games were further divided into those 
where subjects defeated the monster, and those where they failed. 
Since all groups performed well in all conditions it was thought 
sensible to investigate the three age groups further.
The next analysis concerned problem solving ability across age, using 
four main efficiency measures. These were the time taken for that 
game, the number of moves required, the rate of moving, and the mean 
number of utterances between successive moves. This allowed
comparisons between any game from any age group on these four basic 
measures of problem solving ability.
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These four measures were calculated on four sets of maze-game data. 
That is, for each age group on all games, then on the first game only, 
on successfully solved monster games, and then on failed monster 
games.
Finally a comparison was made between successful and failed monster 
games to determine any differences in coping strategies and problem 
solving between those subjects who defeated the monster and those who 
did not.
2. CHILDREN’S ABILITY TO SOLVE THE COMPUTER MAZE-GAME 
The first main analysis was to determine children's ability to 
successfully solve the computer maze-game task. Since three age 
groups of children participated - average age 8, 10 , and 12 years, 
with 28 in each group - it was of interest to discover how they could 
cope with the complex nature of the game. Each pair generally played 
three games, with the second and third games involving the maze- 
monster. The monster complicated the game, since its aim was to 
follow one player at a time, and attempt to occupy the same maze 
square. If it succeeded in doing so, the game terminated and players 
had failed.
Data were pooled in three ways. The first set was taken from all
first games without the monster, the second from all successfully
solved monster games, and the third from all unsuccessfully solved
monster games. It was thought that these three areas would provide
useful comparisons. For instance, to note the effect of a threatening
force on subjects’ performance, and compare those who succeeded in
defeating the monster against those who did not. Furthermore to pool
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first and monster games would confound results, since the monster 
added an extra variable to the game. Table 4.1 illustrates success 
rates across each age group and for each game in proportions.
TABLE 4.1 = GAME SUCCESS RATES IN PROPORTIONS
AGE GAME 1 GAME 2 GAME 3
SUBJECT NO. SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS
8 YRS
N=28 1 .43 .64
10 YRS
N=28 1 .57 .57
12 YRS
N=28 1 .50 .64
A by subjects analysis of variance was carried out with success or 
failure as the dependent variable, age as a between subjects
independent factor, and game as a repeated measures within subject 
factor (ie. first game without the monster, and game2 and game3 with 
the monster). The analysis of variance revealed a main effect for 
game, F(2,78) = 15.13, p < 0.001, the treatment means being 1.0, 0.50, 
and 0.62, for gamel, game2, and game3, respectively. This effect was 
explored using a Tukey test, which demonstrated that gamel > game2 =
game3 at 0.05. Thus game2 and game3 (with the maze monster), had
significantly lower success rates than those first maze-games without 
the monster. The main effect of age proved non-significant, F(2,78) = 
0*057, and the interaction between age and game was also not
significant, F(4,78) = 0.23 (see Appendix D, Table 1 for full analysis 
of variance results).
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Discussion
From these results we can see that all subjects were able to cope with 
the complexities of the computer maze-game task, since all first games 
(without the monster) were successfully solved. In second and third 
games we see the presence of the monster reduced success rates, yet 
all groups performed fairly well in terms of completing the task. 
These results indicate that age does not play a significant role in 
determining success rates, and thus enable us to compare the three age 
groups of children on the computer maze-game.
3. PROBLEM SOLVING ACROSS AGE
The first analysis illustrated that the three age groups were able to 
cope with the complexities of the computer maze-game by simply 
measuring success rates. Hew ever, since these general success rates 
may appear rather crude in themselves, some alternative performance 
measures were also used in order to analyse any finer differences 
between the groups.
The four main measures of efficiency used were based on those of 
Anderson (1983) who compared maze-games played from four different 
experimental conditions with an adult population (see Chapter 3, 
section C. for an account of this work).
The four measures of efficiency employed were:
(i) the number of moves by both players until the game terminated. 
For example, the total number of moves until both players were in 
their respective goal positions, or until defeated by the monster. 
In monster games the move of the monster was not counted in this 
total, only that of the subjects
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(ii) the time taken in minutes to reach a solution, or until the game 
terminated due to failure
(iii) the rate of moving, calculated by taking the number of moves by 
both players over the time taken giving the number of moves per 
minute
(iv) and the mean number of utterances by both players between 
successive moves, where an utterance is taken as a complete turn by 
one player. Thus the total number of turns in one game were counted 
and divided by the total number of moves by both players in that 
game.
In this study the third and fourth efficiency measures are dealt with 
in most detail. For example, the third efficiency measure of the rate 
of moving deals with general performance in the game by taking into 
account the time taken to complete the game, and the number of moves. 
This measure is thus determined by the first and second efficiency 
measures, and these measures are noted in order to illustrate this. 
However, since the first two efficiency measures are confounded with 
success they were not subjected to analysis of variance tests, since 
they would have produced uninformative results in the context of the 
computer maze-game. For example, game time, and total number of 
moves in the game, depend on whether subjects succeeded or failed in 
defeating the monster. Failed games generally produced less moves and 
were shorter than the successful ones and so produce artificially 
shortened game times (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However the ratio of 
the first and second measures provide the third efficiency measure.
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Another interesting measure concerns the amount of speech associated 
with each move with leads us to the fourth efficiency measure which 
shews the mean number of utterances by both players between successive 
moves. It was thought that these basic efficiency measures may 
indicate the extent to which children were able to deal with the 
computer maze-game task.
These efficiency measures were calculated on three sets of data from 
the maze-games. The first compared the three age groups on all 
games. Thus for each age group, the different game types were pooled 
together in order to determine any general differences between the 
groups. The second comparison was carried out on successfully solved 
monster games, and the third on failed monster games, for each age 
group. Each of these comparisons will be explained in more detail 
below.
3.1 GAME COMPARISONS
This involved calculating the mean and standard deviation scores for 
all games in each age group on the four efficiency measures. Thus, 
first games and monster games were pooled in order to get an overall 
picture of efficiency, and determine if any general differences 
emerged between the three age groups. The means and standard 
deviations for the four measures are presented in Table 4.2.
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TABLE 4.2 = GROUP MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON 
FOUR MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY AT SOLVING THE TASK
1.Number of 2.Game 3.Rate of 4.Mean no,
moves in time moving utt.
Age game (mins) (1/2) between
Subiects moves
8yrs M=31.95 M=9.7 M=3.2 M=3.8
N=28 SD= 16 SD=3.8 SD=1.1 SD=2.1
10yrs 26.7 9.6 2.9 4.9
N=28 13.7 4.7 0.9 2.1
12yrs 28.5 9.2 2.9 6.0
N=28 18.5 5.8 0.95 4.7
A by subjects analysis of variance was carried out, with rate of 
moving as the dependent variable, with one between subjects 
independent variable of age, and gamel and game2 as a repeated 
measures within subjects. (Game3 was not included in these analyses 
since not all pairs played three maze-games. For example, due to 
extended game times and school deadlines, on several occasions 
children had to be returned to school after their second game.) From 
this analysis, the main effect of age was not-significant, F(2, 39) = 
0.87, the means being 3.2, 2.9, and 2.9 respectively. The main effect 
of game was also not significant, F(1,39) = 0.6, and neither was the 
interaction of the two, F(2,39) = 0.81. Thus we can safely conclude 
that there were no significant differences in the rate of moving 
across age or from gamel to game2 (full analysis of variance results 
are reported in Appendix D, Table 2).
A by subjects analysis of variance was then carried out with the mean
number of utterances between moves as the dependent variable, with age
as a between subjects independent variable, and gamel and
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game2 as a repeated measures within subjects factor (full results 
reported in Appendix D, Table 3). The main effect of game was not 
significant, F < 1, the means being 4.8 for both games. However, the 
main effect for age, F(2,39) 2.6749 p=0.07, was marginally significant 
with the mean number of utterances between moves 3.8, 4.9, 6.0, for 
the 8-, 10-, and 12-year-old groups respectively. This trend
indicates that the means fall in the predicted direction, with some 
tendency for an increase in utterances per move in the older children. 
The interaction between age and game proved non-significant, F(2, 39) 
= 0.84.
3.2 MONSTER GAME COMPARISONS
The analyses conducted so far fail to take into account the second and 
third monster games which relate more importantly to success rates. 
This analysis now deals with this aspect, separating successful games 
from the failed ones. Thus either players had managed to defeat the 
monster by avoiding its path and reached their respective goals, or 
the monster had defeated subjects before they reached their goals.
In each age group there were between 26 to 28 monster games and 
successful ones will be reported first and then failed ones, on the 
efficiency measures, before comparing the two on efficiency measure 3 
and 4. The comparison may determine any differences in coping 
strategies and problem solving abilities which may be apparent between 
subjects who defeated the monster and those who did not. For 
example, it may be that the older group require less moves than the 
youngest age group to defeat the monster, and produce more 
descriptions and detailed planning between moves. Perhaps the
167
youngest age group are saying less and failing to devise co-operative 
plans until the monster is imminent. Or they may be making more 
moves per minute in an attempt to avoid the monster, however, fail to 
consider their goal. These are the type of questions explored here.
The mean and standard deviation scores are shown in Table 4.3 for each 
age group on successfully solved monster games on the four measures of 
efficiency.
FOUR EFFICIENCY MEASURES
W  VH--
1.Number of 2. Game 3.Rate of 4.Mean no.
moves in time moving utt.
Age game (mins) (1/2) between
Subiects moves
8yrs M=33.3 M=9.5 M=3.5 M=4.8
N=28 SD=20.5 SD=4.1 SD=1.4 SD=3.6
10yrs 30.5 11.0 2.9 5.4
N=28 11.9 5.2 0.6 1.6
12yrs 31.0 10.2 3.3 3.8
N=28 17.5 6.6 0.8 2.1
Table 4.4 displays the mean and standard deviation scores of the four 
efficiency measures for the games where subjects were defeated by the 
monster.
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TABLE 4.4 = MONSTER/FAIL MEANS AND SD ON THE FOUR
EFFICIENCY MEASURES
1.Number of 2.Game 3.Rate of 4.Mean no
moves in time moving utt.
Age game (mins) (1/2) between
Subjects----------------------------------------------------------- moves
8yrs M=28.7 M=9.8 M=3.2 M=4.0
N=28 SD=12.2 SD=5.5 SD=1.1 SD=2.2
10yrs 18.9 7.0 2.8 6.9
N=28 12.5 5.0 1.0 5.5
12yrs 17.3 5.6 3.0 6.0
N=28 9.7 2.5 0.9 2.6
A by subjects analysis of variance was carried out on the dependent 
variable of the rate of moving, with age as the independent variable, 
and success or fail as the between subject independent variable. 
Missing values were estimated for that age group by calculating the 
mean of the available figures and substituting these. The main effect 
of age proved non-significant, F(2,39) =1.0 p=0.36, and there was no 
significant interaction between age and success, F(2,39) = 0.8.
However, the main effect of game F(1,39) = 3.0725 p=0.082, proved 
marginally significant. The mean for the rate of moving 3.18 for 
successful games and 2.97 for failed games. Thus subjects tended to 
make more moves per minute in successful games than failed ones (full 
analysis of variance results are reported in Appendix D, Table 4).
Successful and failed monster games were then compared on the mean 
number of utterances between moves. A by subjects analysis of 
variance was carried out with the dependent variable of the mean 
number of utterances between moves, and age as the independent between
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subjects variable, and game as the between subjects independent 
variable. The main effect of game proved non-significant, F(1,39) = 
0.02, mean success = 4.77, mean failed = 4.83. The main effect of age 
proved marginally significant, F(2,39) = 2.68 p=0.07, with the means 
3.79, 4.9, and 5.96, for the 8, 10, and 12-year-old groups
respectively. And the interaction between age and game was also 
marginally significant, F(2,39) 2.8836 p=0.064. This interaction is 
shewn in Table 4.5. (see Appendix D, Table 5, for full analysis of 
variance results).
TABLE 4.5 = MEAN NUMBER OF UTTERANCES
BEMEEOOTEg
AGE SUCCESS FAILED
8 yrs 4.5 3.9
10 yrs 5.5 4.8
12 yrs 4.3 5.8
A Tukey t e s t  rev ea led  th a t  none of the  means were s ig n if ic a n tly  
d iffe ren t from each o th er a t  the  0.05 le v e l .
Discussion
The main p o in ts  from the monster games tended to  be the m arginally 
s ig n ific an t d iffe re n c e  w ith  the r a te  of moving sco res , where the ra te  
of moving was s l ig h t ly  lower in  f a i le d  monster games as opposed to  
successful ones. This may have been expected, where problems which 
have led  to  f a i lu r e  in  th ese  games may have produced increased  
planning w ith  slower r a te s  of moving. On the  whole though, we may 
have expected more speech in  the  f a i le d  monster games but th is  did not 
prove s ig n if ic a n t from the  a n a ly s is  of variance  r e s u l t s .  However, the
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analysis of variance results from the mean number of utterances 
between moves, partially replicated earlier results where there was a 
significant increase in the number of utterances between moves across 
age. Yet the most interesting result hints of an interaction between 
age and success for the mean number of utterances between moves, where 
there is a trend for older subjects to say more between moves in the 
failed monster games.
Observations of subjects’ performances, and from plotting subjects' 
routes through the maze, suggests that on some occasions the 8-year- 
olds appeared to take alternative routes to their goal and avoid the 
monster at all cost, rather than discussing moves and enlisting co­
operation from their partner to switch their gate state. They tended 
to react with excitement in the face of the monster and moved quickly 
to avoid confrontation regardless of their goal position. For example 
the following excerpts are discussions from different pairs of 7/8- 
year-olds discussing the monster:
A Oooh 
B Oh oh 
A What?
B We'd better move quickly 
A Why?
B The monster's going to get you
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A I think I’ll go across again, if I go up I'll be beside the 
monster oooh oooh you go 
B Right I'm stuck
A Where are you oooh I'm at the le right hand side
Go anywhere 
B I can't go anywhere 
A Go anywhere 
B I'm stuck
A Go anywhere just go anywhere
A Hurry up and go 
B Oh no the monster's coming
A Oh no oh no
B Oh no the monster
A Oh no you're letting it in for god's sake
B oh no it's going to bite me
In this way there was less detailed planning between moves. The older 
groups on the other hand, appeared to react less seriously to the 
monster, focusing on the task of reaching their goal position, 
avoiding the monster as they proceeded. In this way, more detailed 
planning and co-operation was required on how to avoid the monster's 
path while attempting to reach their goal. This more challenging 
approach may explain their greater number of utterances between moves, 
before being defeated by the monster. For example, they would be 
moving more carefully, and discussing routes between each move.
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l}f General Discussion
The four efficiency measures were used in order to determine subjects' 
performance at solving the computer maze-game since it was thought
they may reflect skill on the task. However, determining a successful 
performance proved rather more difficult since low scores on time
taken, and rate of moving, may not simply be equated with increased
efficiency. More important for success may be increased planning 
through co-operation and description, indicated by the mean number of 
utterances between moves. For example, some of the older children
spent quite some time planning their descriptions and routes to their 
goal before moving. For example, these conversations between 11- and 
12-year-old pairs of children occurred before they moved on the maze- 
game:
A Hold on until I tell you where I am, I am in the top left
B OK
A And my goal is in the bottom, third from the left I think it's 
the same as yours
This pair continued to describe each others position as they moved 
throughout the maze:
B Right you are bottom left-hand corner no bottom right-hand corner?
A Uhu
A Right where are you?
B I'm on the second line two right. Where are you?
A Second line one left
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While some pairs of 8-year-olds moved very quickly to solve the game 
in several minutes although they produced little goal directed speech 
(ie.descriptions from the maze). For example, rather than direct 
their partner into one of their switch nodes to open an immediate 
gate, they often followed alternative and longer routes where 
possible, only describing maze locations when they were totally 
blocked. Furthermore, they often continued moving back and forth 
between two blocked gates until their partner moved into one of their 
switch nodes by chance and seemed more pre-occupied with moving their 
X than any other aspect of the game. For example:
B And I've got another s three boxes along
A Can you just move?
B And I've got another s one up
A Just move
A Where are you?
B The left-hand side on the second row
A How high?
B Eh three boxes from the bottom 
A It's my go
B Em four boxes from the bottom
A It's my go
A Do you mean you're on the second you're on the second?
B Never mind it's my go
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Overall the efficiency measures produced some trends in performance 
although these were not very striking, and on the whole the results 
appear rather inconclusive. However, it is surprising that the 
results tend to indicate that the 8-year-olds can cope as well as the 
older children in terms of the efficiency measures discussed in this 
section. In terms of the non-linguistic measures there did not appear 
to be any clear cut developmental trends, but there were some
indication of a trend with the linguistic measure (ie. the number of 
utterances between moves). Marginally significant results were 
reported for the mean number of utterances across age, where there was 
a trend for increasing dialogue with age. This next section will now 
turn to language performance in greater detail.
On closer inspection, an analysis of individual performances indicated 
great variability within the age groups where some 8-year — olds 
performed as well as some 10-, and 12-year-olds, while others as
poorly across all the age groups. Thus perhaps skill, rather than
age, would have produced more informative results. Recent work by A.
H. Anderson, Clark, and Mullin (1989) reported this to be the case 
where skill was shown to be more important then age where pairs of 8-, 
10-, and 13-year-old subjects solved joint communication problems. 
However, an analysis of skill was beyond the scope of this research 
since it is difficult to objectively assess exactly what constitutes a 
good or poor performance on the maze-game, and furthermore the sample 
size is too small from each age group to portion pairs into top and
bottom sections, and the main concern of this thesis involved
linguistic measures and the ability of subject pairs to establish 
shared language. Yet evidence from the transcripts indicated pairs
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from all age groups who performed well in terms of describing maze 
locations, planning their moves, and co-ordinating their goals and 
descriptions, to successfully manipulate the 's' nodes, while poorer 
performers tended to describe less, ignore each others comments and 
questions, and often fail to appreciate the logic of the ’s' nodes.
Yet the measures employed in this section ensure that the computer 
maze-game is roughly comparable across the three age groups of 
children used in this study.
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C. LANGUAGE PERFORMANCE
1. INTRODUCTION
This section deals with more specific aspects of communication in 
dialogue and investigates the actual descriptions generated from the 
computer maze-game. To solve the game subjects were required to 
describe several points on the maze. A description was generally 
initiated by one subject asking the other for their position, followed 
by an explanation of this location, with any interaction included. 
This whole interactional package defined a description unit (see 
Chapter 5 for a full explanation of descriptions).
An investigation was made of the number of description units generated 
by each pair of subjects for all the games, and then for each of the 
three game types. That is for the first games, successful monster 
games, and failed monster games. In addition the number of 
description units per move was investigated since this controls for 
the overall game length, and should give a more accurate comparison of 
successful and failed games.
Finally the number of words in each description unit was calculated to 
investigate the overall length of descriptions. It was expected that 
this may indicate the informativeness and interactional extent of the 
descriptions and how garrulous the subjects were. This was carried 
out across age and for the various game types.
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2. QUANTITY OF DESCRIPTIONS GENERATED IN THE MAZE-GAMES 
First the number of description units generated by each pair of 
subjects was calculated. This was then analysed into the number of 
description units generated in each of the three game types. Thus, 
the total number was calculated for each age group, and then 
partitioned into the first games, the completed monster games, and the 
unsuccessful monster games.
Table 4.6 displays the totals and mean number of description units 
generated during the maze games and then for all first games, monster 
success and monster failed games. There were 14 pairs of subjects in 
each age group, and each pair generally played three maze-games, the 
second and third games having the monster present (6 subject pairs did 
not have time to play a third game due to school time limits).
TABLE 4.6 = MEAH HOMBER OF DESCRIPTION OMITS GENERATED BI BOTH
TOTAL DESC 
IN ALL GAMES
TOT.IN 
GAME1
TOT. 
IN MS
UU11U1J
TOT. 
IN MF
8yrs
N=28
41 Games
334 105 130 99
Mean 23.9 7.5 8.66 8.3
10yrs
N=28
40 Games
436 141 190 104
Mean 31.4 10.1 13.6 8.7
12yrs
N=28
40 Games
562 263 183 116
Mean 40.1 18.8 13.1 9,67
A by subjects analysis of variance was carried out with the number of 
descriptions generated per game by both players, as the dependent 
variable, with one between subjects independent variable of age, and 
gamel and game2 as a repeated measures within subjects factor (as
178
stated earlier, some subjects did not have time to play a third game 
due to school time-tables and so only gamel and game2 were used for 
the analysis of variance tests). From this analysis, the main effect 
of age was significant, F(2,39) = 6.75, p=0.003, the means being 7.3, 
11, and 16.6 description units for the first two games, for the 8-, 
10-, and 12-year-olds respectively. The Tukey test was significant at 
the 0.05 level for the difference between the 8-, and 12-year-old 
groups, but not for the difference between the 10-year-olds and any of 
the other groups. The main effect of game proved non-significant, 
F( 1,39) = 0.3, with the means being 12.1 for gamel and 11.1 for game2, 
and there was no significant interaction between age and game, F(2,39) 
= 1, p=.35 (see Appendix D, Table 6, for full analysis of variance 
results).
Investigating the mean number of description units generated by pairs 
of subjects during all games, the 8-year-olds played a total of 41 
games, and in each game both subjects generated an average of 8.2 
descriptions. This increased to 10.9 in the 10-year-olds, and 14 in 
the 12-year-old group. In order to establish whether this was a 
reliable trend a Jonckheere Trend Test was carried out. This proved 
significant with a value of 1433, far greater than the critical value 
of 124, at C=3, n=28, at the 0.01 significance level. Thus the 
difference in description units between any of the groups proved 
highly reliable.
Although this analysis, of the number of descriptions generated per 
game, is interesting and indicative of some developmental change, it
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is nevertheless confounded. For example, the number of descriptions 
per game depends, to a certain extent, on both the number of moves 
made, and the time of the game, since each move gives subjects a 
natural opportunity to discuss their position. So the number of 
descriptions per move would give a more reliable account of the 
density of descriptions, which will be considered next.
3. THE NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIONS GENERATED PER MOVE
To control for overall game length, the number of description units 
generated per move by both players, was then calculated for each game 
type and age group. This was done by dividing the total number of 
descriptions for that game by the total number of moves in the game. 
Table 4.7 shows the number of descriptions per move for both players 
for gamel, successful monster games, and failed monster games, and 
then the average descriptions per move for each age group.
TABLE 4.7 = THE NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIONS PER MOVE
mean no. 
desc. units
total
desc.
mean no. 
units moves
mean no. descr 
units Der move
group
means
8yrs
gamel 7.5 105 33.5 .22
MS 8.7 130 33.3 .26
MF 8.3 99 28.7 .29 .24
10yrs
gamel 10.1 141 29.6 .34
MS 13.6 190 30.5 .45
MF 8.7 104 18.9 .46 .40
12yrs
gamel 18.7 263 35.8 .52
MS 13.1 183 31 .42
MF 9.7 116 17.3 .. . .56 .50
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A by subjects analysis of variance was performed with the mean number 
of descriptions per move by both players, as the dependent variable, 
age as the between subjects independent variable, and gamel and game2 
as a repeated measures within subjects factor. The main effect of age 
proved significant, F(2,39) = 3.12 p=0.05, the means being 0.27, 0.61, 
and 0.76, for the 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds, respectively. A Tukey 
test revealed that the 8-year-olds provide significantly fewer 
descriptions per move than either of the older groups at the 0.05 
level, but there was no significant difference between the 10- and 12- 
year-olds. The main effect of game proved non-significant, F (1,39) = 
1.76, the means being 0.47 for gamel and 0.63 for game2, and the 
interaction between age and game was also not significant, F(2,39) = 
1.85 (see Appendix D, Table 7, for full analysis of variance 
results).
Our results from the number of descriptions generated per game, and
the number per move, show that the youngest age group generate
significantly fewer descriptions than the oldest group, with the
middle group lying in the predicted intermediate region. This result
may have been expected since the generation of maze descriptions
requires fairly complex planning and skill, and it was common for
younger subjects to only describe points when necessary. Observations
of the 8-year-olds performances suggests that on many occasions they
appeared to experience difficulty in describing points, and so tended
to avoid description unless it was absolutely necessary. The
following excerpts are from different pairs of 8-year-olds avoiding
description in various ways (+ represents a pause):
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Pair 1
A Max where are you?
B I’ve just moved. Are you free?
PAIR 2
B Where are you?
A Where are you?
B I’ve to ask you
A But I'm stuck
B Where are you?
PAIR 3
A Nadine where are you?
B Ehm Ehm + I'm at + I am + just trapped by 2 gates
A No I mean are you up or sire you down?
B Ehm I'm up ehm + haven't had my go yet
A Are you down or up?
B Yes
A No, is you + are you + across, down at bottom?
B De de de liddle (singing)
PAIR 4
B Mathew where are you?
A Ehm + I'm near the star. Mine's is flashing, I haven't tooken my 
go.
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B Where are you?
A Ehm I don’t think I can free you. Move again 
B Where are you?
A Oh oh these are killing me (the headphones) I’ll tell you 
I'm not listening now because of these
PAIR 6
A Where are you?
B I'm quite far away from it (the monster). Right your go
The older groups on the other hand, appeared to answer "where are you" 
questions with some kind of description, tending to describe positions 
at various stages of the game, and even when they were experiencing no 
difficulty. For instance, at the beginning of the game they often
asked each others position and continued to do so throughout the
game.
The dialogues appeared to suggest that the younger subjects were very 
concerned about reaching their * position, and perhaps not as aware of 
the value of describing locations in order to manipulate their 
barriers. The older subjects appeared to have a better grasp of the
fundamentals of the game where they co-operated to solve the joint 
problem. Observations from the dialogues suggested this to be the
case on several occasions, where a certain amount of competition was
evident in the 8-year-olds games. For example:
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PAIR 5
B Oh I'm stuck
A Who cares + bounce for all I care 
PAIR 9
A Oh great and don't move anywhere because I want to win 
B I'm going to win 
A I'm going to win 
B I'm going to win
A Are you stuck?
B No
A Good because I'm not going to bother to help you
These possible explanations, of the 8-year-olds having difficulty 
describing points, along with what they perceive as the most important 
aspect of the game, may account for this decrease in descriptions in 
the younger subjects.
4, NUMBER OF WORDS IN DESCRIPTION UNITS
An investigation was then made of the length of the description units. 
For example, it may be that the youngest age group communicate less 
and produce shorter descriptions than the two older age groups.
Perhaps they sire unaware of the quality and quantity of information
required to describe a desired point, and thus produce inadequate 
descriptions. Or perhaps the youngest age group are producing
descriptions with much redundancy, using more terms than necessary 
which carry less information. They may find it difficult to convey
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information in a clear and concise way. If this was the case then 
descriptive length should decrease with increasing age leading to more 
efficient and economic descriptions.
This assessment involved calculating the number of words in each
description unit for each age group, and each game condition. To do 
so the whole description was analysed counting the total number of 
words from both subjects. So the number of words in descriptions from 
gamel, successfully solved monster games, and failed monster games, 
were compared. This should help determine whether the type of game 
affects the length of descriptions generated. For example, perhaps 
in the monster games descriptions will increase, since it is important 
to plan ahead and co-operate. On the other hand, perhaps in gamel 
descriptions will be longer until subjects establish a familiar joint 
language code to describe points on the maze. As the games proceed, 
these descriptions may become shorter, leading to less ambiguous
descriptions being generated.
Table 4.8 displays the number of words generated in descriptions from 
each of the three game types for each age group.
TABLE U.8 = GROOP MEANS FOR THE NUMBER OF WORDS IN DESCRIPTIONS 
GENERATED FROM GAME1 MONSTER SPCCESS (MS) AND MONSTER FAIL (MF) GAMES
_____________ GAME!___________________Jig___________________ ME________
tot. no. no. words tot. no. no. words tot. no. no. words
Age words per desc words per deer words per ,d£fig
8yrs 3037 30.0 3936 30.3 3144 31.7
10yrs 4086 28.9 4766 25.1 2623 25.2
12yrs 5743 24.6 4260 23.3 2800 24.1
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Since the number of words per description is similar for successful or 
failed monster games, all monster games were pooled together and 
compared to the first games (without the monster). Since some pairs 
played two maze-games, while others played three (see section 2), the 
mean of two monster games was used for the latter group. Table 4.7 
gives a summary of the number of words per description in gamel, and 
in the monster games.
TABLE 4.9 = NUMBER OF WORDS PER DESCRIPTION
iSS_________ gamel (no M)________ M games__
8yrs 30 31.4
10yrs 28.9 27
12yrs 24.6 24.3
A by subjects analysis of variance was carried out with the number of 
words per description as the dependent variable, age as the between 
subjects independent variable, and game (monster or not) as the 
repeated measures within subjects factor. The main effect of age 
proved significant, F(2,39) = 3.48 p=0.037, the means being 30.7, 
27.9, and 24.5, for the 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds respectively. A 
Tukey test revealed that all of the means were significantly different 
from each other at the 0.05 level, thus the number of words per 
description was significantly different between the three age groups 
of children. Yet the main effect of game was not significant, F(1,39) 
= 0.058, nor was the interaction of age and game significant, F(2,39) 
= 0.57 (see Appendix D, Table 8, for full analysis of variance 
results). In this way subjects failed to produce substantially 
different descriptions in monster games. Age appeared to be the only
main factor affecting the length of the descriptions.
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DISCUSSION
The results from the number of descriptions generated per game, and 
then move, found a significant difference between the 8- and 12-year- 
olds, with the 10-year-olds falling in the predicted experimental 
direction, with more descriptions in the older children. We may have 
presumed that since the youngest age group produced the least number 
of descriptions, they were saying less. However, the analysis of the 
length of the descriptions has indicated a significant difference in 
description length with longer descriptions in the younger children. 
So perhaps the fact that the younger children are not taking the 
opportunities to interact and describe maze locations, (indicated by 
the fact that they produced the least number of descriptions per 
game), renders them less efficient at this task where they require 
more words to describe the point informatively.
From reading over the descriptions there appeared to be a certain 
amount of redundancy present in the 8-year-olds descriptions. This 
appeared evident from many of their descriptions, which tended to 
suggest that they were indeed having difficulty clearly expressing 
positions on the maze. For example:
PAIR 6
A Can you, can you + where are you Max?
B Right, you know the second bottom row?
A The second, the second bottom row. Yeh 
B And you know how there's 6 squares on that row?
A 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, yeh 
B 4 from the left-hand side 
A 4th on the left-hand side?
B Yeh + on the left-hand side 
A Right 1, 2, 3, 4. So you're there
PAIR 9
B Where are you?
A Ehm you know how there ehm is + right count the middle, 
the middle one? At the bottom? + The middle one at the 
B Yes
A Right ehm + you go up 3 and I'm in the number 3 
B What way left or right?
A The + I'm not sure + I think it's the east
you know 
bottom?
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PAIR 11
B Where are you?
A Ehm + I don’t know. Ehm + 1, 2, 3, 4, at 4 count down at + at on 
the 
B Left?
A Right, left
B Left? 1, 2, 3, 4, and where else are you?
A I'm still there
B You're there?
A What?
B You're there?
A No I'm not there
PAIR 13
A I'm in the middle + 1, 2, 3, 4 
B From the down? 1, 2, 3, 4 down?
A No + across and 1, 2, 3
B Down?
A Yeh
B You are 3 down?
A Yeh
B 1, 2, 3, 4 and then 1, 2, 3, 4
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PAIR 14
A Where are you?
B I’m at + in the bottom + I’m in the second top line + and the
second one from the left
A Oh describe it a bit better. Is it the + is it the first + the
second the fourth?
B The second
A The second line? Ehm which number of line?
B It's number + the second top 
A Which number? No which square?
B Which square? The second one on the second top line
On the other hand, the older children have used more descriptions and 
so have had more experience and practice at this task, and so may have 
a better understanding of the information required. In this way, the 
older children may be using language more communicatively and relative 
to the game. The following are examples of descriptions from 10- and 
12-year-olds, where they appeared to have a clearer conception of how 
to describe locations. For example:
PAIR 1
A Where are you?
B I'm on the third line + 3 left
B Where are you John?
A Second line up + ehm 3 from your + right
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PAIR 4
A Where are you?
B Second line from the bottom second box from the right 
PAIR 7
B Where are you?
A I'm sort of + urn + 4 up from the bottom and + 3 in
PMP l.g
A Where are you?
B Eh + the the bottom line and 1, 2, 3, along + from the right
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter began by explaining the rules and procedure of the
computer maze-game used in this thesis. Basically the game involves 
pairs of subjects solving a co-ordination problem which leads to the 
spontaneous description of various locations from the maze spatial 
array. This chapter discussed the developmental differences noted 
while three age groups of children played the game, by investigating
their ability to solve the task and produce descriptions.
The first section examined the general performance of subjects on the 
task and investigated such aspects as their ability to solve the
computer maze-task. Results indicated high levels of success since 
all first games were completed, and over half of the more difficult 
monster games were successfully solved by all groups of children.
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The next analysis discussed subjects' efficiency at solving the task, 
using several basic measures. The main measures concerned a non­
linguist ic one, the rate of moving, and a linguistic one, the number 
of utterances between successive moves. The only significant 
difference appeared to be on the number of utterances between moves, 
where the older children were saying more between moves than the 
younger ones.
Attention was then focused on the actual descriptions generated from 
the game. This section investigated the number of descriptions 
generated by each pair of subjects over all games, and then in certain 
game types. However, to control for differences in game length, the 
number of descriptions per move was also investigated. Description 
length was then calculated by counting the number of words in each 
one. The main results from these investigations were a significant 
difference in the number of descriptions generated across age with 
more descriptions generated in the older children. Yet this was not 
significantly different across game nor were any of the interactions 
significant. So older children were producing more descriptions than 
the younger ones both in toto and per move.
There was also a significant difference in the number of words per 
descriptions for age, with more efficient shorter descriptions in the 
older children. A detailed qualitative analysis of actual 
descriptions suggested a certain amount of redundancy for the 8-year- 
olds as compared with the more economic and efficient descriptions in 
the older children. It was suggested that the older children may be 
using language more effectively in relation to their task
192
requirements. On the other hand, the 8-year-olds were not saying as 
much overall and producing fewer descriptions, therefore when they 
describe a location they have had less experience and may require more 
words to describe the point efficiently.
One other point worth mentioning concerns the length of descriptions 
which did not reduce over the games. Earlier research produced 
evidence of a progressive reduction in the length of reference over 
time, where interlocutors negotiate more efficient and economic codes 
(Krauss and Weinheimer, see page 76). Yet these tasks are not 
necessarily comparable to the computer maze-game, since the maze task 
requires the differentiation of 1 point from 36 similar others, as 
compared to 1 from 8 different forms from Krauss and Weinheimer's 
experiment. Furthermore, there do not seem to be many opportunities 
for anaphoric reference through pronoun in the maze-game, since each 
point to be described is usually different on each occasion. This may 
be possible with the figural type descriptions, where the reference to 
some configuration of nodes on the maze could be shortened over time, 
yet there were few of these examples generated. Indeed on any of the 
various efficiency measures calculated there were few differences 
across game. The only main significant effects appeared to be over 
age.
The next chapter focuses on more specific elements of the dialogues, 
paying particular attention to the semantics of location descriptions. 
This investigates the meaning of what subjects actually say, and how 
they interact to solve the computer maze problem.
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CHAPTER 5
A SEMANTIC INVESTIGATION OF MAZE LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS
While the previous chapter discussed general performance of subjects 
on the computer maze-game in terms of efficiency, and quantity of
descriptions and speech, this chapter deals with more specific aspects
of the speech. The semantic contents of location descriptions are 
now considered while categorising descriptions into various types and 
sub-types. Descriptions involve the construction of abstract schemes 
where spatial networks are transformed into some mental conception. 
This chapter considers the underlying way that subjects refer to 
positions on the maze and the meaning behind their descriptions.
Many experiments have been carried out where subjects are requested to
describe points in spatial arrays, indicating a variety of ways that 
this may be done. However, the general finding is that these fall 
into a few major categories. Section A. reviews some of this research 
and focuses on an adult study by Garrod and Anderson (1987) who used 
the same computer maze-game as used in this thesis, while section B. 
and C. examine the semantic contents of the descriptions generated 
from children playing the computer maze-game.
A. GARROD AND ANDERSON'S RESEARCH ON ADULTS
Garrod and Anderson (1987) analysed dialogue from 28 pairs of adults 
playing two computer maze-games each. They discovered a variety of 
ways that maze points were described, however, pairs of speakers 
appeared to entrain each other such that they would end up using the 
same particular descriptive strategy. Thus, between different pairs 
of subjects there were a range of descriptions used to describe 
positions on the maze, hew ever, within a pair of subjects their 
descriptions were extremely similar.
1. DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORIES
On the basis of the 1356 descriptions generated in their experiment, 
four different basic schemes were found for describing points on the 
maze. Each will be explained in turn, and then adults' preference 
for each category.
1.1 LINE TYPE DESCRIPTIONS
Line type descriptions involved describing some line of nodes on the 
maze, and then the maze position with respect to this line. In this 
case the overall shape of the maze is viewed as a structure of 
parallel lines which may be numbered from one end to the other. 
Lines may refer to a horizontal, vertical, or diagonal alignment of 
nodes, followed by the position of the point on this line. 
Furthermore, these were not always referred to as a "line" of nodes, 
and it was common to use row or level to the same effect. Thus the 
terms used to define the line were not important, rather, the 
underlying concept of the definition of some line of nodes on the 
maze, followed by the position on this line. For example, referring
to point Z on Figure 5.1 in terms of this category:
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"I'm on the third level, second from the right".
In this instance the subject is treating the maze as an array of 
parallel horizontal lines, counting the first bottom horizontal line 
as the first one. In the third row there are gaps between several 
nodes, however, these gaps are ignored and an overall structure of 
lines is readily imposed onto the maze. In general the subject has to 
interpret the maze as a global configuration of lines in this rather 
abstract way, where they have to define the line number and impose a 
pre-defined code onto the maze.
1.2 PATH TYPE DESCRIPTIONS
Path type descriptions manoeuvre the listener through the actual maze 
pathways to the destination point. Generally a starting point was 
specified and then details of each step towards the point. For 
example, for position Z in Figure 5.1:
"See the bottom right, go along two and up three, that's where I am".
According to this category the listener would locate the starting 
point and then follow the speaker's directions along each path to the 
desired point. Path type descriptions follow the actual paths on the 
maze, acknowledging any gaps and abiding by exact routes. For example 
for point X on Figure 5.1:
"From the bottom left hand corner go along one to the right, then go 
up two, and then go along one to the left, and that's where I am".
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In this case subjects were aware of gaps and unwilling to ignore them, 
thus they were carefully bypassed which increased the description 
length. This increases awareness of the basic shape and structure of 
the maze and relies on a tour of the actual maze paths.
1.3 CO-ORDINATE TYPE DESCRIPTIONS
This category consists of describing two lines of nodes on the maze, 
whose intersection is the point to be described. The maze has to be 
mentally organised into a set of abstract lines, where some particular 
coding scheme is established for designating the rows and columns. 
For example, to describe point Y on Figure 5.1 as:
"I'm on the third row and fourth column" 
or
"I'm at C four".
With this scheme the interlocutors would generally negotiate the code 
to name each row and column. This notation is often similar to the 
Cartesian co-ordinates in mathematics where an overall abstract 
structure is imposed on a grid for naming points efficiently and 
unambiguously. Thus points would be described by giving two details, 
one for the row and one for the column and the intersection defined 
the point. As well as this, some origin point is required from where 
rows and columns are coded. Thus given the above code of C four, the 
listener would begin at this origin point and find row C, for example, 
and then column four, and locate the intersection.
197
These descriptions involve further abstraction from the maze than line 
type descriptions, since they Impose a set of lines and columns on the 
maze, and ignore gaps and actual pathways. For example, gaps are 
often filled by imaginary locations in order to code the maze in the 
desired co-ordinate way.
Co-ordinate type descriptions are thus more difficult for both speaker 
and listener to formulate, since firstly an overall code for rows and 
columns has to be negotiated, and secondly be remembered by both 
participants throughout the game. The speaker must encode the point 
into this notation, while the listener decodes the description using 
the initial code. In this way, more pauses for thinking, as well as 
counting aloud would be expected during the encoding and decoding 
stages as compared to the other three descriptive types.
1,4 FIGURAL TYPE DESCRIPTIONS
With figural type descriptions a reference is made to some 
configuration of nodes in the maze which form an identifiable visual 
pattern and then the point described relative to this figure. Thus 
communicators have to identify some, often complex, pattern of nodes 
on the maze and then find the point from this. For example, to 
describe point Z in Figure 5.1 as:
"See the middle right indicator, well I’m on the left of it".
In this way, unique parts of the maze shape are selected and described 
in metaphorical terms, and then the particular point relative to this 
shape. The point is then generally described within the figure in 
terms of path type descriptions.
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P. ADULTS* PREFERENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE TYPES
These four descriptive types discovered by Garrod and Anderson (1987) 
are summarised in Table. 5.1. Each descriptive type relies upon 
different conceptions or mental models of the maze onto which language 
may be interpreted. For example, path descriptions depend upon a
path network model of the maze, whereas line and co-ordinate 
descriptions rely on a set of models in which collections of nodes are 
organised into horizontal, vertical or even diagonal vectors. On the 
other hand, figural descriptions require communicators to identify 
complex patterns of nodes such as "T-shapes" or "rectangles" or "right 
indicators". To this extent the various descriptions are both
conceptually and semantically distinct from each other.
Anderson (1983) argued that the four categories contain implicit or 
explicit procedural components where the descriptions give tacit 
instructions on how to visually scan the maze. He found evidence 
that while subjects generated certain descriptions, and listeners 
interpreted them, they often followed the procedural explanations from 
the four descriptive categories, tracing the schemes on the maze with 
their pen or finger.
From the total of 1356 descriptions, Garrod and Anderson discovered 
that adults had a preference for path type descriptions. 29% of the 
total number of descriptions were path type, while line and co­
ordinate type descriptions were equally common, each comprising 22% of 
the total number of descriptions. Figural type were the least 
common, comprising 17% of the total descriptions.
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J A B L E ^ I
LINE TYPE DESCRIPTIONS 
Some line of nodes on the maze are described and then the position of 
the point with respect to this line
Pm.nPE_DSSCRIPTI01]S 
The listener is instructed on a starting point and then taken through 
the maze pathways to the destination point
CO-ORDINATE TYPE DESCRIPTIONS 
Two lines of nodes on the maze are described whose intersection is the 
point being described
FIGUPAL-nPE.DESCRIPTIONS 
A reference is made to some configuration of nodes in the maze which 
form an identiafiable visual pattern and then the point described 
relative to this figure
3. REGULARITIES IN DESCRIPTIVE SCHEMES
Some of the descriptive categories found by Garrod and Anderson have 
been reported in other situations where subjects describe points in 
spatial arrays. For example, Linde and Labov (1975) carried out a 
monologue experiment where residents of New York City had to describe 
the layout of their apartments. Analysing 72 layout descriptions, 
they concluded that people basically use fairly consistent patterns to 
assist them in describing spatial arrays.
Linde and Labov noted two main ways that subjects described their 
apartments. The most popular type they named the "tour", which 
comprised 97$ of the descriptions. In this descriptive type the 
apartment was described by a minimal set of paths by which each room 
could be entered. The listener was taken on an imaginary tour around 
the apartment, where spatial layouts were transformed into organized, 
linear descriptions. For example:
’’You walk into a long, narrow foyer, leading into a smaller, squarer 
foyer eating place, dinette-area.
And uh to the right is my kitchen, 
and uh to the left my living room..."
Evidence for this has also been stated elsewhere such as Klein (1981), 
and Garrod and Anderson(1987). For example, Garrod and Anderson 
found many instances of path type descriptions in their analysis from 
the complex array of the computer maze. Subjects began their 
description from a pre-determined starting point and described through 
the maze on a detailed tour, to the point in question.
200
The second type of description that Linde and Labov observed from the 
monologues was the "map" which constituted 3% of all the layouts 
given. This was a global description of the apartment, which was 
further analysed into more detailed local descriptions by top down 
processing. For example:
"I'd say it's laid out in a huge square pattern, broken down into 4 
units... Now on the ends -uh- in the two boxes facing out in the 
street you have the living room and a bedroom."
This was similar in certain respects to Garrod and Anderson's figural 
category where subjects first described some readily identifiable 
pattern or metaphorical shape on the maze, and then their position 
relative to this shape.
Concentrating on the predominantly tour type descriptions, Linde and 
Labov noticed that this category could be further divided into sub­
sections. For example, within the tour descriptive strategy people 
generally began describing their apartment from the front door. When 
they reached a fork they described one branch first, and then jumped 
back (in one step) to the fork and described the next branch.
These patterns were fairly consistent, leading Linde and Labov to 
conclude that there are certain broad similarities in the way spatial 
arrays are described.
Levelt (1982) found similar results while investigating descriptions 
of spatial networks. He was primarily interested in linearization,
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and how subjects organize information in a structured way. Previous 
work had shown that subjects use consistent strategies in 
linearization.
Levelt asked subjects to describe simple spatial two-dimensional 
networks. Starting from the arrow on the array on page 118, the
subject had to describe the spatial network to enable a listener to 
draw the network when later presented with the description on audio 
tape. The listener was familiar with the spatial array and had 
previously seen the example networks. There were three types of 
structures used - linear, hierarchical, and loops. The linear
structure contained a line of dual nodes, with two single nodes at 
each end, whereas the hierarchical networks consisted of triple or 
quadruple nodes (choice points for the subjects to describe), and the 
loop involved nodes connected by all points. Thus in effect 
subjects had to change this two dimensional input into a linear 
description - organizing the information in a step by step categorical 
way.
Levelt proposed that the linearization process occurred in two main 
ways for generating descriptions, one being predominantly 'speaker- 
oriented1 (which Linde and Labov had discovered), and the other 
predominantly 'listener oriented.' In the 'speaker-oriented' model, 
subjects described points by following a tour of the array, where each 
point was closely connected and followed accurately. Where forks
occurred in the diagram, subjects would describe one fork first, and 
then go back to the other point in one step. The difference with the 
'listener-oriented model' is here, subjects did not simply jump back
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to the unfinished point, but, meticuously retraced their steps, one by 
one, thus lengthening the description by anything up to 50%. This 
would assist the listener further in replicating the model.
Levelt’s experiment confirmed that the two main linearization models 
outlined earlier, existed and were distinct linearization types, since 
33 out of 53 subjects exclusively jumped back to the unfinished choice 
points, and 16 out of 53 exclusively moved back step by step. 
Levelt's work also reported instances of path type descriptions in
situations where people describe simple spatial arrays of nodes, of a 
sort similar to those used in the maze-game.
This previous work on descriptions in monologues does not seem to have 
elicited the wide range of descriptive schemes found by Garrod and 
Anderson in their dialogues. This may be due to the relatively
simple spatial arrays used to elicit descriptive strategies, compared 
to the complex mazes used in the computer maze-game. As well as 
this, the lack of communication may prevent subjects from developing 
schemes further and using varied descriptive types. In addition, 
people may regard the task of describing their apartment as a 
relatively simple and familiar one, and may not feel the need to 
develop complex descriptive schemes to relate this information.
Another factor contributing to the apartment descriptions would
obviously be the size of the array to describe. These reasons may 
explain the difference in the range of descriptive types found.
The next section considers the descriptions generated from children
playing several computer maze-games and investigates the range and 
type of descriptions found.
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B. CHILDREN'S DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORIES 
1 , IIT C M W T O N
This section investigates the type of descriptive categories generated 
by three age groups of children playing two or three computer maze- 
games (see page 166). This was performed by two independent judges 
reading over all the dialogues, comparing and contrasting different 
descriptive schemes, and recording their verdict of what categories 
were involved. The adult categories discovered by Garrod and Anderson 
(1987) were useful as a comparison, but were not used as an initial 
starting point for the children's descriptions. For example, it was 
interesting to note any differences with the adult group and whether 
the children would produce a broad spectrum of imaginative descriptive 
types, creating particularly unique co-ordinated codes, or would they 
find it difficult to engage and converge on joint language codes to 
efficiently describe points on the maze. Perhaps the 8-year-olds 
would exhibit egocentric qualities and be unable to venture into joint 
language systems evidenced by a limited amount of categories.
This analysis deals with the meaning of the various terms used to 
describe locations and any broad descriptive categories that may 
emerge by noting any consistent patterns.
Firstly an explanation of what qualifies as a description will be 
given followed by an outline of the basic descriptive categories that 
emerged from the transcripts.
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2. DEFINITION OF A DESCRIPTION
A description was classified as, ideally, everything from the initial 
request of a position on the maze, to the successful conclusion and 
confirmation of this information. For example, for two players A and 
B the following would be classed as one full description:
B: Look where are you?
A: Right + first row on the fourth box
B: Oh + so you're down there (10 years old)
In this case player B initiated the description by requesting A's 
position, A provided the information, and B confirmed their 
understanding of the point. Thus a description encompassed both 
subjects contribution until players changed to another topic of 
conversation. For example, the following would be classed as one 
description:
A: Where are you now?
B: Well see the bottom left-hand corner?
A: Ehm yeh
B: Go 2 boxes along
A: Which way?
B: Ehm to the right
A: Yeh
B: Then up 2 boxes
A: Yeh
B: And that's where I am
A: Ok I've got you (10 years old)
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However, descriptions were not always as neatly packaged as this and 
often offered without any initial requests. For example:
A: The monster's gone up
B: 'cos I'm at the bottom row three, up four + just
+ I'm in the box of my star (12 years old)
In this case B's total contribution was counted as the description
since it appeared unconnected to player A's last utterance and was not 
followed by any affirmation. At the other extreme, some subjects
followed each others positions on the maze throughout the game stating 
where they thought their partner was after each move.
It was noted that several of the descriptions provided partial 
instructions, yet some vital information was omitted on how to 
uniquely identify the point. However, these partial descriptions
could be identified with one of the descriptive categories. For
example:
B: Oh where are you?
A: I'm + on the second bottom line
B: Second bottom line?
A: Well it's not the last bottom line it's the one before
B: I know (8 years old)
This information was accepted as a description unit. 26 of the 8- 
year-olds' descriptions were of this partial type, compared to 13 from 
the 10-year-olds, and 11 from the 12-year-olds. A 2x2 Chi Square test
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was performed with age as the independent between subjects variable 
and the number of partial descriptions as the dependent factor, 
normalised for the total number of descriotions generated for each age 
group. The Chi Square value was 18.75, which was higher than the 
critical value of 9.21 at the 0.01 level of significance. So age was 
significantly affecting the number of partial descriptions generated 
with less occurring in the older children. There were 24 very partial 
descriptions which were a slight attempt at a description, yet these 
were not coded since they did not provide sufficient information to be 
classed as any particular type (16 in the youngest age group, 7 in the 
middle age group, and 1 in the oldest group of children).
Each utterance within a description was not coded, only the overall 
description that emerged. For example, if player A gave a
description, and player B repeated it, or added some information, this 
was not coded as a separate description but part of the whole 
descriptive unit, that of player A's contribution. For example the 
following description would be classed as a line one (see page 210), 
attributed to player B:
B Right I’m down, I’m on the bottom, second in + right?
Right + on the bottom storey?
A Right, bottom storey, second box, and you can't move to 
the right? (12 years old)
This whole unit was classed as one description including both A and 
B's contribution with a total number of 27 words. Player A's
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contribution is included in the whole descriptive unit, since it is 
seeking confirmation of the point.
3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
14 pairs of 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds participated in the study where 
each pair generally played three maze-games (6 pairs played two games 
due to time restrictions with their school). All dialogue was audio­
taped, excluding the practice games, and full verbal transcripts made 
including sighs, laughs, uhms and ers. Pauses within contributions 
were not measured and simply marked by a + since these were not the 
main focus of attention in this thesis. The use of a four-track 
audio-tape recorder enabled each player's contribution to be easily 
identified on separate tracks.
There were a total of 121 dialogues which generated 1332 location 
descriptions - 334 descriptions in the 8-year-old group, 436 in the 
10-year-olds, and 562 in the oldest group.
These descriptions were then abstracted and analysed in terms of their 
semantic and pragmatic qualities. Thus for each pair of subjects 
their descriptions were highlighted and transferred to a separate 
sheet for detailed analysis, as well as any associated dialogue, such 
as explicit negotiations of descriptive codes.
Two > Independent judges - Dr. Simon Garrod and myself - each
i
independently analysed the 1332 descriptions comparing and contrasting 
descriptions and looking for any broad similarities between some, yet 
which were fundamentally different from another set of descriptions.
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Each age group was analysed separately, as well as looking for any 
broad similarities or differences that may emerge between the groups. 
Both judges recorded their verdict of what type they thought each 
description was. This was performed independently of Garrod and 
Anderson's (1987) adult classification scheme, since there was no 
reason to presume that children would describe maze locations in a 
similar way to adults. There was a high level of agreement between 
the two judges, and those few disagreements, which accounted for 3% of 
the total descriptions, were dealt with by detailed discussion. While 
discussing these disagreements there did not appear to be any argument 
for additional categories over and above the ones considered.
From casual inspection of the data, it was discovered that subjects 
used fairly consistent patterns to describe maze locations. A number 
of frequently used, similar descriptions emerged which could be 
grouped together and contrasted with the other categories in some 
fundamentally different structural way. These categories were
similar in form and structure to the descriptive strategies found by 
Garrod and Anderson (1987) from an adult sample. However, the 
categories were specific to children since they were of a different 
quality and type.
Each descriptive category differed from the others in the way that 
they conceptually coded the maze-shape and interpreted its pattern. 
In effect each descriptive type denoted a different formula, whether 
implicit or explicit, of how to interpret the maze-shape.
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There were two main descriptive categories, and two less frequently 
used categories, that emerged from the children's dialogues, which 
will be explained below along with numerous examples from the 
transcripts. A systematic list of features was prepared for each 
descriptive category, which documented the boundaries within which the 
description should fall, and which discriminated it from the other 
categories. Each category was by no means exhaustive or uniquely 
defined, and within each were a variety of ways that points may be 
described. For example, within the line type category there were 
four sub-types of line type descriptions. As well as this,
descriptions varied in terms of the number of words, and interactional 
contributions, as indicated in Chapter 4.
3.1 LINE TYPE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
The most common category to emerge from the transcripts was a line 
type one, which appeared similar in form and structure to the line 
type category discussed by Garrod and Anderson (1987) in adults (it 
composed 23% of adults' descriptions). From a total of 1332 
descriptions generated by the children, 637 (48%) were classed as line 
type.
The features associated with this descriptive category involved:
1) the speaker referring to some line of nodes on the maze, whether it 
be a vertical or horizontal array of nodes
2) and then specifying the position of the point with respect to this 
line.
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This category rests on the assumption that the maze is viewed as a 
series of distinct parallel lines in an abstract way, where less 
detail is paid to the individual paths and gaps between nodes but 
rather to the overall linear shape of the maze.
Some examples of these from the children's dialogues will be given 
below to give the reader a clear conception of this category.
Bs Where are you?
A: Well I'm in the third line down 
B: Right
A: And the + fifth box along 
B: From what side?
A: From the left
B: Right (8 years old)
In this example B initiates the description by requesting A's position 
on the maze, and A replies by firstly referring to a line on the maze, 
and secondly, to their position with respect to this line. In this 
case B has asked for clarification of where they are calculatong the 
point from. However, this was often the exception rather than the 
rule and was generally implicit.
On some occasions the 8-year-olds described line type descriptions by
1) alone, which were accepted by their partner. For examples
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PAIB-6
A I'm stuck I’m stuck I'm stuck 
B Where?
A I am on the + last + I am on the last line + right?
A I am on the + second line + you know how there's 1 2 3 4 5 6
+ you know how there's 6 lines + I am on the + fourth line on the 
left
PAltt U
B Lorna where are you?
A I'm + eh in the third line down + oh it's my turn to move just now
Thus it was not clear whether they were aware of the need for the 
unique identification of a point, and how much information was 
required.
3.1.1 HORIZONTAL LINE TYPE
Within the line descriptive category, the term line could refer to
either a horizontal or vertical alignment of nodes. For example,
horizontal line type views the maze as a series of parallel horizontal 
lines where gaps in a horizontal line are filled by imaginary nodes 
and less detail is afforded the vertical plane (see Figure 5.2). 62% 
of the total number of line type descriptions were horizontal line 
type. This was expected, since the terms line or row generally evoke 
a horizontal image and most subjects referred to a horizontal 
alignment by the terms row or line. However, a few pairs referred to 
this as floor, layer, storey, or level. For examples
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A I'm on the first storey ok?
B No
A Right we'll call them storeys ok?
B Right + I'm on the second storey 
A Right I'm on the second storey 
B Which is the first + boxes + first floor 
A I'm on the very left
B You're on the very left where I've got a box?
A Right
B And I'm on the first storey, no second storey 
A Right and 
B One from the edge
A So you're the second storey and second box?
B Uhu (12 years old)
In the 8-year-old group there was only one instance of a 'floor' type 
description, compared to the 10-year-olds where 2 pairs of children 
used 'layer', and one 'floor', and the oldest group where one pair of 
subjects used 'storey' on 23 occasions, four pairs used 'floor' on 18 
occasions, and one pair used 'level' on 3 occasions.
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3.1.2 VERTICAL LINE TYPE
In the next examples of line type descriptions the maze was perceived
as a series of parallel vertical lines where less detail is afforded
the horizontal plain, or the actual gaps or paths between nodes. For 
example:
PAIR 9 10 years old
A: I've got to know where you are
B: Well + right you know down the way?
A: Where I am?
B: No in columns + you know in columns?
A: Dhu
B: Well I'm in the second column 
A: Uhu
B: And I'm in the second square starting from the top 
A: Right
A: Where are you?
B: I'm + I'm in the third column down the way in the 
second box down the way 
A: Well + you're in the third column, the second one from 
the top 
B: Uhu
Subjects have imposed a line on each vertical alignment of nodes 
whether it be broken by gaps or not (see Figure 5.3). In the first 
description B has explicitly negotiated the meaning and interpretation 
of their description. For example, B explains 'down the way' in
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columns. In the next description, B now shortens this to column 
number, and position on the column, and later A also adopts this 
descriptive style producing the column number and location. Thus a
descriptive scheme has been initiated, negotiated to a more efficient 
form, and utilized by both players to describe positions on the maze. 
20$ of the 637 line type descriptions were of the vertical line type.
3.1.3 UNCATEGQRISEP LINE TYPE
In the following examples of line type descriptions, it was not clear 
whether subjects were referring to the horizontal or vertical plane. 
This type of description was classed as uncategorised line which could
refer to either plane. For examples
PAIR 2 9. yeerg q>ld
Bs Tell me where your s*s are?
As Up in one of the left corners 
Bs Which row?
As Eh + first row
As You're on the second line, second from the top?
Bs I'm on the second line + fourth box.
15$ of line type descriptions fell into this sub-category where it was
not definite whether the line description was of the horizontal or 
vertical type.
215
3.1.4 LIME/m UfiAL TYPE
It was noticed that some line type descriptions had several 
similarities with the figural descriptive category (see later), 
however, on closer inspection they were predominantly line type and 
may be a part of a transition from figural into the line type mould. 
For examples
A You know the first line?
B Yeh + the one with two squares?
A The one with only one square 
B The one with only one square?
A Aye in it. Then the line after that 
B Yeh right 
A On the third one 
B The third one (10 years old)
From all the line type descriptions generated this sub category 
accounted for 3% of the 637 line type descriptions.
3.1.5 SUMMARY
Over the three age groups there were a total of 637 (48%) line type 
descriptions out of a possible 1332 descriptions. This was the most 
predominant descriptive type. Within this line type category were 
four subcategories which remained part of the overall line-type 
category since they were all associated with the identification of 
some line of nodes on the maze and then the position with respect to 
this line. 62% were of horizontal line type, 20% vertical line, *\5% 
uncategorised line, and 3% line/figural.
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3.2 PATH TYPE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
The next most predominant descriptive category to emerge from the 
descriptions was a path type one, which was comparable to that 
discussed by Garrod and Anderson (1987) and composed 39% of their 
adult descriptions. 516 (39%) of the children's descriptions from a 
total of 1332, were of this type. The features associated with this 
category involved:
1) stating some origin point on the maze
2) manoeuvring the listener on a mental tour of the maze, step by 
step, and following the actual maze pathways and gaps to the 
destination point.
This descriptive type differs from line or co-ordinate type, since it 
relies on the actual structure of the maze while adhering to its paths 
and gaps. For example, gaps in the maze structure cannot simply be 
ignored as they are in the line or co-ordinate descriptive type, but 
must be incorporated into the tour, describing their way around them. 
For example:
PAIR 5 12 years old 
A Go to the right hand corner, right?
B Uhu
A Right you go one space along, right?
B Uhu
A Two spaces, right?
B Uhu
A Three spaces, right?
B Hold on
A Right, you're on the right hand side, right? (cont.)
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B Uhu
A You move one space to the left, right? 
B Uhu
A Another space to the left 
B Uhu
A Another space to the left 
B Uhu
A Stop, right?
B Uhu
A Then you move one space up 
B Uhu
A One space up 
B Uhu
A One space up 
B Uhu
A That's where I am, right?
B Right
PAIR 11 8 years old 
A Right where are you?
B I'm + right see the left top corner?
A Yes
B Two down 
A Hmm
6 One along 
A Uhu
B Another one along and I'm in that one
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Although subjects may be referring to maze paths, nodes, or larger 
configurations of squares, they generally counted the nodes joined by 
paths. From these examples we can see that the children take path 
type descriptions very seriously indeed. The speaker begins by 
stating an initial point, that is the right hand corner in the first 
example, and the left top corner in the second example, and describes 
each path until they reach the point in question. In addition, the 
speaker often seeks confirmation from the listener after each piece of 
information. In this way information is given in small incomplete 
pieces such that the processing demand is more manageable. This 
feedback may be important to enable the speaker to dismiss the last 
stage and concentrate on the present one, without having to keep track 
of each step they have described.
In some cases children failed to state their initial starting point, 
yet on the whole an origin point was generally given as one of the 
corners. For examples
PAIR 6__10 years old
B Where is your star?
A See four down on the left-hand side?
Right, then two to your right
PAIR 1 8 years old
A Right, on the left-hand side corner two down 
B Right
A And see the bottom one, well count that as number one, 
and then go three along, the very end, got that?
B Right
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From this we see that path type descriptions require little pre­
negotiation and may proceed with only reference to some initial 
starting point on the maze. These descriptions do not require much 
processing or abstraction from the maze and simply involve what 
players see in front of them.
3.3 CO-ORDINATE TYPE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
The third type of descriptions which were evident in the transcripts 
involved a co-ordinate type, which was also independent from the other 
three categories in terms of the underlying conceptual structure. The 
components of this category involved:
1) the speaker stating two sets of orthogonal lines on the maze, one 
for the horizontal plane and one for the vertical
2) and the intersection concerned the point being described.
The maze is now conceptualised as a set of abstract lines with some 
coding system Imposed on each row and column. Thus, points on the 
maze would be described as the intersection of two pieces of 
information. In the true sense of the description, some origin point 
should be given from where the descriptions are coded, yet this was 
not the case with the children's descriptions. Co-ordinate
descriptions should thus begin by explicit negotiation where 
interlocutors specify the coding system they would use. For
example:
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P A I O  12 ,Y?ar? old
A We're calling it lines OK? So we're calling it linel, 
line2, line3, and line4, OK?
B Right + I'm in linel,2 + I'm in line2, one up + so I'm 
one from the bottom, right?
Thus the coding system has been negotiated and devised leading to the 
simple co-ordinate descriptions of:
B I'm on the second line in, right? On the second 
storey, right?
A Right
A Where are you?
B I'm in the + second up, and 1,2,3,4th, 2,4 + 2,4, 2 up 
and 4 at the very right hand, OK?
A Now wait a minute + you're in the second box, second 
storey?
B Uhu
This descriptive type ignores the actual maze paths and gaps, and
imposes a set of abstract rows and columns onto the maze, each one
numbered or coded such that each location has a unique address. In
this way any point may be referred to unambiguously by simply giving
the name of two lines on the maze. This more complex language
category requires negotiation of a suitable code, then to encode each
description into this established system, and to decode the
description into the maze location. In this way processing demands
are high and much forward planning is involved.
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The category of co-ordinate descriptions found in the child sample 
appeared to be a simplified version of that found by Garrod and 
Anderson from their adult dialogues, and could be referred to as 
simple co-ordinate, as seen above. Two positions of lines were 
given, yet they were seldom associated with the negotiation and 
formation of some joint code at the onset of the game. For example, 
each horizontal row and vertical column did not have a pre-negotiated 
name, such as rows 1 to 6, columns A to F. The children discussed 
lines and calculated locations through a straight forward counting 
procedure, such that less abstractions and coding was necessary. 
For example:
PAIR 4 12 years old
B I'm on the second line in, right? On the second storey 
right?
A Right, on the second line.
A And what box are you in?
B I'm in the second, second, 2, 2.
B Where have you got an s near where I am, 'cause I'm on 
the second, third?
A Ready + eh eh
B You'll have to move into the second, second 
A No I can't, where are you + are you on the second + 
third?
B Uhu
A And moving into the second, second?
B I can move in there once
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PAIR 14__1 gjd
B Right + I'm in my goal + look tell me where you are?
A I am in the 1,2,3,4th down + 1,2,3,4th in 
B Where are you?
A I'm in the + 1,2,3,4
B Just say 4,4 + you can look at it easily enough 
A I'm in 4,4
B Right and I'm in 5,4 + OK?
A Right
Thus each row and column was simply counted in this way. 
Furthermore, co-ordinate type descriptions were more common in the 12- 
year-old group than the two younger groups. For example, 3$ of the 
8-year-olds descriptions were of this type, compared to 11% of the 10- 
year-olds and 17$ of the oldest groups.
In the adult descriptions 23$ were co-ordination type, the second 
equal most popular descriptive category, supplying an efficient and 
economic coding system, while this category composed 6$ of the 
children's descriptions.
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3.4 FIGURAL TYPE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
The fourth category to emerge from the descriptions was a figural type 
which comprised 7% of the total descriptions. This descriptive type 
was similar in form and structure to Garrod and Anderson's (1987) 
category and accounted for 17% of their adult descriptions.
The features associated with this category concerned:
1) the speaker referring to some configuration of nodes on the maze 
which form some identifiable structure
2) describing the point relative to this figure, generally in a path 
type way.
Two sub types of figural type descriptions emerged from the children's 
descriptions, where they described points in either a global or local 
way.
3»*LJ QLQBAL/EIQflRAL TYPE
In global/figural descriptions the whole maze shape was taken into 
consideration and then the point relative to this, such as:
PAIR 19_____8 years <?!<*
A Where are you?
B I'm in the + on the left box next to my goal
A In the left box + is it round the edge or near the
middle?
B Eh it's on the second floor from the bottom, in the 
middle
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PAIR 12 8 years old
A Could you + if you eh + how many boxes are you along 
from the very end?
B What end?
A Bottom
B End + what do you mean by end, edge of the side?
A Uhu 
B Two
A Two boxes
3 . H.S LQ.QAL/FIGURAL,TYPE
Local/figural descriptions on the other hand involved describing a 
specific part of the maze and then the position of the point relative 
to this shape. For example:
PAIB 5__12 years old
A Right I'll tell you where I am, right you know how 
there's a wee bit at the top?
B Yeh
A The top left hand side, right?
B Uhu
A Then it's like a figure 8 
B Yeh
A Right + well the bottom of the figure 8 
B Oh ehm
A On the left hand side, I'm in there 
B Right well
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B Where are you the now?
A Right I'll tell you, right see the figure 8?
B Yeh
A Right I'm at the end of it + right three up + at the 
very corner on the + right hand side
B Oh yeh
PAIR 2__10 years old
B Where is your cross?
A Jfy cross is + do you know the very left, right?
There's sort of two bits going + well the last row of 
boxes down, right?
B You mean on the + on the left-hand side where there's 
something like a bone?
A Aye yes
B You mean on the top row where there's one going upwards 
+ sort of like a bone going upwards?
A Yeh
B Yeh, right there, you're there are you?
Out of the total 1332 descriptions, 7% were figural type descriptions,
and from this overall total, 57$ of the figural type descriptions were
of this local type, and 43$ of the global type.
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3.5,DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CATEGORIES
These four descriptive categories indicated different ways that 
subjects chose to describe points on the maze. They were viewed as 
distinct from each other since each type leads to a different set of 
simple operations which are used as a basis for producing or 
interpreting spatial terms. For instance, each descriptive type 
delivers information on how to locate points on the maze and imposes 
restrictions on how this may be done.
While classifying each description a set of questions were asked which 
appeared to differentiate the four categories sufficiently from each 
other.
1) Does the description involve a line of nodes from the maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description may be line, co­
ordinate, or figural. To differentiate between these three 
categories the following questions were then asked:
a) Does the description refer to a point on this line?
If the answer is no, then move to question b). If the answer 
is yes, then the description is line type.
The following questions were then asked:
(i) Was the line a vertical one?
If the answer is yes, then the description is vertical
line type. If the answer is no, then:
(ii)Was the line a horizontal one?
If the answer is yes, then the description is horizontal 
line type. If the answer is no, then:
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(iii)Could the line be either horizontal or vertical?
If the answer is yes, then the description is 
uncategorised line type. If the answer is no, thens 
(iv)Was the line referred to by way of a figure?
If the answer is yes, then the description is line/ 
figural type. For example, "the middle", or "it's 
sticking out on own its own".
b) Does the description then refer to an orthogonal pair of lines 
on the maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is co-ordinate type.
If the answer is no thens
c) Does the description then refer to a configuration of nodes 
relative to this line?
If the answer is yes, then the description is figural type.
The following questions then apply:
(i) Does the description refer to a specific local figure on 
the maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is local/figural
type. If the answer is no thens
(ii)Does the description refer to a global figure of the whole 
maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is 
global/figural type.
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2) Does the description refer to some configuration of nodes on the 
maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is figural type.
The following questions were then asked:
a) Does the description refer to a specific local figure on 
the maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is local/figural 
type. If the answer is no then:
b) Does the description refer to a global figure of the whole 
maze?
If the answer is yes, then the description is 
global/figural type.
3) Does the description begin with reference to an origin point?
If the answer is yes, then the description may be co-ordinate or 
path type.
The following questions were then asked:
a) Does the description then supply two pieces of information 
one relating to the vertical plane, and one to the 
horizontal plane?
If the answer is yes, then the description is co-ordinate 
type. If the answer is no, then:
b) Does the description supply a step by step account of the 
direction through the maze, while acknowledging gaps and 
actual maze pathways, to the destination point?
If the answer is yes, then the description is path type.
229
These three main questions were able to account for all the full 
descriptions generated from the maze-games. There were several tricky 
cases which will be explained in more detail below.
For instance, the children's simple co-ordinate descriptive type 
should not be confused with path type descriptions of the following 
type:
"Go one along and one up"
since if one looks at the diagram in Figure 5.4, we see that the point 
Y could be described in path type descriptions as above or:
"It's two along and one up".
However, as a co-ordinate type description could be referred to as:
"It's two along and two up" but not as 
"It's one along and one up"
Co-ordinate type descriptions take the horizontal and vertical planes 
independently into consideration. Path type descriptions on the 
other hand, cannot count the vertical line as two up which would 
clearly differentiate these two types of descriptive categories from 
one another in this instance. Furthermore, path type descriptions 
involve traversing the actual maze pathways and thus a glance at the 
maze could differentiate path type from co-ordinate descriptions. 
For example, if there were no pathways to traverse between the points
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then it must be co-ordinate. Line type descriptions on the other 
hand, generally require some reference to a line first, whether it be 
line, row, column, floor or level. For example:
’’I'm on the 1st line two boxes along”.
In this way a line is required for one dimension, however, it is not 
required for the other one, while co-ordinate type descriptions 
require both dimensions to be named.
3.6 CONCLUSION
Two independent judges analysed the 1332 descriptions generated from 
three groups of children playing two or three computer maze-games, 
independently of Garrod and Anderson’s (1987) adult classification 
scheme. Two main conceptual categories emerged for describing points 
on the maze spatial array (line 48%, path 39$), and two less 
frequently used categories (figural 7$, co-ordinate 6$). These 
categories were similar in form and structure to those found by Garrod 
and Anderson from a group of adults playing a similar version of the 
same specially designed computer maze-game. For example, the line
type category was similar, where subjects referred to a line of nodes 
on the maze, and then the point on this line, and also the path type 
category which conducted the listener on a mental tour of the maze to 
the point in question.
The distribution of adults' descriptions displayed a slightly 
different picture from the children's pattern. For example, path type 
descriptions were most predominant accounting for 39$ of the adults'
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descriptions, while line and co-ordinate type were second popular with 
each accounting for 23% of the total descriptions, and figural type at 
17%• Thus co-ordinate type descriptions rate as high as line type, 
with figural type not far behind. Although Garrod and Anderson's 
descriptive classification acted as a good foundation with which to 
explore the children's descriptions, it was not used as an initial 
starting point. Nor were any direct comparisons made between the 
children's and adults' descriptive categories since there were several 
main differences between the experimental situations which rendered 
this impossible. For example, the adults' maze-games were played on a 
slightly different system using different maze shapes, where subjects' 
start and finish positions were in different positions. As well as 
this, the children's classification scheme was formulated 
independently of the adults’ scheme, and specific to their 
descriptions. For example, the co-ordinate descriptive category was 
of a simplified type and more superficial than the adults' scheme 
based more on the wording than any underlying conceptual code.
The following section will now compare the children's semantic 
categories in more detail investigating subjects' preference for the 
various categories.
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C. A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORIES
1. INTRODUCTION
The last section analysed the descriptions generated from the computer 
maze-game and described a four-fold typology system that emerged. 
This section deals with a statistical analysis of these data and 
investigates subjects' preference for any particular descriptive 
scheme.
2. A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS
The first comparison involved classifying each description in terms of 
the four-fold typology scheme. Thus a count of each type of
description was made for each subject. Table 5.2 displays the 
proportion of descriptions from the total which fell into each
category for each age group.
TABLE 5.2 = PROPORTION OF DESCRIPTIONS IN EACH CATEGORY
A«e _ LINE PATH CO-ORD FIG. T o t a l  fle3Q_t
8yrs
N=28
.35 .46 .03 .16 334
10yrs
N=28
.49 .37 .11 .03 436
12yrs
N=28
.47 .31 .17 .05 562
Thus in the youngest age group 46$ of all the descriptions generated 
were path type, 35$ were line type, 16$ were figural, and 3$ were co­
ordinate .
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2.1 THE NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIONS GENERATED PER MOVE FOR EACH 
DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
In order to analyse any preference for the descriptive types, the 
number of descriptions per move was calculated for each category, 
since this controls for any differences in game length. Table 5.3 
displays the number of descriptions per move of either line, path, co­
ordinate, and figural type, for each age group.
TABLE 5.3 = THE NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIONS PER MOVE FOR EACH 
CATEGORY AND EACH AGE GROUP
___________ LIM _____E&I2 CO-ORD FIG. MEAN AGE
8vrs .104 .111 .013 .047 .0689
10vrs .211 .14 .044 .024 .1045
12vrs .242 .209 .119 .041 .1528
MEAN DESCR. 
TYPE
.1855 .1537 .0584 .0372
A by subjects analysis of variance was performed on the number of 
descriptions per move for each descriptive category. This analysis 
allows an investigation of any evolution of descriptions across the 
games, and whether there were any interactions between the age of the 
subjects and their preference for any particular descriptive types. 
The dependent variable was the number of descriptions in that category 
per move for each subject (ie. the number of descriptions in category 
N / 0.5 x the number of moves in that game). Game was a repeated 
measures within subjects factor, contrasting gamel, with the remaining 
games (see page 166), and age was the between subjects independent 
variable.
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The main effect of age proved significant, F(2,81) = 13.409 p=,000, 
with the means being .0689, .1045, and .1528, for the 8-, 10-, and 12- 
year-olds respectively. A Tukey test found the 12-year-olds to be 
significantly different from the 8-, and 10-year-olds, at the .05 
level, yet there was no significant difference between the 8-, and 10- 
year-olds. These results illustrate an increase in the quantity of 
each descriptive type, with more descriptions generated in the older 
children. This result is consistent with the finding from Chapter 4, 
Section C, part 2. The main effect of game proved non-significant, 
F( 1,81) = .683, thus there were no substantial changes in the number 
of descriptions from gamel, to the later games. A significant 
difference was found for the main effect of descriptive type, F(3, 
243) = 21.78 p=.000, the means being .1855 for line type descriptions, 
.1537 for path type, .0584 for co-ordinate type, and .0372 for figural 
type. A Tukey test found line type descriptions to be significantly 
different from both figural and co-ordinate type at the .01 level, and 
path type to be significantly different from both co-ordinate and 
figural type at the 0.01 level, yet there was no significant 
difference between path and line type, or co-ordinate and figural type 
descriptions. These results indicate that subjects were preferring 
path and line type descriptions to co-ordinate and figural type.
None of the interactions from the analysis of variance proved 
significant. For example, there was no interaction between the age of 
subjects and the number of descriptions of each type in gamel, or 
game2 and 3, F(2,81) = 1.06 p=.35. Nor was the interaction between 
the age of subjects and their choice of line, path, co-ordinate, or 
figural type descriptions significant, F(6,243) = 1.775 p=.105. So
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age did not determine whether they preferred any descriptive category 
over the others. And the interaction between game and the choice of 
descriptive type was also not significant, F(3,243) = 1 .15 P=.327. 
Finally there was no interaction between all three, that is age, game, 
and choice of descriptive type, F(6,243) = 1.71 p=.118. So subjects’ 
choice of path, line, figural, and co-ordinate type descriptions was 
not affected by the age of the subjects or the game (see Appendix D, 
Table 9, for full analysis of variance results).
DISCUSSION
From the analysis of variance we have two significant results. These
were an increase in the total number of descriptions of each type,
with more descriptions generated in the older children, and a 
significant difference between the occurrence of path and line type 
descriptions versus co-ordinate and figural type. Thus all subjects 
were significantly preferring path and line type categories to the 
figural and co-ordinate ones. Yet there were no significant 
interactions between the choice of descriptive categories and either,
age of subjects, or the game ie. gamel versus later played games.
Thus the younger subjects were not shewing a preference for say 
figural to co-ordinate type descriptions, but overall all subjects 
preferred path and line type descriptions.
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3. SUBJECTS1 PREDOMINANT DESCRIPTIVE TYPE
This section investigates subjects1 choice of descriptive category in 
terms of their predominant descriptive type in each game. Thus we 
are not simply counting each instance of the four descriptive
categories relative to the number of moves as above, but calculating
what category the subject used most in each game. This separate
analysis uses different information from the analysis of variance 
performed above, and allows an investigation of any possible age 
effects on choice. Thus for each subject, the most predominant
descriptive type in gamel, and then game2 plus game3, was coded. For 
example, if player A predominantly used path type descriptions in 
gamel followed closely by line type, path would be marked as their 
most predominant descriptive type. This was carried out for game2 
plus game3. On any game where two, three, or four, descriptive 
categories were equally as popular, these data were dropped from the 
sample. This comparison noted the most predominant descriptive type 
in each game, and investigated group preference for certain 
descriptive types. A summary of these figures is displayed in Table 
5.4, which illustrates how many subjects predominantly used each 
descriptive type in gamel, as compared to later games.
TABLE 5.4 = THE NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO 
FEEDOMINANTLY USED EACH CATEGORY
GAME1 
L P F C
GAME2+GAME3 
L F JL
8 yrs 8 7 5 0
N=28
11 10 1 1
10 yrs 10 8 2 0
N=28
14 9 0 2
12 yrs 10 11 0 6
N=28
10 9 3 1
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To determine whether subjects' most predominant descriptive type 
differed significantly by the age of the subjects, a 3x4 Chi Square 
test was performed with subjects' most predominant descriptive type as 
the dependent variable, and age as the between subjects independent 
variable. This was performed on the actual frequencies for gamel, and 
then for game2 plus game3.
For gamel the obtained Chi Square value was 18.75 which exceeded the 
critical value of 16.81 at 6 d.f. at the 0.01 level. Thus there was a 
significant relationship between the age of subjects and their most 
predominant descriptive category. Almost certainly this is due to the 
8-year-olds preference for figural over co-ordinate type descriptions, 
versus the 12-year-olds preference for co-ordinate over figural 
descriptions. In fact it was these deviations that contributed to 
more than half of the Chi Square value. However, for game2 plus game3 
the Chi Square value was 4.32 which was less than the critical value 
of 12.59 at 6 d.f. at the 0.05 level of significance, so in the later 
games there was no significant relationship between the age of the 
subjects and their most prodominant descriptive type. This is most 
probably due to the fact that the pattern evidenced in gamel has 
disappeared where the 8-year-olds predominantly used figural type, and 
the 12-year-olds predominantly used co-ordinate type descriptions.
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DISCUSSION
From the first analysis of the number of descriptions generated per 
move for each descriptive type, the children's results show a general 
and substantial preference across all age groups for path and line 
type descriptions over co-ordinate and figural ones. This result is 
in contrast with the adult data from Garrod and Anderson (1987), who 
found a general preference for path type descriptions, followed by an 
equal preference for line and co-ordinate type, with a lower 
preference for figural type. So it would appear that the children are 
much less likely to apply a co-ordinate descriptive category as 
compared to adults.
The conclusion from the second analysis, dealing with subject's most 
predominant descriptive type, gives some indication of a shift towards 
the adult pattern for gamel, in that while the younger subjects prefer 
figural to co-ordinate descriptions, the older children prefer co­
ordinate to figural, even though these two categories are not nearly 
as predominant as path or line type. These results may have been 
expected since co-ordinate descriptions involve a high cognitive 
demand since abstractions from the maze are required. For example, 
some coding scheme should firstly be negotiated, then each description 
should be encoded into this scheme by the speaker, and decoded by the 
listener. Thus the maze is viewed as a series of abstract lines each 
with a particular code name. There exists the possibility that the 
youngest age group have not yet developed, or mastered this 
technique.
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Garrod and Anderson (1987) found a developmental descriptive pattern 
occurring across games with their adult sample. They observed that 
adult speakers tend to change their descriptions between the first two 
games, steadily moving from relatively concrete schemes, such as path 
or figural, toward more abstract ones, such as line or co-ordinate. 
However, there was no evidence from the children's data to indicate 
any choices of descriptive type across game for any of the age 
groups.
4. THE EFFECT OF MAZE SHAPE ON SUBJECTS' CHOICE OF DESCRIPTIVE TYPE 
This section investigates whether the shape of the maze affected 
subjects' choice of description scheme. There were two main maze 
shapes used - either the figural type mazes, or the line type mazes 
(see Appendix A for all maze shapes used). For each of these two 
types, each subject's most predominant descriptive type used to 
describe maze points was calculated. Table 5.5 shows the number of 
subjects who predominantly used each descriptive type to describe 
points from either the figural or line type mazes.
TABLE 5.5 = THE NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO PREDOMINANTLY USED 
EACH DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY FOR THE LINE AND FIGURAL TYPE MAZES
_ ____________________ Line Path Co-ord Figural
Line based mazes_______5J____44_____ 12________4
Figural based mazes 15______18______ 1________4
For example, with the figural type mazes, path type descriptions were 
the most common descriptive type used across the three age groups of 
children. 47% of pairs predominantly used path type, 39.5%
predominantly used line type, 10.5% used figural type, and 3% used co­
ordinate type, while describing locations from the figural type mazes. 
A Chi Square one-sample test founc! this to be a reliable difference
with the Chi Square value of 21.6 far higher than the critical value 
of 11.34 at the 0.01 level of significance at 3 d.f. In the line based 
mazes 46% of subjects preferred to use the line type category over any 
other type to describe maze locations, followed closely by path type 
at 40$, co-ordinate at 10$, and figural at 4$. Thus path type 
descriptions were almost as popular for the line type mazes as the 
line type category. A Chi Square one-sample test found this to be 
reliable since the value of 58.5 was far higher than the critical 
value of 11.34 at 3 d.f. for the 0.01 level of significance.
It was then decided to compare the more abstract descriptive 
categories of line plus co-ordinate descriptions, with the more 
concrete path and figural ones. A Chi Square 2x2 test was thus 
performed on the number of subjects who predominantly used line plus 
co-ordinate descriptions versus the number of path plus figural 
descriptions, for the line based and figural based maze shapes. The 
Chi Square value of 1.2 was not greater than the critical value of 
3.84 at 1 d.f. at the 0.05 level of significance.
DISCUSSION
These results indicate significant differences for the use of each 
descriptive type for both the line and figural based mazes, yet there 
was no interaction between the maze shape and subjects' choice of 
descriptive scheme. Thus the salience of the particular maze pattern 
did not affect the descriptions generated. For example, subjects 
predominantly used path and line type descriptions, and relied on 
precedence more than anything else. That is, they described maze 
locations with the descriptive scheme they had previously been using.
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Thus it appeared that the salience of the maze shape did not play a 
great part in determining subjects' choice of descriptive scheme, 
rather path and line type dominated over figural and co-ordinate type 
descriptions, with precedence playing a more important role.
Another way of investigating the way that subjects perceived the 
overall shape of the maze was attempted with a "memory test" (see page 
149) t yet this did not prove very informative. At the end of each
maze-game, subjects were given a maze shell and asked to draw the maze
shape they had just viewed (from memory). This was an attempt to 
understand how they interpreted the maze and what patterns or shapes 
they perceived as most salient. For instance, if they were using a 
vertical line descriptive category to describe locations on the maze, 
would they perceive the maze as a series of vertical parallel lines? 
However, all age groups of children produced partial and uninformative 
drawings, and appeared to find the task extremely difficult, often 
concentrating on drawing local aspects of the maze such as two or 
three maze boxes with monsters in them, rather than drawing the whole 
picture. Very few subjects actually completed the maze in the time
allocated, although they were instructed to quickly "join up the dots
with lines and draw the maze you have just seen on your screen". Some 
examples of the children's drawings are shown in Appendix C. Yet this 
in itself may demonstrate an inconsistent and unorganized view of the 
maze where no strong patterns were evident to the children.
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D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter was concerned with semantic and pragmatic aspects of 
spatial descriptions. It began by explaining some research which 
elicited various descriptive categories from subjects while describing 
spatial arrays. A study by Garrod and Anderson (1987), using the same 
computer maze-game on an adult sample, found four differnt basic 
schemes for describing points on the maze from a total of 1356 spatial 
descriptions. These four types were then explained in more detail 
along with the adults' preference for each. For example, path type 
were most popular, followed by line and co-ordinate, and then figural. 
While other research has found similar descriptive types they have not 
elicited such a wide range of conceptual schemes.
The following section then examined the semantic contents of location 
descriptions which emerged from three age groups of school children 
playing several computer maze-games. This considered the meaning of 
various terms and noted any broad descriptive patterns that emerged 
along with any developmental trends of the evolution of joint 
descriptive codes. A content analysis was carried out by two 
independent judges on the 1332 descriptions generated, to reveal two 
main descriptive categories, and two less frequently used categories. 
The line type category was most popular, followed by path, co­
ordinate, and then figural.
The final section analysed these descriptive categories in more 
detail, investigating subjects' preference for each, both over age and 
across game. The main analysis of variance found a significant 
preference for line and path type descriptions over co-ordinate and
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figural type, for all age groups, and an increase in descriptions with 
increasing age. However, there was no interactions between the age of 
subjects and their choice of descriptive category, nor was there any 
effect of gamel versus later games on descriptive schemes. While 
investigating subjects' most predominant descriptive type in each 
game, a significant interaction was found between the age of subjects 
and their preference for figural or co-ordinate descriptions for 
gamel, but not for game2 plus game3. Thus in gamel the 8-year-0ids
preferred figural to co-ordinate descriptions while the two older 
groups shewed a preference for co-ordinate type over figural type.
The last analysis in this section investigated the affect of the maze 
shape on subjects' choice of descriptive category and found no 
interaction between the two. Thus precedence of descriptions, rather 
than salience of the maze shape, appeared to be used for choice of 
reference.
The next chapter now turns to dialogue co-ordination and investigates 
how synchronized partners' descriptive schemes are. This provides a 
measure of dialogue co-ordination with which to compare any pair of 
subjects.
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CHAPTER 6
LANGUAGE CO-ORDINATION IN THE DIALOGUE MAZE-GAME
INTRODUCTION
The last chapter discussed the type of descriptions generated by 
children playing the computer maze-game. The proportion of each 
descriptive type was then investigated across the three age groups and 
over the games, along with subjects' preference for each category. 
This chapter investigates the co-ordination of descriptive schemes 
within pairs of subjects and compares this to the descriptive schemes 
of other subjects.
Descriptive sequences were used to provide a measure of dialogue co­
ordination both within and between different subject pairs. For 
example, the level of co-ordination was measured by subjects' choice 
of descriptive sequence, since if a pair of subjects were both using a 
particularly unique descriptive pattern to communicate maze locations 
then this reflected a high level of dialogue co-ordination. This co­
ordination is even more pronounced if the subjects' sequence is unlike 
any other descriptive code used in their age group. On the other 
hand, lack of co-ordination could be evidenced by much 
misunderstanding and confusion over maze locations where subjects were 
not co-ordinating their thoughts and intentions clearly.
Since the computer maze-game was devised to elicit descriptions, there 
were generally a sufficient number from each pair to allow this 
analysis. It was found that a variety of different description 
schemes were used, yet pairs of subjects appeared to entrain each
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other to describe points in the same way. This implies that subject 
pairs were co-ordinating their language and establishing joint 
descriptive codes to refer to points on the maze. This analysis 
attempts to establish the extent of such co-ordination both within and 
across each age group.
The analysis was directed at three questions which will be 
investigated in turn:
1) The general question of the degree to which the subjects co­
ordinated their language use,
2) the extent to which co-ordination increased between players over 
the games as the interaction proceeded, and
3) convergence and change of description schemes across games.
1. THE CO-ORDINATION OF LANGUAGE USE
The first analysis deals with general co-ordination of descriptive 
schemes, comparing schemes generated within a pair of subjects with 
those across different subjects who did not interact. Subjects' 
descriptive schemes were used to calculate their levels of co­
ordination. For example, if dialogue partners were co-ordinating 
their interpretation, each should predominantly be using the same 
language code as the other. That is, 'within' pair communicators 
should be using the same terms to express the same meaning. The
procedure for calculating such a co-ordination measure was taken from 
Garrod and Anderson (1987) who developed a technique to determine
levels of dialogue co-ordination in adult descriptive schemes.
Hence, one major aspect of the analysis revolved around comparing the
use of descriptions within a given dialogue, and determining the
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extent to which interlocutors employed the same language to describe 
points on the maze, as compared with other members of their group.
A detailed analysis revealed that subjects used two main descriptive 
schemes, and two less frequently used categories, to locate maze
points which are discussed in Chapter 5. To establish each subject's 
pattern of use of the different schemes the following steps were
taken:
i) For each speaker the total number of descriptions of each type were 
recorded (see Table 6.1).
TABLE 6.1 = QUANTITY OF DESCRIPTIONS OF EACH TYPE 
PAIR/PLAYER LINE PATH CO-QRD FIGURAL 
A 5 4 0 \
1 B 4 3 0 1
For example, the pair of subjects in Table 6.1 played three maze- 
games, and player A produced 5 line type descriptions, 4 path type, 1 
figural, and no co-ordinate type. Player B generated 4 line type
descriptions, 3 path, 1 figural and no co-ordinate type. This 
analysis of descriptive type and quantity was carried out for all
subjects.
ii) Each subject's scores were then ranked 1,2,3,and 4 according to
frequency, with 1 being the most frequent and 4 the least, as shown in
Table 6.2. Thus for player A, line type was the most predominant
descriptive type and awarded the rank of one, path was the next
popular and thus ranked second, figural came third, and co-ordinate
ranked fourth. In this case player B's pattern of descriptions were
similar and thus had identical ranging.
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TABLE 6.2 = DESCRIPTIVE SCHEME RANKING 
PAIR/PLAYER LINE PATH CO-ORD FIGURAL 
A 5(1) 4(2) 0(4) 1(3)
1 B 4(1) 3(2) 0(4) 1(3)
In the case of ties, where two, three, or four, descriptive types were 
equally predominant, the ranks were summed, and divided by the number 
of ties. For example, if line and path type were equal first then 
the ranks one and two were summed and divided by two, and path and 
line were each awarded the rank of 1.5.
(iii) It was then possible to obtain a measure of similarity of 
pattern use, by calculating the total absolute difference between 
rankings for any comparison pair. If the patterns are identical this 
will be 0, if purely by chance it should be 5. In the above example 
the sum of the absolute difference in ranks is 0, since both players A 
and B have the same pattern of choice of descriptive types. Hence 
total descriptive scheme co-ordination is reflected in a zero 
difference score.
This may appear a rather criide measure of dialogue co-ordination since 
the quantity of each descriptive type suffers at the expense of the
overall pattern of use. For example, subject A may use 20 line type
descriptions, 3 path, and no figural or co-ordinate, while subject B
uses 2 line, 1 path, and no figural or co-ordinate, yet this pair
would be awarded a score of 0 for total co-ordination of decriptive 
pattern. Furthermore, one subject from a pair could predominantly be 
using a line type descriptive strategy while the other a path type,
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yet they may understand each other, while both subjects from another 
pair could be using a line type strategy but in different ways such 
that misunderstanding occurs. Nevertheless, this measure does 
indicate if pairs of subjects were using the same pattern of 
descriptions which reflects their level of dialogue co-ordination to a 
certain extent, and highlights those using divergent schemes. It was 
assumed that those subject pairs who were using the same descriptive 
pattern were co-ordinating their dialogue and the meaning of the 
expressions at some level. Table 6.3 shows the absolute difference in 
ranks scores for each pair of subjects from each age group in their 
games.
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TABLE 6.3 = THE SUM OF THE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RANKS
FOR EACH PAIR IN EACH GAME: ’WITHIN* DIALOGUE COMPARISON 
PAIR/GAME________ 8vrs_______ 10vrs_______ 12vrs
1 A 3 0 2
B 2 0 1
C 3 —
2 A 2 0 2
B 4 2 1
C 3 _ 4
3 A 0 0 4
B 3 2 4
C 4 0 _
4 A 2 3 0
B 3 4 0
C 0 2 0
5 A 4 2 4
B 0 0 0
C 4 0 4
6 A 3 3 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 4 0
7 A 2 3 0
B 0 1 8
C 2 2 3
8 A 3 3 2
B 0 1 2
C _ 6 1
9 A 4 3 0
B 0 3 3
C 0 3 5
10 A 0 2 5
B 3 4 2
c 2 0 0
11 A 4 4 4
B 2 3 3
C 0 0 4
12 A 2 0 0
B 0 2 0
C _ 0 0
13 A 0 2 1
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 0
14 A 2 0 4
B 2 0 0
C 4 0 0
Total 0 15 17 17
Average
Baseline 1.69 1.60 1.68
Within
Mean . I.fi______ . J,.7. ... . 1.8
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DISCUSSION
Table 6.3 illustrates the number of games where pairs of subjects had 
an absolute difference score of 0. In the youngest age group, pairs 
of subjects were co-ordinating their dialogue and using the same 
pattern of descriptions as their partner in 37 -5% of games, indicated 
by a 0 difference score. This increased to 43% of games in the 10-
and 12-year-old groups. In each group 0 was the mode, the most
frequently occurring score.
Table 6.4 displays the number of games where pairs of subjects were 
exhibiting an absolute difference in ranks score of 0, which reflects 
total co-ordination of descriptive scheme.
AN ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE SCORE OF 0
£ AX1\U
12vrs TOTAL8vrs 10vrs
TOTAL 0 IN: Gamel 3 5 5 13
Game2 7 3 6 16
Game3 5 9 6 20
TOTAL 15 17 17
When analysed over the three games for all age groups, the total 
number of 0 scores increased from 13 in gamel, to 16 in game2, and 20 
in game3, indicating a greater number of pairs co-ordinating their 
descriptive schemes as the games progressed. However, a Chi Square 
one-sample test calculated that this was not a significant difference 
between the games. The Chi Square value was 2.31 which was less than 
the critical value of 5.99 for 2 d.f. at the 0.05 level of 
significance.
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This basic difference measure, illustrated above, was used to look at 
both intra-dialogue, and inter-dialogue co-ordination within any 
sample or set of games. The analysis established both dialogue co­
ordination within subject pairs and allowed comparisons between 
patterns for all others in that group.
The 'between1 dialogue similarities for each age group were calculated 
in the following way:
i) one player was randomly selected from each pair of subjects
ii) the subject's rank ordering was then compared with that of all
other speakers in their group.
This produced 91 comparisons in each age group. For example, 1 
subject from pairl had their ranking compared with that of 1 subject
from pair2, 1 subject from pair3, 4, 5, 6, to pairl4, to produce an
absolute difference in rank scores for each comparison. Then 1 
subject from pair2 was compared with 1 from pair3 to 14, 1 from pair3 
compared with 1 from pair4 to 14, and so on until 1 from pair 13 was 
compared with 1 from pairl4. These absolute difference in rank 
scores were then added and divided by 91 to produce the across 
dialogue baseline scores shown in Table 6.5.
This yielded an estimate of how similar that speaker's choice of 
description scheme was to all the others in the age group. Thus for 
a given pair, scores were calculated as the mean difference between 
the chosen member and every other chosen member.
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’BETWEEN’ AND 'WITHIN' DIALOGUES
12vrs TotalAcre GrouD 8vrs 10vrs
Between 3.18 3.35 3.88 3.47
Dialogue
Within 1.69 1.60 1.68 1.66
Dialogue
These results were then compared to the 'within' dialogue co­
ordination scores which was calculated by simply contrasting each 
speakers ranks with those of the other member of the pair for that 
game. This contrast between 'within' and 'between' pair co­
ordination of language indicated the extent to which dialogue partners 
were more like each other than anyone else in the group, and gives an 
indication of variability. For example, if everyone in that group 
used a certain term, then there would be nothing extraordinary about 
subjects within a given pair using the term, but to the extent that 
each were different from the group their similarities were more 
significant.
These data were subject to both parametric and non-parametric 
statistical analyses. The various hypotheses will be considered in 
turn.
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?. COMPARISON OF ’WITHIN1 AND ’BETWEEN1 DIALOGUE CO-ORDINATION 
The similarity scores were tested using a three factor analysis of 
variance, with ’within' versus 'between' pair scores as the dependent 
variable, and game as the repeated measures (within subjects) factor, 
and age as the independent (between subjects) factor. The only 
significant result from this analysis was the main effect of 'within' 
versus 'between' pair scores, F(1,39) = 84.5 p<.001, with the total 
'between' difference 3.47, and the 'within' difference 1.66 (see 
Appendix D, Table 10, for full analysis of variance results). Thus, 
within each pair of subjects there was a high degree of co-ordination 
of descriptions occurring, which was not the case across different 
pairs of subjects where a wide variety of descriptions were used.
For each age group and game, there were a reliable number of dialogue 
pairs whose 'within' dialogue co-ordination score was significantly 
less than the 'between' dialogue comparison (p<0.01,Sign test). This 
implies that within any given pair, dyads were co-ordinating their 
language and using the same terms to express the same meaning, as 
compared to other members of the group.
This was further broken down into 'between' and 'within' means for 
each of the three games for each age group, with the means displayed 
in Table 6.6.
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TABLE 6.6 = TREATMENT MEANS FOR THE 'WITHIN1 
AND ’BETWEEN* DIALOGUE CO-ORDINATION
Gamel Game2 Gme3
W B_______W B________W B
8 yrs 2.2 3.4 1.5 2.7 1.8 3.5
10 yrs 1.8 2.9 1.4 3.7 1.6 3.5
12 yrs 2.0 4.1 1.7 4.3 1.5 3.4
In each case the 'within1 dialogue mean was smaller than the 'between' 
dialogue score. However, from gamel to game3, the analysis of 
variance indicated no reliable difference over the three age groups on 
the 'within' and 'between' dialogue means, F(4,78) = 0.828.
DISCUSSION
The main analysis of variance indicated a significant difference in 
the level of description co-ordination occurring within pairs of 
subjects for all age groups, as compared to subjects from different 
dyads. However, it was also expected that dialogue co-ordination 
would increase from the first to the third game, where descriptive 
schemes were progressively negotiated and developed. Yet the results 
from the main analysis of variance produced no evidence of any 
reliable improvement of descriptive co-ordination from game 1 to game 
3 for all age groups, F(2,78) = 1 .026. The relevant means are
displayed in Table 6.7.
TABLE 6.7 = 'WITHIN' AND 'BETWEEN' DIALOGUE
CO-ORDINATION ACROSS GAME
Game 1 2 3
Between Dialogue 3.45 3.54 3.42
Within Dialogue 2.00 1.55 1.64
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Another way of investigating descriptive co-ordination from one game 
to the next, involves counting the number of games where the absolute 
difference in ranks was 0. Thus in 31% of all first games, subjects 
exhibited exactly the same pattern of descriptions as their partner, 
which increased to H3% in the second game, and 52% in the third. 
These data is illustrated by the thick mean line on Figure 6.1. This 
was then analysed to show each age group separately and their group 
co-ordination pattern. The three lines in Figure 6.1 illustrate each 
groups pattern of co-ordination over the three games.
This further examination indicated some improvement across all age 
groups between the first and second game with 21 out of the 32 
comparisons showing increased co-ordination (p=0.05 Sign test). Thus 
for all age groups there was evidence of increased dialogue co­
ordination between the first two games. Furthermore, in numerical 
terms the two older groups continued to increase co-ordination of 
dialogue to the third game, while the youngest age group decreased, 
thus confounding the overall increase in group co-ordination.
The final analysis looked at the number of instances where subject 
pairs decreased their absolute difference in ranks over the three 
games, and included those cases where they remained co-ordinated with 
a 0 rank score. This analysis takes the ceiling effect into account 
where subject pairs have increased their co-ordination to 0 from gamel 
to game2. So if they remained co-ordinated at 0 from game2 to game3 
this would now be included. This investigation indicated improvement 
in description co-ordination across all age groups from gamel to game2 
where 27 out of 42 comparisons illustrated increased or total co-
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ordination (p=0.05 Sign Test), and 26 out of 42 comparisons from game2 
to game3 showing improvement in co-ordination (p=0.05 Sign Test), with 
the results illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Bearing in mind that the main analysis of variance found no 
significant improvements in descriptive scheme co-ordination from 
gamel to game3, these further analyses should be treated with caution. 
Figure 6.1 deals with the number of cases where subject pairs had an 
absolute difference in ranks score of 0, and found increased dialogue 
co-ordination between gamel and game2 for all age groups, where 
subjects were demonstrating early entrainment and engaging onto each 
others language. This may have been expected since when players 
first interact they often use different descriptive schemes which 
become more similar following communication. Yet there was no 
evidence of any improvement in description co-ordination from game2 to 
game3 across all age groups. The result may reflect a discrepancy in 
each players descriptive scheme where one of the pair for example, 
changes the joint scheme to a more efficient one, while the other 
fails to incorporate this change. Figure 6.2 displays the number of 
cases where subject pairs increased dialogue co-ordination from one 
game to the next, and included those cases where they remained fully 
co-ordinated at 0. This analysis found increasing dialogue co­
ordination over the three games for all age groups.
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3. CONVERGENCE AND CHANGE OF DESCRIPTION SCHEMES ACROSS GAMES.
The next analysis investigated the dynamics of the descriptions used - 
that is the type of description used by subjects over the games. For 
example, a pair of subjects may both predominantly use path type 
descriptions in game 1, and then change to use a line type code in 
game 2, or perhaps only one of the players changes to this scheme 
while the other remains with the first. When two independent systems 
engage, they often converge on descriptive types and then may jointly 
progress to another scheme. From this we can investigate the 
likelihood of change and any general patterns that may arise
throughout the age groups.
Evidence has indicated that younger children may be less flexible than 
older ones, rigidly adhering to the first suitable scheme that works 
(Werner, 1945), and failing to incorporate more efficient changes over 
time. Garrod and Anderson (1987) observed that adult speakers tend 
to change their descriptions between the first two games, steadily 
moving from relatively concrete schemes such as path or figural toward 
more abstract ones such as line or co-ordinate. Furthermore, most of 
the adults who changed schemes did so as a pair. In other words the 
speakers were not changing to a scheme used by the other members of 
the pair in game 1, but rather changing together to a new scheme.
70% of adults who changed did so as a pair.
By comparison this does not seem to be the case for the younger
speakers (see Table 6.8) where the three age groups appear more rigid 
than the adult groups studied by Garrod and Anderson. On average 
only 28% of the children moved schemes between the first and second
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game, and only 15% between the second and third game. Thus they may 
both begin by using different descriptive schemes and it all depended 
on who dominated the other, rather than negotiating a new descriptive 
scheme and both adhering to this. For example, if one subject used 
line type, the other subject generally followed suit, rather than both 
negotiating a path or co-ordinate one and changing to this.
TABLE 6.8 = PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS SHIFTING SCHEME BETWEEN GAMES
Game 1 to Game2 46$ 24$
00 28$
Game 2 to Game 3 17$ 17$ 9$ .. 15*
Looking at each age group separately 46$ of the 8-year-olds shift 
schemes from gamel to 2, whereas only 24$ do so in the 10-year-old 
group, and 18$ in the 12-year-old group. A Chi Square test was 
performed on the number of subjects who changed their most predominant 
scheme from gamel to game2, and then from game2 to game3. These 
scores were normalised for the total number of available games where 
subjects had a predominant score. For gamel to game2 the Chi Square 
value was 4.6 (of which 3.7 of this value was made up of the 8-year- 
old's score) which was less than the critical value of 5.99 for 2 d.f. 
at the 0.05 level of significance. For game2 to game3 the Chi Square 
value was 0.24 which was much less then the critical value of 5.99 
required for the 0.05 level of significance for 2 d.f. So there was 
no significant differences between the age of the subjects and their 
choice of descriptive schemes between two games.
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Table 6.9 displays the proportion of subject pairs who either both 
shift to a new scheme or one converges with the other. Only 46$ of 
the children change scheme as a pair, where both subjects have changed 
to a new scheme together, rather than one simply dominating the 
other.
WHO EITHER BOTH SHIFT
---------L n i t w  n w v  J.
OR CONVERGE
8vrs 10vrs 12vrs Total
Both Shift 50$ 40$ 50$ 46$
Converge 50* 60$ 50$ 54$
This last result is consistent with the view that children 
predominantly change their descriptive schemes to converge on the same 
description scheme as that used previously by their partner. 54$ of 
all children converged on the same descriptive type as their partner, 
thus more than half shift in order to merge with their partner's 
scheme. In 46$ of cases on the other hand, both shift to a new 
scheme.
Since the number of descriptions generated per game is less than for 
the adults and older children, there is less opportunity for the 
younger age groups to converge per game. Thus if the youngest 
subjects were allowed to continue communicating for an extended period 
then increased convergence may occur, where their schemes may develop 
into more abstract ones. Indeed compared to the adult data by Garrod 
and Anderson (1987), all children say considerably less than adults, 
therefore there is less opportunity for the younger children to 
converge. Thus perhaps we are not seeing the whole picture and if
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our oldest age group interacted for a longer period of time, the 
pattern may be similar to the adult one in a systematic way.
U. CONCLUSION
This chapter investigated the co-ordination of description schemes 
both ’within1 and ’between1 pairs of subjects. It was found that 
within each pair of subjects there was a high degree of entrainment 
occurring where speakers were using the same pattern of descriptions 
as their partners. The next section discussed improvements in co­
ordination across the games and for each age group. There was some 
indication that for all age groups co-ordination increased from gamel 
to game2, although this did not prove significant in the analysis of 
variance. While investigating the proportion of subject pairs that 
were fully co-ordinated a reliable pattern emerged between all games 
for all age groups.
The final section looked at convergence and change of description 
schemes across the games. All of the age groups illustrated strong 
evidence for a general convergence on a similar description scheme 
across the dialogue. From the dialogues this appeared to occur 
implicitly where one partner began using a certain descriptive scheme 
and the other followed suit. For example, with this pair of 10-year- 
olds, player A began describing points from the maze in the following 
way, which was shortly taken up by player B:
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PAIR 2 10 years old 
A I am + bottom row 
B Right it's my turn
A Bottom row four from the right, four from the left
B Right
B Where are you?
A Fourth row u p  + two from the right 
A Where are you Sandie?
B I am + the’ bottom row + three from the left
PAIR 3 10 years old 
B Hang on what laver are you on?
A Well I'm on the bottom laver. what laver are you on?
B I'm on the second laver
A Where are you?
B I'm on the 1, 2, 3, 4th layer
A Yes
B On the third box
PAIR 4 10 years old 
B Where are you?
A Third row third position
B Fourth line fourth position?
A Third line third position
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PAIR 1 12-vear-olds 
B I'm in the second storev 
A Right
B And the second box in
B Right I'm on the second storev 
A Right I'm on the second storev 
B Which is the first + boxes + first floor 
A I'm on the very left
B You’re on the very left where I’ve got a box?
A Right
B And I'm on the first storev. no second storev 
A Right
B One from the edge
A So you're the second storev and second box?
B Uhu
Implicit negotiation was by far the most common form of entrainment, 
yet on several occasions descriptive schemes were changed explicitly 
where one partner explained the scheme they should use. Explicit 
negotiation of descriptive schemes occured in 3.3/6 of the total number 
of descriptions. For example:
PAIR 1 10 years old
A Right we'll take it from top to bottom this time + like linel's 
the top + line2's the next and so on
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PAIR 6 10 years old
A Hang on this is getting a bit confusing + we1re calling it lines 
OK + so we're calling it linel line2 line 3 line4 OK?
B Right + I'm in linel + 2 + I'm in line2 + one up + so I'm one
from the bottom + right ?
PAIR 7 12 years old
B Well what way are you describing the maze?
A Tim right pretend there's a + pretend it's lust like + eh vou know 
like a grid?
B Yeh
A Without all those chunks out of it. so I'm iust two up and two in
B Two up from the right or from the left?
A From the left
PAIR 14 12 years old
A I am in the 1 2  3 4th down + 1 2  3 4th in 
B Where sire you?
A I'm in the + 1 2 3 4th
B Just sav 4 4 +  vou can look at it easily enough 
A I'm in 4 4
B Right and I'm in 5 4 + OK?
A Right
PAIR 12 10 years old
B Hev when we're saving no and ves we've got to sav affirmative 
and negative + OK?
A Right
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B Where are you?
A Bottom left corner two jumps 
B Right could you go along + one lump + left?
A Negative
B Could you go + up one jump?
A Infirmative
B Not infirTnitiveT afflrmltive.
B Are you starting from the bottom row two jumps. over and out?
A I am bottom left corner + 2QQQ miles
B Is that two jumps?
A Yes
B Right
A 2000 miles to the + right + up 2000 miles
B That isn’t + 2000 + that’s two jumps though isn!t it?
A Or 2000 miles u p . vou sav 2000 for jumps
B Right
PAIR 2 12 years old
A Right Barry where are you?
B Right do vou know how there’s three columns?
A There!s six columns 
B How’s there six?
A Oh vou mean three double ones?
B Uhu
A Right
B Just sav this whole grid
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The above finding of general convergence onto a similar scheme between 
particular dialogue partners, is consistent with results from adult 
studies where there was evidence of convergence onto a similar 
descriptive scheme over time. The main difference with the adult 
statistics seems to be in the dynamics of choice of description across 
the games. The adult picture is one of a progressively increasing co­
ordination, linked to the steady development of more abstract and 
generally more efficient languages of description. On the other 
hand, the younger dialogue partners seem to only show a steady but 
weak increase in co-ordination initially, which seems to be associated 
mainly with convergence on a single description scheme. The rule 
seems to be that when a scheme works successfully, subjects tend to 
adhere to it, rather than developing a new and possibly more efficient 
one.
The fact that the younger subjects did not seem able to, either adopt 
novel schemes once they have converged, or readily employ more 
abstract descriptions, might therefore reflect a rigid adherence to 
Garrod and Anderson's (1987) output/input co-ordination principle 
described in Chapter 3, section C.
Finally, something should be mentioned about comparisons between the 
various age groups in the sample. The most striking thing is how 
similar they all sire, at least with respect to the somewhat crude 
measures of co-ordination discussed above. All groups seem to 
demonstrate co-ordination and all show some improvement between the 
first and second game. It is interesting to note just how similar 
even the youngest group are to adults with respect to the general
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process of co-ordination, which would suggest that this basic process 
is a central component of all human interactional dialogue.
The next chapter involves an independent study which investigates the 
generalizability of the descriptive schemes found in the computer 
maze-game. It explores the type of descriptions produced in a less 
interactive environment, as compared to those generated from the 
computer maze-game.
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CHAPTER 7
AN EXPLORATION OF DESCRIPTIONS PRODUCED IN A LESS 
INTERACTIVE ENVIRONMENT THAN THE COMPUTER MAZE-GAME
INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the generalizability of the descriptive schemes 
found from the computer maze-game, based on an independent study by 
Anderson (1983). As explained in Chapter 3, Anderson concluded that 
adults described maze locations in four main ways. These categories 
were path, line, co-ordinate, and figural type, which he 
hypothesized:
"may reflect four distinguishably different ways of conceptualising, 
or mentally modelling, the maze shape."
In addition, he carried out a further study to determine if these four 
basic categories would emerge in a situation independent of the
computer maze-game, or whether they were inextricably linked to the 
game itself. The study involved subjects describing points from 
photo-copied maze diagrams on paper, into a tape-recorder.
The study reported in this thesis is a partial replication of
Anderson's (1983) Pencil and Paper study (P&P), modified to use on
children. This allows an investigation of the generalizability and
consistency of the underlying descriptive types which emerged from 
children playing the computer maze-game. Furthermore, several other 
aspects may be investigated, such as the accuracy or ambiguity of the 
descriptions, the number of points correctly located by the listener, 
the use of certain descriptive types, and a comparison of monologue 
with dialogue.
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A. ANDERSON'S (1983) PENCIL AND PAPER STUDY
1. PROCEDURE AND CONDITIONS
Sixteen same-sex pairs participated in the study. These subjects were 
first-year undergraduates in the Psychology class at Glasgow 
University. The task involved subjects describing several points from 
a photo-copied maze diagram into a tape-recorder, with or without a 
listener. Eight different photo-copied maze diagrams were used, five 
from his computer maze-game experiment, and three designed especially 
for this study. The eight mazes had several points marked on them. 
There were three main conditions in the experiment where the level of 
interaction was manipulated to investigate its effect on the 
descriptions generated.
a) INTERACTIVE CONDITION
In this condition, adults participated in pairs, seated across a 
screened table to avoid any non-verbal communication. Both subjects 
received identical booklets containing five different maze shapes with 
eight locations to be described on each by either subject. For 
example on Maze 1, one subject would have eight points to describe to 
the other subject who was required to locate these points and mark 
them on the maze. On Maze 2, the previous listener would now 
successively describe eight location points to the other, and so on. 
Thus each dyad generated forty descriptions, during which the listener 
could ask any questions. All dialogue was audio-tape recorded.
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b) NON-INTERACTIVE CONDITION
In this condition one subject was requested to describe all forty 
points, eight on each of the five mazes, to the other. The listener 
was aware that they may ask any questions in response to the 
descriptions. In this way each dyad generated forty descriptions, 
which were audio tape-recorded.
o) MONOLOGUE CONDITION
In this case a solo subject described the forty points from all of the 
five mazes, into an audio tape-recorder in the absence of a listener, 
generating forty descriptions.
2. SUMMARY OF ANDERSON’S RESULTS
Anderson found a ’partial replication’ of the previously discussed 
four-fold categorical system emerging from the descriptions. While 
using the computer maze-game he discovered that adults predominantly 
used path type descriptions, followed by line and co-ordinate 
descriptions, and then figural ones. In his P&P study, he found path 
descriptions most prevalent, followed by line, then figural, with a 
total absence of co-ordinate descriptions. This replicated three out 
of the four categories which were found in the maze-game.
Anderson had predicted such results, since from a semantic stance, 
similar maze shapes would be expected to generate similar descriptive 
types. However, due to the differing cognitive and social demands a 
certain degree of incompatibility was expected. He offered several 
explanations for these differences. Firstly, the computer maze-game 
involves a greater degree of collaboration, where subjects are in an
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interdependent situation, with a joint problem to solve. In the P&P 
study there is more independence between subjects since co-operation 
is not essential in solving the task. In addition, the speaker and 
listener roles are well established where one subject is clearly 
either the instruction giver or instruction follower. Secondly, the 
spontaneous nature of the computer maze-game allows subjects to 
describe locations at any point in the game. However, the P&P study 
involves a fairly rigid and limited situation, where descriptions are 
the main point of focus, and less negotiation is required. Thirdly 
the dynamics of both differ where changes in the maze-game occur over 
time, whereas this is not the case with the P&P study where subjects 
simply describe one point after another.
In addition, social factors are considerably different in both 
conditions, especially in relation to what Orne (1962) termed 'demand 
characteristics'. Orne emphasized the social importance of the 
experimental situation where subjects usually participate at their own 
will, yet with an aim to comply with the experimenter's demands. 
Similarly, the experimenter is generally enthusiastic regarding the 
experimental results, and this often influences the subjects' 
behaviour, especially in the desired experimental way. Orne
describes demand characteristics as:
"..the totality of cues which convey an experimental hypothesis to the 
subject."
Anderson explained some of his results as due to the perceived demand 
characteristics of the experiment. For example, in the computer
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maze-game, time-pressures and total number of moves to the goal are 
important. Thus subjects may predominantly use co-ordinate type 
descriptions, since these are a very efficient way of precisely 
locating points, leaving increasing time to complete the task. On the 
other hand, the P&P study involves no such time-pressure, which may 
influence their choice of descriptive strategies.
Anderson also attributed the differences to differing degrees of 
conscious awareness in the two tasks. For example, in the computer 
maze-game subjects are predominantly "aware-of-self-as-subject" and 
thus less aware of the language they produce, while in the P&P study 
subjects are aware that they are the object of interest, and thus 
"aware-of-self-as-object" and more conscious of the descriptions they 
generate. This was indeed evident in the two tasks.
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ftr THE PRESENT STUDY
The study reported here involves a modified version of Anderson’s 
(1983) P&P study, using the Interactive condition on three age groups 
of school children from Hillhead Primary School (see page 150). There 
were 10 children in each group of average age 8, 10, and 12 years old, 
who had not participated in the computer maze-game experiment. These 
children were paired with others from the same class.
1. DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
APPARATUS
Subjects were positioned across a screened table to avoid any visual 
contact. A small portable Philips N2234 audio tape recorder was used 
to tape all the dialogue onto three BASF 90 minute cassette tapes.
STIMULI AND DESIGN
Eight photocopied maze diagrams were used in this study, five from 
Anderson (1983) and three designed especially for this study (see
Appendix E for the 8 mazes used). These eight mazes were stapled
together in the form of a booklet and labelled Mazel to Maze8. Each
pair of subjects were given an identical booklet, consisting of the 
eight photocopied maze diagrams (the order of the mazes was changed 
for different pairs of subjects). Subject A had a number 1 and 2, 
marked on Maze 1,3,5, and 7, in red ink, whereas subject B had a
number 1 and 2 marked on Maze 2,4,6, and 8, in red ink. Players were 
instructed to look at the first maze, and the person with a number 1 
and 2 on their maze, then described these points to the other player 
to enable them to mark it on their maze in black ink. They were 
instructed to state clearly the number and then describe its position.
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Ink colour enabled the experimenter to clearly differentiate the 
speaker and listener in each maze. Thus each pair described a total 
of 16 points, with each subject describing 8 points.
PROCEDURE
Subjects arrived at the school room in pairs, and were positioned at a 
table and chairs, and were each given a maze booklet. They were 
instructed that four of their mazes would have a number 1 and 2 marked 
on them in red ink. From maze to maze, the subjects with the red 1 
and 2, should describe the position of each point very clearly and 
accurately such that their partner could specifically locate it and 
mark the number on their maze. The listener was instructed to ask 
any questions during the task if they were unsure of points. 
Children were rewarded for participating in the study with various 
school utensils. They were aware that their speech was audio-taped, 
and of the experimenter's presence. The tapes were later transcribed 
and the descriptions analysed.
2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
There were four main areas of investigation which will be considered 
in turn.
2.1 To investigate the range and occurrence of the four-fold typology 
system of line, path, co-ordinate, and figural, type descriptions.
2.2 To consider the accuracy with which the listener found the desired 
point and marked it on the maze. However, since this is dependent on 
the quality and informativeness of the description, then
2.3 the ambiguity of the speakers' descriptions were analysed to give 
a weighted estimate (baseline) of the likelihood of finding a specific 
point.
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2.4 To measure co-ordination within a given pair of subjects by 
determining their similarity of descriptive schemes.
2.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF DESCRIPTIONS
A preliminary analysis of the transcriptions revealed a predominance 
of line and path descriptions, with a total absence of co-ordinate 
ones. Table 7.1 displays the proportion of descriptions which fell 
into each type.
FALLING INTO THE DIFFERENT
IVXi. A J-VllM Utvn ttUU UHVUT
DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORIES
MEAN AGE LINE PATH CO-ORD FIGURAL TOTAL
8
n=10
.72 .28 0 0 80
10 
n=10
.18 .79 0 .04 80
12 
n=10
.14 .86 0 0 80
TOTAL .35 .64 0 .01 240
In all groups co-ordinate descriptions were totally absent from the 
dialogues, and figural ones negligible. One striking difference 
across age concerns the proportion of line and path descriptions. 
Whereas the youngest age group predominantly used line type, the two 
older groups preferred path type.
Since path and line type choice of descriptions are reciprocally 
related to a certain extent, a Chi Square one-sample test was carried 
out on the row frequency of path and line descriptions separately. 
For the line type descriptions, the Chi Square value was 45.14 much
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greater than the figure of 9.21 at 2 d.f. required for significance at 
the 0.01 level. With the path type descriptions, the Chi Square 
value was 26.62, once again much greater than the value of 9.21 for 2 
d.f, required for significance at the 0.01 probability level. Thus 
both results were highly significant where the youngest group were 
preferring line to path, and the two older groups preferring path to 
line type descriptions.
It was noted that the descriptions were slightly different from those 
generated in the computer maze-game. This may be due to the various 
maze shapes used, such as the diagonal one, which was not used in the 
computer maze-game. Yet subjects replicated two of the four-fold 
descriptive categories. These were path and line type descriptions, 
which were similar in form and structure to those generated in the 
computer maze-game study. These results mirrored that of Anderson 
(1983) where he replicated path, line, and several instances of 
figural type descriptions, but no co-ordinate type.
In the computer maze-game the youngest age group did not demonstrate 
any preference for either line or path type descriptions, yet in the 
P&P study they indicated a preference of line to path type 
descriptions. It was suspected that the younger age group may prefer 
path to line type descriptions, since pre-negotiation is unnecessary 
apart from mentioning a starting point, and cognitive demand is at a 
minimum. However, in the P&P study the 8-year-olds generated less 
path type descriptions (than line type), and proved poor at locating 
them (see p27^), which perhaps influenced the decreased use of this 
category. With path type descriptions, where the listener has to
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follow a set of directions, there may be more opportunities for the 
listeners to get confused on the route. The 8-year-olds were able to 
locate as many line type descriptions as the two older groups of 
children (see p27^) since perhaps there was less chance of getting 
confused with different pieces of information as given in the path 
type descriptions. Their preference for line type may be reflected by 
this success rate.
The two older groups did not demonstrate any preferences for line or 
path type descriptions in the computer maze-game, yet the P&P study 
found a significant preference for path type descriptions. In the P&P 
study the quality of descriptions improved in the two older groups, 
where descriptions were less ambiguous (see p284). The two older 
groups may prefer path type descriptions in an attempt to produce 
clear unambiguous descriptions given the nature of the task. For 
example, the main aim of the experiment is for subjects to describe 
points on the diagram. Subjects are much less interactively involved 
and may evolve a good appreciation of the task. They may thus prefer 
path type descriptions since these are the less ambiguous of the 
descriptive types to use when there is less interaction and pre­
negotiation of codes. For example, since there are few points to be 
described, and less opportunity for interaction subjects may not wish 
to set up a descriptive code for line or co-ordinate type 
descriptions. Path type descriptions may offer the best solution to 
allow explicit directions when there is little interaction available. 
The older children may also be more capable of following their 
partner's path type directions.
277
?.? ANALYSIS OF CORRECTLY LOCATED POINTS
The second investigation concerned the listener’s ability to locate 
the correct point from the speaker's instructions and mark it on their 
maze. Two main factors may influence the subject's ability to locate 
the desired point on the maze. One is their guessing ability to infer 
the best solution from the alternatives, while the other is their
referential ability to use the appropriate skills to choose the
correct referent from the set of alternatives. Both these skills have 
been found to improve over age and so the older children may be at a 
considerable advantage to the younger group.
From all age groups a total of 240 points were described (80 points
for each age group) and 75% were accurately located by the listener.
This was calculated by simply checking if two points matched up. This 
percentage appeared quite high compared to the ambiguity of the 
speaker's descriptions. The 8-year-olds located 68% of descriptions, 
which increased to 79% in the 10-year-old group, and 8056 in the 12- 
year-old group.
A Chi Square one-sample test was carried out on the actual frequencies 
of the number of correctly located descriptions, by age. The Chi 
Square value was 1 which was less than the critical value of 5.99 for 
2 d.f. at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus although we have a 
slight numerical pattern in the predicted direction with the older 
children successfully locating more points from their partner's 
description than the younger subjects, these results are not 
statistically significant.
Since path and line type descriptions were most common, a separate 
analysis was carried out to determine the number of each type which
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were correctly located. The actual frequencies of this analysis can 
be seen in Table 7.2.
CORRECTLY LOCATED
rhin h n u
8 years 10 years 12 years
LINE PATH LINE PATH LINE PATH
HITS 47 6 17 44 11 53
MISSES 10 17 0 16 0 16
TOTAL 57 23 17 60 11 69
A Chi Square test was carried out on the number of correctly located 
line descriptions for each age group, and then for the number of 
correctly located path type descriptions. Both analyses were 
normalised for the total number of each descriptive type. For the 
number of correctly located line type descriptions the Chi Square 
value was 0.94, which was much less than the critical value of 5.99 at 
2 d.f at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus subjects' ability to 
locate a line type description was not affected by age where the 8- 
year-olds were able to locate a high number of these, and the two 
older groups demonstrated complete accuracy. For the number of 
correctly located path type descriptions the Chi Square value was 5.99 
which was equal to the critical value of 5.99 at 2 d.f. for the 0.05 
level of significance. So the ability to detect path type 
descriptions was affected by age, where the older children had more 
success in locating path type descriptions than the younger children.
The results from all age groups indicate that the older children are 
better at locating path type descriptions than the younger ones. The 
8-year-olds have more line type descriptions than path, and when they 
get a path type description they have more misses than hits. With
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path type descriptions information is generally given in a number of 
small units and perhaps this gave the 8-year-olds more opportunities 
to get confused with the directions. In the computer maze-game 
children did not mark where they thought the point was and thus it was 
impossible to know whether the listeners were able to detect the 
location of a path type description. There were no developmental 
differences in children's ability to detect a line type description. 
Line descriptions may enable the listener to locate points, where they 
find the appropriate line on the maze and then the point on this line.
2.3 AMBIGUITY OF DESCRIPTIONS
From reading over the transcriptions, speakers appear to generate
fairly ambiguous descriptions. For example, the following
descriptions could lead to several points being located, and not
necessarily one unique point.
1)Number 2's on the third line + fourth along (8 years old)
2)Ehm, well it's + top line, you count along + five boxes along on the
top line, and then it's three down (10 years old)
3)First line, three along (12 years old)
Without referring to the actual maze used, these descriptions appear 
highly ambiguous. For example in (1) and (3) the speaker has not 
indicated what a line refers to, after all it could refer to either a 
horizontal or vertical alignment of nodes. The speaker has also 
omitted the initial reference point of their description, and failed 
to define what a 'box' entails. For example, a 'box' may be counted
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ass a small square node on the maze, the path joining two nodes, or 
the larger square box made up of four square maze nodes.
Thus a description such as (3) above, could refer to any of the 
following points on Figure 7.1.
In general there were few descriptions which would serve to pick out a 
point uniquely, although they did occur occasionally as in the 
following:
B Well you go to the top one 
A Top left one?
B Yes
A And then go along one to the right 
B Go along one box?
A Yes, and that's number one (10 years old)
In this case the left/right, and top/bottom, dimensions have been 
mentioned, as well as how many boxes to move along, although a box has 
not been defined.
Natural language is inherently ambiguous when analysed out of context. 
However when descriptions were viewed in the context of the maze shape 
they were generally far less ambiguous, where it was often obvious 
that they referred to only one point, or two at most.
Each description was then investigated in terms of the whole 
interactional unit, since descriptions which were ambiguous in the
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c o u l d  r e f e r  t o  a n y  o f  t h e  a b o v e  p o i n t s  
m a r k e d  b y  a  Z .
early stages of the game often became less so over time where terms 
were expanded and clarified.
A classification scheme was devised where descriptions were assessed 
in terms of their ambiguity. Firstly, certain defaults were taken as 
being reliable and constant. For example certain terms appeared to be 
shared knowledge amongst the sample of children, such that a row 
almost always referred to a horizontal alignment of nodes, similarly a 
column to a vertical alignment. In addition most children began 
counting and describing points from an origin point of the top left 
hand corner. Similar results have been found in picture coding where 
this point acts as an implicit reference. This may develop and be 
reinforced by learning to read and write from here, and cross-cultural 
studies on people who read and write from other reference points may 
prove this to be the case. On the other hand, some evidence 
indicates that more sophisticated describers use the bottom left-hand 
corner as a reference since this is the origin of graphs. The first 
line generally referred to the first, bottom horizontal row, yet in 
Britain at least, the bottom ground level of a building is almost 
always referred to as the ground floor, with the next level referred 
to as the first floor. And floors are always ordered from the
ground.
There were 240 descriptions generated in this study and each
description was classified in terms of an ambiguity scale using the 
specific maze diagram for reference and assessing its position in the 
dialogue. Each description was classified in terms of whether it was
ambiguous or not, and if it was ambiguous, then to what degree. For
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example, could the description refer to 2, 4, or 6, points? The scale 
was as shown in Table 7.3.
TABLE 7.3 = AMBIGUITY SCALE FOR ASSESSING DESCRIPTIONS
UNAMBIGUOUS_______________ AMBIGUOUS
___________________________________2__ 2___4 5 6
PAIR1 2 8 3 3
Thus for this pair of subjects in Table 7.3, 2 of their descriptions 
were classed as unambiguous, and their remaining 14 descriptions were 
ambiguous to varying degrees.
This analysis was carried out on all the descriptions by three
independent judges, who were myself and two Psychology Honours 
students who were familiar with the experiment. The judges were 
instructed to analyse each description, along with the relevant maze, 
and rate it in terms of whether it was ambiguous (ie. could the
description refer to more than one point on the maze), and if so then
how many points could the descriptions refer to. There was a very 
high level of inter-judge agreement and those cases where 
disagreements occurred were dropped from the analysis. The results, 
in proportions, are summarised in Table 7.4.
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TABLE 7.4 = THE PROPORTION OF DESCRIPTIONS FALLING INTO EACH LEVEL OF
AGE GROUP 2 3 4 5 6 . AMBIG, LOCATED
8 years 
n=10
.16 .4 .2 .2
00. .68
10 years 
n=10
.61 .16 .16 .05 .39 .79
12 years 
n=10
.47 .16 .2 .15 .53
o00•
TOTAL
OJ• .25 .2 .14 .58 .75
A Chi Square one-sample test was performed on the number of ambiguous 
descriptions to determine whether there was a significant difference 
between the age groups. The Chi Square value was 20.7, which was much 
greater than the critical value of 9.21 at 2 d.f. at the 0.01 level of 
significance. Thus the age of subjects determined the number of 
ambiguous descriptions generated with fewer produced in the older 
children. Table 7.4 illustrates how the 8-year-olds generated more 
ambiguous descriptions than the two older groups, and it is quite 
striking how the 10-year-olds produced less ambiguous descriptions 
than the 12-year-olds.
From all age groups, with a total of 240 descriptions, 100 were
classed as unambiguous, compared to 140 classed as ambiguous. Yet
listeners succeeded in discovering of the appropriate points from 
their partner's description. Generally there were a number of 
positions the description could refer to. For example, if there were
36 points on the maze, then by chance alone there would be a 1 in 36
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chance of guessing the correct location. To calculate the reliability 
of the number of correctly located points, the number of points which 
may have been found by chance alone was used. Thus a weighted 
baseline was calculated for each age group on the basis of the number 
of descriptions in each ambiguity slot, multiplied by the 
corresponding number of points it could refer to (for example, .5, 
.25, or .17), and divided by the total number of points being 
described, which was 80 in each group. The figures generated act as a 
baseline to the amount of descriptions we may expect correct by 
chance. Thus if a child was insensitive to descriptions and failed 
to give any feedback, we would still expect this percentage correct by 
chance. This figure may now be compared to the actual figures for the 
three age groups, to discover if our results are significant or not. 
The results indicated that all groups were able to get more from the 
descriptions than chance alone compared against the potential 
ambiguity.
The ambiguity of each description was then correlated with its correct 
location, with the results displayed in Table 7.5.
TABLE 7.5 = THE NUMBER OF UNAMBIGUOUS AND AMBIGUOUS 
DESCRIPTIONS AND THE TOTAL CORRECTLY LOCATED
AGE__________ UNAMBIGUOUS AMBIGUOUS NO. LOCATED
8 YEARS 14 66 54
10 YEARS 49 31 63
12 YEARS 37 43 64
This analysis did not prove particularly informative. For example, 66
of the 8-year-olds descriptions were classed as ambiguous and 14 as
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unambiguous, yet listeners correctly located 54 points from the 
speaker's descriptions. Thus it may be more informative to correlate 
unambiguous plus low ambiguous descriptions (where the description 
could refer to two points) with the correct location of the point. 
Table 7.6 indicated that most listeners found the desired point 
whether the description was unambiguous or slightly ambiguous.
TABLE 7.6 = THE NUMBER OF UNAMBIGUOUS PLUS LOW AMBIGUOUS 
DESCRIPTIONS AND THE TOTAL CORRECTLY LOCATED
AGE UNAMBIGUOUS AMBIGUOUS NO. LOCATED
+ LOW AMBIG. (4&6 points)
_____________ (2 points)__________________________________
8 YEARS 45 35 54
10 YEARS 62 18 63
12 YEARS 52 28 64
A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation was carried out on unambiguous 
plus low ambiguous points, against the correct location of the point, 
across all the age groups. The Product Moment correlation was 0.69 
which was greater than the value at the 0.01 level (r=0.64) d.f. = 13, 
to conclude that there was a significant relationship between low 
ambiguity of descriptions and partner's success in locating the 
point.
Three separate correlations were than carried out for each age group 
on these two measures to determine any developmental differences 
between low ambiguity and correct location of the point. For the 8- 
year-old group the value was 0.455 which was a modest correlation, yet 
not a significant one. The two older groups both had a high
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correlation score at the 0.01 level (r=0.765) d.f.= 8. The values 
were 0.84 for the 10-year-old group, and 0.79 for the 12-year-old 
group. Therefore the two older groups demonstrated a significant 
relationship between low ambiguity of descriptions and success in 
locating them. Thus although the general correlation on the age 
groups was significant, when analysed separately the youngest group 
did not demonstrate a significant correlation between the two 
measures.
It appeared that errors in locating points were only evident when the 
descriptions were extremely vague with speakers making gross errors 
such as confusing their left and right.
The following type of ambiguous descriptions were generally located 
without any difficulty:
First line third square, number 1
Third line second last, number 2
It’s on the third line and it's the first one
Three boxes along on the first line
Ehm five, five, boxes along from the third line
(8 years old)
It appeared that only very vague descriptions such as the following 
were confusing and impossible to locate:
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A See the fifth row, fifth row, have you got it?
B Uhu
A Go to the second, three steps towards the right, go 
like one, two, three, move to the other 
B Uhu (8 years old)
A Look where number 1 is, right?
B Uhu
A Look all the way down to them boxes and then look on 
the next row, look at the very fourth row, right?
B Uhu
A From the bottom count four steps and then you come to 
number four, just write number 2 in that box 
B Uhu (8 years old)
The listener was often willing to accept such descriptions without 
querying the speaker. A count was then made of the number of 
ambiguous descriptions which were accepted by the listener without any 
queries. Thus for each age group this was separated into the number 
of ambiguous descriptions which could refer to two points (low- 
ambiguity), and those that could refer to more than two points (high- 
ambiguity), and whether they were queried by the listener, with the 
proportions displayed in Table 7.7.
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TABLE 7.7 = THE PROPORTION OF AMBIGUOUS DESCRIPTIONS ACCEPTED 
WITHOUT ANY QUERIES FROM THE LISTENER FOR EACH AGE GROUP
Age Ambiguous descr, 
could refer to 
two points
Ambiguous descr. 
could refer to 
more than two points
8 years 
10 years 
12 years
90.6
46
93
77
61
31
Thus, the 8-year-olds accepted 90.6$ of low-ambiguity descriptions
without any questions, compared to accepting 77$ of high-ambiguity
descriptions without querying them. It is surprising to note that the
8- and 12-year-olds accepted nearly the same amount of low-ambiguity
descriptions without querying them, whereas the 10-year-olds accepted
a much lower number of these descriptions. A Chi Square one-sample
test was performed on the actual number of cases where subjects
accepted low-ambiguity descriptions without questioning them, for the
three age groups of children. The Chi Square value of 2.68 was less
than the critical value of 5.99 required at the 0.05 level of
significance at 2. d.f. A Chi Square one-sample test was then
performed on the actual number of high-ambiguity descriptions accepted
without query, for the three different age groups. The Chi Square
value of 1.95 was less than the critical value of 5.99 required for
the 0.05 level of significance at 2 d.f. Thus the suspected trend of
the younger children accepting more high-ambiguity descriptions
without querying them, than the older children did not prove a
significant one. Thus the only general findings were the correlation
of low ambiguity with the successful location of the point, and the
substantial number of ambiguous descriptions which were unqueried by
any of the age groups in the sample.
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?.4 RANK ORDER CHOICE
In order to discover the level of co-ordination occurring between 
subjects, their descriptions were investigated for similarity. A
rank order of choice table was tabulated to display the similarity of 
descriptive scheme within a pair of subjects. This was calculated in 
the following way:
a) For each subject the actual number of descriptions of each type 
were calculated. For example:
GROUP 1___ U M ______ EAlfl_Elfi*
PAIR 1 A 7 3 0
B 5 2 0
b) These scores were then ranked from 1 to 3 according to frequency, 
with 1 being the most frequent and 3 the least.
GRQVP 1 LIHE P U S  USu.
PAIR 1 A 7(1) 3 (2) 0 (3)
B 5(1) 2 (2) 0 (3)
c) It was then possible to obtain a measure of similarity of 
descriptive pattern by calculating the total absolute difference 
between rankings for any comparison pair. Zero indicates identical 
patterns, while if purely by chance it should be 3.5. Although this 
may appear a rather crude analysis, it nevertheless indicates co­
ordination of descriptive scheme within any dialogue. For example, 
If dialogue partners are co-ordinating their language, then by coding 
the occurrence of these particular expressions will allow a measure of
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co-ordination. Thus if the absolute difference in ranks is 0, this 
indicates total descriptive co-ordination between this pair. So for 
each pair their 16 descriptions were coded as either line, path, or 
figurail, and then ranked and the absolute rank difference scores are 
noted in Table 7.8.
TABLE 7.8 = SUBJECT PAIRS ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN RANKS
AGE____________ 8 years_______ 10 years_______ 12 years
PAIR A 2 2 0
PAIR B 1 0 0
PAIR C O  0 0
PAIR D 1 0 2
PAIR E___________ 0______________ 0______________ 0
MEAN RANK N 0.8 0.4 0.4
In the youngest group, two pairs had total entrainment, where they 
were using the same descriptive scheme as each other, which increased 
to four pairs displaying total entrainment in the 10- and 12-year-old 
groups. A Chi Square one-sample test was performed on the total 
number of subject pairs displaying an absolute difference in ranks 
score of 0, to determine if this was affected by the age of subjects. 
The Chi Square value was 0.83 which was much less than the critical 
value of 5.99 at the 0.05 level of significance at 2 d.f. indicating 
that the increase in co-ordination from the 8-year-olds to the two 
older groups is not a significant one, and may have occurred by 
chance.
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C. CONCLUSION
This study is a modified version of Anderson’s (1983) interactive 
condition from his P&P study to investigate the generalizability of 
the four-fold typology scheme which emerged from the computer maze- 
game. In addition various other aspects were considered such as the 
quality of the information and the ambiguity of descriptions, the 
listener's ability to find the desired point, and the level of 
dialogue co-ordination occurring within pairs of subjects.
Anderson found a predominance of path type descriptions, followed by 
line, and then figural, with a total absence of co-ordinate type. He 
explained this due to several main differences between the two tasks, 
such as collaborativeness, spontaneity, dynamics, and social aspects.
The present study similarly found path type descriptions to be most 
predominant followed by line, then figural, with a total absence of 
co-ordinate type. There were also developmental preferences, with the 
youngest age group preferring line type to path, while the two older 
groups preferred path to line type. In this respect the older 
children were performing more like adults where they shew a preference 
for path type descriptions.
In all three groups listeners managed to successively locate a high 
number of points with 75% being correctly located. Yet the 
corresponding descriptions appeared to be extremely ambiguous. An 
ambiguity count revealed 100 of the 240 descriptions to be classed as 
unambiguous, and 140 as ambiguous. These ambiguous descriptions were 
then coded further as to whether they could refer to 2,3,4,5, or 6
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points. While inspecting the relationship between ambiguity and 
correct location of the corresponding point it was discovered that low 
ambiguity correlated with success, rather than with unambiguous 
points. Thus listeners seemed able to deduce the correct point from 
the speaker’s unambiguous and low ambiguous descriptions. 
Furthermore, a high number of ambiguous descriptions were accepted 
without query by the listener, perhaps because ambiguous descriptions 
did not pose great problems. Probably as adults, we would require 
greater specification since our experience leads us to seek out 
alternatives in order to uniquely identify the point in question. On 
the other hand, children may be unaware of complications such as 
mentioning a reference point, or whether a line refers to a vertical, 
horizontal, or diagonal alignment of nodes. For instance, they may 
share classroom conventions where they automatically begin counting 
from the top left hand corner. This may explain their partner's 
willingness to locate Q point on their maze without any queries. 
Another explanation is that they may believe that they are at fault 
and not that their partner's message is to blame, and so fail to 
approach their partner for more information. A further analysis 
revealed a high level of dialogue co-ordination occurring in the 
groups, where subjects pairs were using the same descriptive language 
as their partner.
From the results there appeared to be two main differences between the 
age groups. The first is the difference in their choice of 
descriptive scheme, since the 8-year-olds preferred line to path type, 
while the two older groups preferred path to line type. The second 
concerned the ambiguity of descriptions, where the youngest age group
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generated more ambiguous descriptions than the two older groups, yet 
their partner still found a high number of these points. This may be 
due to the limitations and restrictions on the number of possible 
alternatives that the description may refer to.
Since the experiment reported here used a limited number of subjects 
it seems that firm conclusions cannot be made. However, this study 
has been useful in replicating Anderson's results, and analysing 
several other issues.
The next chapter of the thesis reports the final conclusions from the 
studies, and relates the experimental findings to the research 
reviewed in the earlier chapters.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS
The work reported in this thesis explored the development of 
communication skills as they relate to language, paying particular 
attention to the process where speakers and listeners co-ordinate on 
the shared meaning of natural language expressions. In particular, 
semantic and conceptual co-ordination was examined in 14 pairs of 8-, 
10-, and 12-year-old school children, in the context of a specially 
designed computer maze-game.
A main strand of the thesis focused on the process of semantic 
negotiation and how this may occur in natural dialogue. In relation 
to this investigation, two basic types of knowledge were discussed - 
shared knowledge which refers to the portion of information we have in 
common with others, such as what the terms "up" and "down" refer to, 
or that a "column" is generally a vertical line while a "row" 
generally refers to a horizontal line, and mutual knowledge which 
develops from actually knowing that certain knowledge is shared. For 
example, in the following discussion Player B explicitly describes 
columns as "down the way", such that both subjects become aware that 
each is referring to columns as a vertical alignment of nodes:
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A I've got to know where you are 
B Well + you know down the way?
A Where I am?
B No In columns + you know in columns?
A Uhu
B Well I'm in the second column 
A Uhu
B And I'm in the second square starting from the top
Although some type of mutual knowledge is required for successful 
communication, it remains debatable how the knowledge is assessed, and 
what mechanisms are involved in the process.
Semantic co-ordination was considered at two levels. Firstly In 
relation to general meaning within populations where they come to 
share certain interpretations of terms, and secondly in relation to 
specific encounters where communicators arrive at the same 
interpretation of expressions. Schelling (1960), and Lewis (1969), 
have argued that general co-ordination problems, such as the 
convergence on the meaning of natural language expressions, may be 
solved through explicit agreement when possible, or the use of various 
heuristics and tacit knowledge, such as conventions of use, when 
communication is not available. For example, Schelling proposed that 
co-ordination problems were solved using several heuristics - namely 
salience, familiarity, uniqueness, and precedence. From the computer 
maze-game it appeared that in the main, subjects relied on precedence 
to describe maze locations. For example, once one type of description 
had been used, both partners generally followed suit, and continued to
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use this code over the games. And salience of the maze shape did not 
play a great role in describing points from the figural or line based 
mazes, since path and line type descriptions dominated over all other 
descriptive schemes regardless of maze shape. However, Anderson and 
Garrod (1987) found evidence that the nature of the maze shape 
affected the descriptions generated from their adult subjects who were 
influenced by both the salience of the maze and precedence of 
descriptive schemes.
In particular cases of semantic co-ordination, such as definite 
reference, the controversy concerned whether a certain degree of 
mutual knowledge was required prior to, or during the interaction, and 
hew mutual knowledge may develop. Clark and Marshall (1981) for
instance, have argued that mutual knowledge is required prior to the 
interaction by the use of certain heuristics, while others such as 
Johnson-Laird (1982) have argued that mutual ignorance may even be an 
incentive to communicate since success in itself implies the existence 
of shared and mutual knowledge.
Semantic negotiation was investigated within the general framework of 
an interactionist approach, promoted by Rommetveit (1968, 83), which 
emphasises the relationship between the speaker and listener, the 
knowledge they share, and the social context of the exchange. It was 
argued that language use is inherently a social process and so depends 
on a variety of social-pragmatic factors for its success. This
approach was contrasted with the traditional view which focuses on the
isolated sentence as the basis of meaning without recourse to the
speaker, listener, or social context of the exchange.
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The data from the present studies tend to support the view that 
meaning evolves from the interaction, and the relationship between 
speakers and listeners in a dynamic way. From the dialogues from the 
computer maze-game, subjects did not appear to be totally dependent on 
a set of pre-determined assumptions but used alternative meanings of 
terms between different subjects pairs. All age groups produced 
evidence of joint language codes relative to the task, where subject 
pairs devised the meaning of terms at a local level in a spontaneous 
and dynamic way, using a variety of specific terms to the same effect. 
For example, some subject pairs referred to a horizontal alignment of 
nodes by the term "layer", while others used "storey", "floor", "row", 
"level", or "line". The following pair were using the term "row" to 
refer to a vertical alignment of nodes:
PAIR 5 10 years old
A What1s your position?
B My position is + ehm + you know + on the + right-hand-side?
A Yes
B You know on the second box on the right the second line on the + 
the second row on the right?
A Yes
B I'm the second from the top 
A Right
B Now where are you?
A I am + the very left row, third top box
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A Where are you again?
B Eh + I'm I'm in the right-hand-side the second + the second + the 
second row from the right on the top + the second top
There was some indication of different mechanisms being used to 
achieve this semantic negotiation. Garrod and Anderson (1987) offered 
an output/input co-ordination principle to account for their 
observations of semantic negotiation from their adult data. To 
produce reference they hypothesised that speakers should attempt to 
use what succeeded previously, where they equilibrate production with 
comprehension. While they managed to simulate many description 
sequences with a computer model, they noted several limitations of the 
scheme. For instance, it blocked the development of novel schemes, 
and the fact that communicators can never be certain they share the 
same scheme but only to the extent that they can interpret the 
descriptions against their own scheme. In terms of the mechanism used 
to produce descriptions from the children's data, this output/input 
control principle may suit well since subjects appeared to rely on 
precedence, and there was not any great change in descriptive schemes 
across game. Furthermore, the children's descriptions did not always 
rely on success, since descriptions often failed and were inadequate 
yet they continued to be used (see examples on p212). Thus, with the 
youngest children at least, the output/input control principle could 
account for a number of the descriptive sequence dialogues. However, 
with the older groups it may not be able to account for the 
development of more efficient descriptive schemes over time.
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The main mechanism used to achieve semantic co-ordination with the 
children appeared to be implicit negotiation where dialogue co­
ordination occurred tacitly with one player introducing (by 
mentioning) a certain descriptive code and the other following suit 
(see examples on p262/3). Furthermore, there was little evidence of 
mutual knowledge being established prior to the interaction. In 
general children simply communicated plans and descriptions to their 
partner. Lewis's (1979) principle of 'master/slave1 appeared to suit 
the rule, since often one child dominated the other by requesting the 
other's position on the maze, and implicitly defining the descriptive 
category to use. Yet contrary to the conclusions of Schelling (1960), 
and Lewis (1969), concerning the role of explicit negotiation in this 
process, it did not play a great role in solving the computer maze-
game problem. Infact, only 3% of the descriptions were explicitly
negotiated, where terms and their meaning were devised and explained 
openly between the subject pair. When this type of explicit 
negotiation did occur it was often after problems cropped up with 
descriptive scheme interpretations, rather than when subjects were 
initially devising a scheme. Most of the examples of explicit 
negotiation on p264 occurred after problems had arisen in the 
dialogues, such as the followings
PAIR 6 10 years old
B What are you talking about, I don't understand?
A Well there's 1 2 3 4 5 6, there's 6 layers isn't there?
300
A You know where I am don't you? In the second column, second from 
the top?
B Are you talking about columns down the way or columns across?
A Down
B Oh + and the second wee box?
A Uhu
B Starting from the top?
A Uhu
With access to the position of the children on the maze, one was able 
to observe the exact position being described at any time, and the 
problems encountered with misunderstandings, and how these were 
overcome. For example, player A is located at position A on Figure 
8.1, and player B at position B, and they described their positions 
as:
PAIR 4 8 years old
B Look where are you?
A Right first row on the fourth box
B Oh + so you're down there? And I'm on + ehm the fifth row + on 
the first box
In this example it would appear that the players have different 
conceptions of the ordering of the term "row". For example, player B 
appears to order the rows from bottom to top, while interpreting 
player A’s position, yet describes their own position ordering rows 
from top to bottom. However, this was tacitly rectified with player 
B's subsequent consistent ordering of the rows from top to bottom.
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The following excerpts of dialogue illustrate another example of 
misunderstanding and how this was cleared up. Player A and Player B 
are located at the positions indicated in Figure 8.2:
PAIR Q 10 years old 
A Where are you?
B Ehm + know where the + first line?
A The first line, yeh 
B Ehm + three up 
A Three up?
B Aye
A Look you mean the first two squares?
B Yeh the first two squares
In this example, Player B is referring to the right-hand full vertical 
alignment of nodes as a "line", whereas Player A uses explicit
negotiation to define the first "line" as the first top horizontal
alignment of nodes with the two squares on it. Yet when player A 
queries this description and asks if the first top horizontal
alignment of nodes with the two squares is the "line" in question, 
player B agrees. This ability to readily accept player A's conception 
of "line" although incongruent with Player B's own definition, tends 
to indicate a type of superficial semantic co-ordination, where player 
B accepts the statement without fully understanding it. In many
similar cases it was difficult to determine the level of semantic co­
ordination occurring between the players, and to what extent they were
genuinely co-ordinating their interpretations.
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To continue with the above example, player B then described their 
position in the same manner but explicitly defined what they meant by 
the "first line":
A Where are you + tell me?
B OK + the first line on the right
A The first line on the right? + Alright I got that
B Eh three up
A Three up?
B Aye
A But there’s no three up
At this point Player A is referring to the furthest right line with 
the one square sticking out, while Player B is referring to the next 
vertical line. The description continues:
B No you know the first line?
A Yeh + the one with two squares (now referring to the top, first
horizontal alignment of nodes)
B The one with only one square (furthest right box sticking out)
A The one with only one square?
B Aye in it + then the line after that?
A Yeh right 
B On the third one
A The third one
At this point both players appear to understand the descriptive scheme 
and have a mutually shared conception of the term "line", and so
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perhaps we now have true semantic co-ordination occurring between this 
pair of subjects. Thus their shared knowledge of what a "line” refers 
to has developed into mutual knowledge where A knows B's conception of 
the term "line”, and B knows that A knows their conception of the term 
"line" and so on.
Thus although children demonstrate convergence on the names of similar 
expressions to use, it was not clear whether semantic co-ordination 
was occurring as regularly between pairs. The three groups produced 
statistical evidence of co-ordination of descriptive schemes, yet in 
some cases it was doubtful whether the 8-year-olds in particular, were 
co-ordinating on the meaning of expressions and understanding each 
others descriptions. For example, they often accepted partial and 
very inadequate information and were most concerned with whose turn it 
was to move rather than their partner's position on the maze (see 
examples on p174)« It was possible that they were co-ordinating on 
the form of expressions at a superficial level, where the listeners 
were very passive, failed to monitor content and ask relevant 
questions, and accepted vague descriptions, since no objective scoring 
protocol procedure was required on their part. For examples
PAIR 3 8 years old
B Right + i'm on your left + I'm on my left-hand-side 
A Right
B Two away from ehm the black screen OK?
A OK
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PAIR 4 8 veaP3 old
A I’m over at the right one
B The right one + aha + found it + you're over on the right
B I'm over on the left one 
A I can't see you
B I'm in the left one + over there + left top 
A Where are you?
B I'm in + in the + left + I'm in the left ehm middle space 
A Middle?
B Uhu
PAIR 6 8 years old
A I am about + the second line 
B Second line?
A No the + yeh the second line
A What line are you on?
B About number three
A 1 2  3 shall I press down or up or sideways or left or right?
On the other hand true descriptive scheme co-ordination appeared to be 
occurring when the listener actively participated in the description 
by evaluating the contents of the message, asking relevant questions, 
and providing feedback in such ways that illustrated their 
understanding of the maze conception (see example on p303). Using a 
task based game, Brown (1985) found differences in the communicative
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styles of good and poor communicators due to the interaction between 
pairs, where success depended M  fche act±ve involvement t0 note
inconsistencies and act upon them, while failure to monitor content 
and ask appropriate questions resulted in poor performance. However, 
in the computer maze-game this distinction between superficial and 
true descriptive scheme co-ordination is difficult to establish 
objectively so more detailed investigations were not carried out.
The developmental review in Chapter 2 focused on how the child may 
develop such a shared meaning system, and the necessary skills to cope 
with communication in dialogue - whether through innate abilities, or 
due to early pre-linguistic experiences. This section emphasised the 
importance of parents for this development, which takes place within 
communicative experiences in the cultural environment, as well as the 
underlying influence of hereditary factors which play a more obscure 
role. The early developmental research generally concluded that 
young children demonstrate many problems while interacting, shown to 
improve over the school years. Piaget's (1926, 1955) egocentrism
principle was one of the earliest and best known explanations for this 
failure, which blamed the child's inability to adopt a listener's 
perspective. However, the research conducted in this thesis concluded 
that this was not the case with the sample used. Young children 
proved to be fairly efficient communicators, where all three age 
groups were able to co-ordinate their language and interact to 
describe points on a complex computer maze. For example, all of the 
base-line games were successfully solved, and more than half of the 
more difficult monster games were completed by all age groups.
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The experimental results from the computer maze-game were also 
incongruent with those of Krauss and Weinheimer (1964, 1966), and
Anderson and Garrod (1987), in terms of a progressive reduction in 
description length in future use of a term. Krauss and Weinheimer 
concluded that interactors negotiate and develop private two-person 
idiosyncratic codes during communication where they exclusively share 
the specific meaning of the reference. Furthermore, they suggested 
that children may be poor communicators of reference because they are 
incapable of this co-operation. However, this thesis produced 
evidence that children were able to negotiate a shared conception and 
set of interpretations for the expressions they were using within 
particular dialogues. Even the 8-year-olds negotiated idiosyncratic 
codes to describe maze locations. Yet the length of maze descriptions 
(in terms of the number of words), did not reduce over the games. For 
example, game type did not affect the length of descriptions, and 
subjects were not producing more efficient and economic codes across 
game, at least not in terms of description length. Age appeared to be 
the only significant factor affecting the length of the descriptions.
Others such as Asher and Oden (1976) proposed that children produce 
uninformative reference because they ignore the nonreferents and so 
produce ambiguous descriptions. Descriptions generated from the 
computer maze-game and P&P study were generally ambiguous, yet this 
did not appear to be so much of a problem, and subjects accepted a 
high number of ambiguous descriptions without querying them. Infact 
the youngest age group produced more ambiguous descriptions than the 
two older groups, yet located just as many points, proving themselves
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to be exceptionally skilful at locating points from ambiguous 
descriptions. It was argued that this may be due to their limited set 
of possible alternatives for the location of the point, so that they 
have less chance of choosing the wrong point. On the whole it 
appeared that only very ambiguous descriptions were unsuccessfully
located. In this respect subjects may be relying on salience as
Schelling and Lewis claimed, since although many descriptions were
ambiguous, their partner chose the most salient meaning from the set 
of alternatives which often proved correct. This analysis was 
impossible with the computer maze-game since listeners were not 
requested to physically locate a position from their partner's 
description.
Other sets of studies produced evidence that young children were able 
to communicate referentially with a listener if the tasks were simple, 
and the child was aware of the skills to use, and possessed the
necessary lexicon to express their intentions. Further evidence from 
the literature review concluded clear age divisions in children's 
ability to evaluate and monitor the contents of information (Markman, 
1977). So from this developmental section it was concluded that 
children either fail to monitor messages, or monitor but fail to note 
inadequacies, or note inadequacies but fail to act upon them unless 
prompted by an adult. The maze-game data produced many examples of 
the younger children failing to monitor due to task involvement (see 
examples on ^ >/7|/l)f as well as their apparent lack of awareness of what 
constitutes an informative description (see examples on p305). For 
instance, they often seemed to request maze locations from their 
partner only because they had grasped this from the rules of the game,
yet accepted some weak and partial information.
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Deutsch and Pechman (1982) found that social interaction alleviated 
many communication deficits and improved performance and referential 
communication, which was also shown to be beneficial in the maze-game. 
The use of feedback in the way of queries, interruptions, 
clarifications, and so on, greatly improved and developed the 
descriptions in many cases (see example on p303), since interaction 
led to an increased chance of more information with the possibility of 
success. Yet it proved impossible to classify the adequacy of a 
response on the computer maze-game since one was never completely sure 
whether this indicated greater semantic co-ordination since subjects 
were not dealing with specific objects from a limited spatial array. 
Furthermore, since the main focus of this thesis fell on descriptive 
scheme co-ordination, time did not permit a detailed analysis and 
classification of quality of response.
In the computer maze-game several efficiency measures were employed on 
the children's data to investigate problem solving ability across age 
and game, concentrating on a non-linguistic measure of the rate of 
moving, and a linguistic measure of the mean number of utterances by 
both players between successive moves. These efficiency measures were 
based on those of Garrod and Anderson (1987) from adults' performance 
on the computer maze-game. For all games the only significant 
difference among the child subjects was on the mean number of 
utterances between moves where the older children were saying more 
between moves than the younger ones, which tends to indicate that 
speech focusing on the problem increases with age. From a detailed 
analysis of the actual performances, the younger subjects appeared to 
be far more excited in relation to the monster and so moved quickly to
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avoid its path regardless of their goal position. In this way they 
tended to plan less between moves. The two older groups appeared to 
have a better conception of the rules of the game and so attempted to 
avoid the monster, while focusing on the task of reaching their goal, 
therefore more detailed planning and co-operation was required between 
moves, which was reflected in the dialogue.
Using a task oriented game A. H. Anderson (1988) found that more 
difficult tasks produced greater communication from subjects. Yet in 
the more difficult monster games in the computer maze-game this did 
not appear to be the case. For example, there were no significant 
differences in the number of descriptions produced across game, nor of 
the number of words in descriptions across game. The only significant 
difference was in the number of descriptions generated across age, 
with more descriptions generated in the older children, which were 
more economic and efficient in terms of word length. When 
successfully solved, and failed, monster games were compared the only 
significant result was the rate of moving which was higher for 
successful than failed monster games for all age groups.
The 1332 descriptions generated from the children's games were then 
investigated in terms of their semantic contents. Results were in 
accordance with Garrod and Anderson (1987), since children used fairly 
consistent schemes to describe points on the maze spatial array. For 
all the age groups of children a content analysis revealed a line and 
path type category to be most predominant, with figural and a 
simplified version of a co-ordinate scheme being less popular. There 
was also a preference for figural and co-ordinate type descriptions
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across age. Whereas the younger subjects preferred figural to co­
ordinate descriptions, the two older groups preferred co-ordinate to 
figural type.
While Garrod and Anderson noticed continuous improvement in co­
ordination of descriptive schemes from gamel to game2 in their adult 
data, there was no evidence of continuous improvement in the 
children's dialogues. However, on the number of games where subject 
pairs had an absolute difference in ranks score of 0, all groups of 
children increased co-ordination from gamel to game2, but not game2 to 
game3. The initial increase in co-ordination may demonstrate early 
entrainment and convergence onto a description scheme, while the 
result from game2 to game3 (ie. no increase in co-ordination) may 
reflect some discrepancy in partner's schemes, where one partner 
changes to a more efficient scheme while the other fails to 
incorporate the change. Garrod and Anderson also found that most 
adults changed scheme as a pair, therefore they were not changing to a 
scheme used by the other but both changing together to a new scheme. 
In comparison the children in the computer maze-game were not doing 
this. One member of the pair generally changed to suit the other, 
where it appeared to depend on who dominated. Thus they shift in 
order to merge with their partner's scheme. Although it would have 
been interesting to look at this aspect of dominance in more detail, 
it proved rather difficult to define since in some cases there was a 
dominant partner who persistently asked the other for their location 
on the maze while avoiding description themselves, yet the describer 
was the dominant one who was defining the descriptive scheme to use. 
Thus general dominance, and descriptive scheme dominance, would
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firstly have to be defined. In other cases of explicit negotiation of 
schemes (see example on p264/5) one partner was clearly determining 
the descriptive scheme used, yet this type of negotiation was quite 
uncommon compared to implicit negotiation. Thus a definition of 
dominance required a more subtle and specific analysis which did not 
fall within the scope of the present research. Indeed many other 
potential investigations fell outwith the range of the thesis, such as 
hew descriptions evolved over time and move number, the quality of 
response from the listener, general overall planning techniques, meta 
comments, pauses, question and answer sequences, and so forth.
The type of task based approach used in the thesis emphasised the 
interactional possibilities of the exchange, where communicators 
negotiated certain solutions, such as reference, over a whole series 
of interactional turns. Subject pairs appeared to use the interaction 
to produce greater understanding of descriptive schemes over sections 
of dialogue. This process mirrors the way that parents and elders 
take advantage of the interaction to increase communicative success 
with the developing child and maintain the conversation. For example, 
word meaning develops gradually in the young child through precedence 
of the parents' use of the term, and from the interaction surrounding 
the use of the word. Yet earlier studies generally investigated the 
development of word meaning through detailed analysis of a single 
young child. The type of task based approach outlined in this thesis 
offers a more realistic and informative picture of the child's 
communication skills over a longer time period, since there is the 
opportunity for free interaction, similar to real life encounters. 
Through the computer maze-game structure we can observe how terms are
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introduced into the conversation, and how local meaning gradually 
develops, such that both players come to use specific terms to refer 
to the same concept. Indeed this process of word meaning is not 
confined to early childhood but continually occurring throughout our 
everyday life where we encounter new words, and tacitly negotiate 
their meaning through precedence and the interactional opportunities 
in the conversation.
These findings from the computer maze-game have implications far 
beyond the task employed, and have broad applications for the 
development of meaning on the whole, and indeed any process that 
involves the establishment of a semantic system within a particular 
context. For instance, since all of the age groups of children 
demonstrated strong evidence for general convergence on a similar 
description scheme, this would tend to indicate that poor 
communication may not be due to co-ordination of meaning. It was 
found that children of 8, 10, and 12 years old, were able to engage in 
semantic negotiation, and co-ordinate on the form and meaning of 
expressions in certain occasions of use. To this extent, they were 
inferring meaning from the interaction to co-ordinate their 
interpretations with others, rather than depending on the conceptual 
contents of the words alone. Thus social interaction with others, and 
the use of social-pragmatic factors, play a critical role in 
establishing a shared meaning system. This would tend to suggest that 
social-pragmatic factors are essential to a theory of meaning and 
should be considered in relation to the development of interactional 
skills.
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Surprisingly this research did not produce any main developmental 
effects over a period from 8 to 12 years old. Recent work by 
Anderson, Clark, and Mullin (1989), produced evidence that skill has 
important effects on communicative performance rather than age alone. 
In the studies reported in this thesis most of the analyses used the 
age of the subjects, and the game, as the main variables of 
investigation. Although the factor of age produced significant 
differences across several of the maze-game analyses (such as the 
length of descriptions, and the number of descriptions generated, and 
in the P&P study on the ambiguity of descriptions, and subjects' 
preference for certain schemes), there were very few differences found 
across games, apart from some indication of increased co-ordination 
between gamel and game2. There also appeared to be a selection of 
good and poor communicators from each age group, thus perhaps IQ, and 
partner variables, are more important for successful reference than 
simply age alone. It may have been interesting to analyse each
subject's performance in terms of skill and compare top and bottom 
performers from all age groups. Yet the studies reported in this
thesis were not devised with this in mind, and it was not clear what 
constituted a 'good' or 'poor' performance on the maze-game. For
example, were the best measures of success the time taken to reach the 
goal, the number of moves used and penalties incurred, or the planning 
structure and level of descriptive scheme co-ordination? In any
future studies some independent intelligence score and objective 
performance measure may be more useful and necessary to produce more 
informative results which reflect communicative performance.
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This research demonstrated that some of the 8-year-olds coped as well 
as the older children on many of the aspects investigated. This might 
suggest that children are not improving and developing over this age 
span on the measures discussed - that is on the skills involved in 
referential communication, and the ability to co-ordinate their 
language and produce joint descriptive schemes. Perhaps this 
indicates that reference does not pose a real problem in everyday 
interactions, unless one has to specifically identify some object from 
a detailed array, such as the earlier referential communication tasks 
involved. Shared knowledge may be an important aid for this process 
which is constantly available and enables an idea of meaning even 
before the interaction occurs. Another reason for the lack of 
developmental findings may be that the skills investigated in the 
thesis are perhaps well established by 8 years old. There is much 
evidence for the presence of a real basic communication skill from 
early childhood, although the nature and precision of the 
communication remains debatable. In this case efforts should be 
directed at a wider age span to incorporate a younger age group of 
children.
Finally, the three age groups of children investigated appeared quite
similar in terms of the co-ordination onto similar description
schemes. For example, all groups demonstrated co-ordination of
description schemes, with some improvements in co-ordination over the
games. However, it appeared that, with the youngest children at
least, they shared common expressions without fully understanding
them. For example, although all children were co-ordinating their
descriptive schemes, it was not clear whether the youngest age group
were actually co-ordinating on the meaning of the expressions.
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However, with this one proviso, the results indicated that 
establishing meaning is essentially an interactive process, and that 
children were able to infer the meaning of terms from the interaction 
in specific contexts of use. Whether the youngest age group fully 
understood or not, they still produced evidence of co-ordination of 
terms. This tends to suggest that this basic process of co-ordination 
is a central component of all human interactional dialogue.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX- A; Mazes Used in the Computer Maze-Game
Maze 1 Row and Column Type
Maze 2 Horizontal Row Type
Maz e 3 Horizontal Row Type
Maze 4 Horizontal Row Type
Maze 5 Vertical Colum n Type
Maze 6 Figural Type
Maz e 7 Figural Type
Maz e 8 Mixed Type
338
r *t
r *-l
t - i
J
r l f  L
i _  j
r
.r n. r i r  n .
r n
HAZE I ROW AND COLUHN TVPE
339
»\
1 I L i r
_  J  I l L  j  L  j  i r
j L
J u _r
J L
1_ J L
i_ _ _ r  n _ _ _ r  n _ _ _ r  n _ _ _ r  n _ _ _ i
J L  J  L J L J L _l L
L, _[ L J l  _r 1
j- i r n  r i r n r
1 I L J  L1_ J  L
n  r  n  i 1 i 1 r  ~i r
i i i i i i i_
MAZE 2 HORIZONTAL ROW TVPE
340
r n
L. J
r
L, j
l  j
_r
MAZE 3 HORIZONTAL ROW TVPE
341
" L  _ T
r 1 h
L ,  J
_J L
1 _  J -
I. _T
j— L
J— L J  u J
■u j
i ,  J  L
r  l
i, _r
J------ 1 r
1____I--- L
J 1
L. J
r t.
j— L
L. J
f
U  J
r n  r  n . r l
j L j L
MAZE 4  HORIZONTAL ROW TVPE
342
i r 1 1' "i r
L, J  L, J L rJ L, j L J  L J
■ U  _ T L  _T T_ J
r i
i_  J
.r 4.
i_ _r L  j
i. j
_r
L  j
r l
r l
MAZE 5 VERTICAL COLUMN TYPE
343
L  - J
L J"
L J'
j— L
n__ r  n___ r
_i---1____i---L
MAZE 6 FIGURAL TYPE
344
L,  J L J
r -  n
U  j ■L J L _T T- J
—I r— r n _. i -------
J _ _ _ i 1
J L
t r
L J L J — I
MAZE 7 FIGURAL TVPE
345
L I-  1-  I- 1 1- 1 1—
Lii-J L  J  " ' L  J  L  J L jr l  J
1 1— — I r i i---
.. ... J 1 _ J  l .. 1_
MAZE 8 MIXED TVPE
346
APPENDIX  Bj Example of a Haze Computer Printout
HAIELGGt L O G A C 6 C  
MAZE USED: riAZEC4
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1 coo:07: A  m o v e d  DOUN FROM 4 TO Y (GATE STA^E 1)
coo:213 B  MOVED LEFT FROM 5 TO C (GATE STATE.!)
2 C00:23: A  MOVED RIGHT FROM Y TO Z (GATE STATE 1)
COO:34] M  MOVED RIGHT FROM M TO N
201:032 b  moved up from c to i (gate state n
3 201J072 A  MOVED LEFT FROM I TO Y (GATE STATE 1)
201t202 B  MOVED UP FROM I TO 0 (GATE STATE 1)
C0i:2?: Mi MOVED UP FROM N TO T
4 C0i;353 A  MOVED DOWN FROM Y TO S (GATE STATE 2)
201:332 b  bounced right from o to o (gate state :
3 PENALTIES INC UR R ED . CURRENT TOTAL =
3 C0 2 : 0 4 I A  MOVED DOUN FROM S TO M (GATE STATE 2)
202:092 H  MOVED RIGHT FROM T TO U
202:213 B  BOUNCED RIGHT FROM C T O  G (GATE STATE ( 
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL =
6 202:342 A  BOUNCED DOUN FROM M TO M (GATE STATE 2
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL =
2 021 442 ©  BOUNCED DOUN FROM G TO C (GATE STATE 2
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL = 
202: 493 «  BOUNCED DOWN. FROM U TO L
7 C02:392 A  MOVED UP FROM M TO 3 (GATE STATE 2)
C03:072 B MOVED RIGHT FROM 0 TO P (GATE STATE 1)
8 C03:i?2 A  BOUNCEL DOUN FROM S. TO S (GATE STATE 1
2 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL - 
C 03*.24 2 M  MOVED DOUN FROM U TO C
203:392 S  MOVED UP FROM P TO V (GATE STATE 1)
9 C031452 A  BOUNCED UP FROM S TO S (GATE STATE 1)
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL = 
204:222 B  BOUNCED RIGHT FROM V TO V (GATE STATE •
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL = 
204:282 fi MOVED RIGHT FROM 0 TC P
10 204:372 A  BOUNCED DOUN FROM S TO S (GATE STATE 1
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL = 
204:432 B  BOUNCED RIGHT FROM V TO V (GATE STATE
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL =
11 2041563 A  BOUNCED DOUN FROM S TC S (GATE STATE 1 
3 PENALTIES INCURRED. CURRENT TOTAL = 
205:012 tt MOVED UP FROM P TO V
GAME ENDS HERE
(CHASING PLAYER A)
(CHASING PLAYER B )
1)
o
(CHASING PLAYER B)
2)
6
)
9
!
12
(CHASING PLAYER B )
13
(CHASING PLAYER £)
IS 
[ )
21
(CHASING PLAYER B)
>
24
1 )
27
)
30
(CHASING PLAYER B)
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APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SUCCESS OR FAILED GAME 
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME 1, 2, AND 3
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
TOTAL 26.135 125
AGE 0.016 2 0 .008 0 .0568 NS
ERROR AGE 5.452 39
GAME 5.73 2 2 .8 6 5 15 .138 0
AGEXGAME 0.174 4 0 .044 0.231 NS
ERROR AXB 14.762 78 0 .189
TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE RATE OF MOVING 
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME 1 AND GAME 2
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
TOTAL 80.589 83
AGE 2.41 2 1.2 0 .8 7 7 NS
ERROR AGE 53.467 39 1.37
GAME 0.36 1 0 .36 0 .6 NS
AGEXGAME 0.975 2 0 .487  0.81 NS
ERROR AXB 23.38 39 0 .5 9 9  0.81 NS
TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE MEAN NO. UTTERANCES 
BETWEEN MOVES
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME 1 AND GAME 2
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
TOTAL 883 .75 83
AGE 66.03 2 33.01 2 .67 0 .078
ERROR AGE 4 81 .398 39 12.34
GAME 0.002 1 0 .002 0 .0002 NS
AGEXGAME 13.926 2 6 .96 0 .84 NS
ERROR AXB 322.39 39 8 .26
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TABLE 4: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE RATE 
OF MOVING IN MONSTER GAMES AND ACROSS AGE 
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = SUCCESSFUL OR FAILED MONSTER GAME
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
TOTAL 67.98 83
AGE 2.75 2 1.37 1.029 0 .3678
ERROR AGE 52.12 39 1.336
GAME 0.92 1 0 .92 3 .073 0 .0822
AGEXGAME 0.486 2 0 .243 0 .809 NS
ERROR AXB 11.7 39 0 .30
TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE MEAN NO. UTTERANCES 
BETWEEN MOVES ACROSS AGE AND MONSTER GAMES
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = SUCCESSFUL OR FAILED MONSTER GAME
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
TOTAL 43 1 .27 83
AGE 13.63 2 6 .815 1.052 0 .359
ERROR AGE 252 .62 39 6 .477
GAME 0.088 1 0 .0887 0 .024 NS
AGEXGAME 21.247 2 10.623 2 .884 0 .0647
ERROR AXB 143.678 39 3 .684
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE NO. OF DESCRIPTIONS
GENERATED PER GAME BY BOTH PLAYERS 
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS
FACTOR B = GAME 1 AND GAME 2
SOURCE S S  DF MS F P
TOTAL 7 3 74 .036  83
AGE 1243 .143  2 6 2 1 .5 7  6 .7 5  0 .00313
ERROR AGE 3589 .393  39 92 .04
GAME 20 .012  1 2 0 .0 1 2  0 .3 2 7  NS
AGEXGAME 132 .095  2 66 .048  1 .078 0 .3509
ERROR AXB 2389 .393  39 61 .267
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TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE MEAN NUMBER 
OF DESCRIPTIONS PER MOVE, PER SUBJECT PAIR
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME 1 AND GAME 2
SOURCE S S  DF MS F P
TOTAL 3 9 .342  83
AGE 3 .578  2 1 .789 3 .117  0 .0 5 2 5
ERROR AGE 22 .379  39 0 .5738
GAME 0 .529  1 0 .5299  1.76 0 .188
AGEXGAME 1.115 2 0 .5578  1 .852  0 .1672
ERROR AXB 11.739 39 0.301
TABLE 8
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE NO. OF WORDS PER 
DESCRIPTION ACROSS AGE AND MONSTER GAME
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B -  MONSTER GAMES AND GAME 1
SOURCE S S  DF MS F P 
TOTAL 4 8 8 6 .7 1 6  83
AGE 5 4 8 .015  2 2 7 4 .008  3 .487  0 .0 3 7 9 5
ERROR AGE 3064.671 39  78 .58
GAME 1.83 1 1.83 0 .058  NS
AGEXGAME 3 6 .322  2 18.161 0 .573  NS
ERROR AXB 1235 .878  39 31 .689
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TABLE 9
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIONS 
PER MOVE FOR EACH DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME1, AND THE AVERAGE OF GAME 2 & 3
FACTOR C = THE DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORY
SOURCE S S DF MS F P
AGE .794 2 .397 13.409 .0000
ERROR AGE 2.398 81 .030
GAME .17 1 .017 .683 .4111
AGEXGAME .054 2 .027 1.06 .3512
ERROR AXB 2.075 81 .026
DESCR. 2 .612 3 .871 21 .78 .0000
AGEXDESCR. .426 6 .071 1 .775 .1049
ERROR AXDES . 9 .716 243 .04
GAMEXDESCR. .075 3 .025 1 .157 .327
A B C .222 6 .037 1.714 .118
ERROR A B C 5.235 243 .022
TABLE 10
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON 'WITHIN' AND 'BETWEEN' 
DIALOGUE CO-ORDINATION ACROSS AGE AND OVER 
GAME
FACTOR A = THE THREE AGE GROUPS OF SUBJECTS 
FACTOR B = GAME1, GAME2, AND GAME3
FACTOR C = 'WITHIN' AND 'BETWEEN' DIALOGUE CO-ORD. 
SOURCE S S  DF MS F P
TOTAL 671.021 251
AGE 5.664 2
ERROR AGE 103.068 39
GAME 1.969 2
AGEXGAME 13.99 4
ERROR AXB 133.101 78
'W' & 'B' 190 .374 1
AGE X C 6.776 2
ERROR AXC 87.811 39
GAME X C 3.167 2
A B C 5.096 4
ERROR A B C 120.006 78
2 .8 3 2  1 .0716  0 .3532
0 .985  
3 .498  
1 .706  
190 .374  
3 .388  
2 .252  
1.583  
1.274  
1.5385
0 .577
2 .049
NS
0 .0928
8 4 .5 5  0 .00000
1 .505 0 .2 3 2 5 2
1.029 0 .36343  
0 .8 2 8  NS
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